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


—OF—
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THE REAL PRESENCE
OF THE
BODY AND BLOOD OF OUR LORD
JESUS CHRIST

IN THE
BLESSED EUCHARIST,

PROVED FROM SCRIPTURE.

IN EIGHT LECTURES,
DELIVERED IN THE ENGLISH COLLEGE, ROME,

BY
CARDINAL WISEMAN.

From the last London Edition.

NEW YORK:
P. O'SHEA, PUBLISHER,
27 BARCLAY STREET.

PREFACE

TO THE FIRST EDITION.

THE Lectures here presented to the public, are simply what the title-page describes them, a portion of the theological course several times delivered in the English College at Rome. When the Author came over to this country, he had not the remotest idea that he should feel called upon to publish them; and he brought the manuscript with him, solely for the purpose of submitting it to the judgment of a few friends, better versed, perhaps, than he could be, in the controversial literature of this country, so as to satisfy himself of the propriety of publishing it at some distant period. But when he found it necessary to give a more popular and compendious exposition of the Catholic arguments for the Real Presence, in his "Lectures on the Principal Doctrines and Practices of the Catholic Church," he felt that ample justice could not be done to the line of argument which he had pursued without the publication of these Lectures, in which it is more fully developed, and justified by proofs. Under this impression, he has not hesitated to send his manuscript to press.

The method pursued in these Lectures, and the principles on which they are conducted, are so amply detailed in the introductory Lecture, that any remarks upon them in this Preface would be superfluous. Many will, perhaps, be

startled at the sight of an octavo devoted to the Scriptural Proofs of our doctrine, which, in general, occupy but a few pages of our controversial works; and a prejudice will be naturally excited, that the theme has been swelled to so unusual a bulk by digressive disquisition, or by matter of very secondary importance. If such an impression be produced, the writer has no resource, but to throw himself on the justice and candor of his readers, and entreat them to peruse, before they thus condemn. He flatters himself, that he will not be found, on perusal, to have gone out of the question, or overloaded it with extraneous matter. His studies have, perhaps, led him into a different view of the arguments from what is popularly taken, and he may be found to have sought illustrations from sources not commonly consulted; but he will leave it to his reader to determine, whether he has thereby weakened the cause which he has undertaken.

To him, this judgment cannot be a matter of indifference. He has, within a few months, been unexpectedly led to submit to the public eye, two of the courses of Lectures prepared and delivered by him, for the improvement of those whose theological education has been confided to his care; and he feels that he has thus, however unintentionally, appealed to the public, whether he have discharged his duty in their regard. The "Lectures on the Connection between Science and Revealed Religion," will explain the views which he has endeavored to inculcate, on the proper extent of ecclesiastical education; the present course will exhibit the system followed in every branch of controversial theology. What is done in these Lectures for the doctrine of the Eucharist, has been done no less for the Christian Evidences, the authority of the Church, Penance, the Mass, and every other part of modern controversy. On the study of Scripture, and the

ience of its introduction, more care has been bestowed ; and from the reception with which the present treatise may meet, the Author will form an estimate of how far he may be justified in troubling the public, further, with his academical instructions.

He will be perfectly satisfied, however, if he shall appear not to have used less diligence and application than becoms his office, in the promoting of sound theological learning, among those whom it has been his duty to instruct. The fate of this work becomes to him a matter of deeper interest, from its connection with any opinion which may thence be formed of the value of an establishment, which many considerations should render dear to the English Catholics. As the lineal representative of the Anglo-Saxon school founded by King Ina, as the substitute for the English Hospital, which once received the wearied pilgrim that went to kiss the threshold of the Apostles, as the only remnant of Catholic Church property which has been left in our hands, from its wreck at the Reformation, as a seminary which has sent forth many martyrs into the vineyard of this country,* the College of Rome has a strong claim upon the sympathies of all who bless Providence for its watchfulness over God's holy religion amongst us.

If Bellarmine, as he assures us in his preface, wrote his magnificent "Controversies" chiefly for the instruction of the students in that establishment, they who actually preside over it must surely feel it their duty to contribute their small abilities, to nourish in its members a spirit of application, and a taste for solid learning. For this purpose, it indeed enjoyed, when restored under the auspices of Pius VII.

* St. Philip Neri, who lived nearly opposite the house, used to salute the students as they passed his door, in the words of the hymn for the Holy Innocents : " *Salvete flores martyrum.*"

of sacred memory, an advantage which it may never again possess, in him whom the wisdom of the Vicars-Apostolic chose for its first superior. They who had the happiness to be the pupils, and consequently the friends, of the late venerable Dr. Gradwell, will ever love to dwell, not only on his unaffected piety, his profuse charity, and his unalterable kindness to all around him, but likewise on his varied and solid learning in every branch of sacred literature, on the warm encouragement which he ever gave to application, and the sincere delight which he felt and expressed at the academical success of any under his charge. His talents and virtues were not of that dazzling character which flash upon the public eye; but they possessed the more genial and more enviable property, of warming and cheering all that approached.

The taste and principles which he introduced and encouraged, have been carefully preserved and nourished, since the duty of supporting them has passed into less able hands; and the following sheets, it is hoped, will attest some diligence and assiduity, at least, in the prosecution of his views

LONDON,
On the Assumption of our Lady, 1836.

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LECTURES
ON
THE REAL PRESENCE.

SECTION I.

EXAMINATION OF THE SIXTH CHAPTER OF
ST. JOHN'S GOSPEL.



SIXTH CHAPTER OF ST. JOHN,

FROM VERSE 26 TO ITS CONCLUSION.

GREEK TEXT.

26. Ἀπεκρίθη αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς καὶ εἶπεν· Ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν· Ζητεῖτέ με, οὐχ ὅτι εἶδετε σημεῖα, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐφάγετε ἐκ τῶν ἄρτων, καὶ ἐχορτάσθη. ε.

27. Ἐργάζεσθε μὴ τὴν βρωσιν τὴν ἀπολυμένην, ἀλλὰ τὴν βρωσιν τὴν μένουσαν εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον, ἣν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὑμῖν ἐδώκει· τοῦτον γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ ἐσφράγισεν, ὁ Θεός.

28. Εἶπον οὖν πρὸς αὐτόν· Τί ποιῶμεν, ἵνα ἐργαζώμεθα τὰ ἔργα τοῦ Θεοῦ; Ἀπεκρίθη ὁ Ἰησοῦς καὶ εἶπεν αὐτοῖς·

29. Τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ἔργον τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἵνα πιστεύητε ἰς ἃν ἀπέστειλεν ἐκεῖνος.

30. Εἶπον οὖν αὐτῷ· Τί οὖν ποιῶς σου σημεῖον, ἵνα ἴδωμεν καὶ πιστεῦσωμέν σοι; τί ἐργάζῃ;

VULGATE.

26. Respondit eis Jesus, et dixit: Amen, amen dico vobis: quæritis me, non quia vidistis signa, sed quia manducastis ex panibus et saturati estis.

27. Operamini non cibum qui perit, sed qui permanet in vitam æternam, quem Filius hominis dabit vobis. Hunc enim Pater signavit Deus.

28. Dixerunt ergo ad eum: Quid faciemus ut operemur opera Dei?

29. Respondit Jesus, et dixit eis: Hoc est opus Dei, ut credatis in eum quem misit ille.

30. Dixerunt ergo ei: Quid ergo tu facis signum ut videamus, et credamus tibi? quid operaris?

VERSION AUTHORIZED BY THE ENGLISH PROTESTANT CHURCH.

26. Jesus answered them and said, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Ye seek me, not because ye saw the miracles, but because ye did eat of the loaves, and were filled.

27. Labour not for the meat which perisheth, but for that meat which endureth unto everlasting life, which the Son of Man shall give unto you: for him hath God the Father sealed.

28. Then said they unto him, What shall we do, that we might work the works of God?

29. Jesus answered and said unto them, This is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom he hath sent.

30. They said therefore unto him, What sign shewest thou then, that we may see, and believe thee? what dost thou work?

31. Οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν τὸ μάννα ἔφαγον ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ, καθὼς ἐστι γεγραμμένον· Ἄρτον ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς φαγεῖν.

32. Εἶπεν οὖν αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς· Ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, οὐ Μωϋσῆς δέδωκεν ὑμῖν τὸν ἄρτον ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ· ἀλλ' ὁ πατήρ μου δίδωσιν ὑμῖν τὸν ἄρτον ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὸν ἀληθινόν.

33. Ὁ γὰρ ἄρτος τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστίν ὁ καταβαίνων ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, καὶ ζῶν διδούς τῷ κόσμῳ.

34. Εἶπον οὖν πρὸς αὐτόν· Κύριε, πάντοτε ὁς ἡμῖν τὸν ἄρτον τοῦτον.

35. Εἶπε δὲ αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς· Ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ ἄρτος τῆς ζωῆς· ὁ ἐρχόμενος πρὸς με, οὐ μὴ πεινάσῃ· καὶ ὁ πιστεύων εἰς ἐμὲ, οὐ μὴ διψήσῃ πώποτε.

36. Ἄλλ' εἶπον ὑμῖν, ὅτι καὶ ἐωράκατέ με, καὶ οὐ πιστεύετε.

37. Πᾶν, ὃ δίδωσι μοι ὁ πατήρ, πρὸς ἐμὲ ἵξει· καὶ τὸν ἐρχόμενον πρὸς με οὐ μὴ ἐκβάλω ἔξω.

38. Ὅτι καταβέβηκα ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, οὐχ ἵνα ποιῶ τὸ θέλημα τὸν ἐμὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πέψαντός με.

31. Patres nostri manducaverunt manna in deserto, sicut scriptum est: Panem de cœlo dedit eis manducare.

32. Dixit ergo eis Jesus: Amen, amen dico vobis: non Moyses dedit vobis panem de cœlo, sed Pater meus dat vobis panem de cœlo verum.

33. Panis enim Dei est, qui de cœlo descendit, et dat vitam mundo.

34. Dixerunt ergo ad eum: Domine, semper da nobis panem hunc.

35. Dixit autem eis Jesus: Ego sum panis vitæ: qui venit ad me, non esuriet: et qui credit in me, non sitiet unquam.

36. Sed dixi vobis, quia et vidistis me, et non creditis.

37. Omne, quod dat mihi Pater, ad me veniet: et eum, qui venit ad me, non ejiciam foras:

38. Quia descendi de cœlo, non ut faciam voluntatem meam, sed voluntatem ejus, qui misit me.

31. Our fathers did eat manna in the desert; as it is written, He gave them bread from heaven to eat.

32. Then Jesus said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Moses gave you not that bread from heaven; but my Father giveth you the true bread from heaven.

33. For the bread of God is he which cometh down from heaven, and giveth life unto the world.

34. Then said they unto him, Lord, evermore give us this bread.

35. And Jesus said unto them, I am the bread of life: he that cometh to me shall never hunger; and he that believeth on me shall never thirst.

36. But I said unto you, That ye also have seen me, and believe not.

37. All that the Father giveth me shall come to me; and him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out.

38. For I came down from heaven, not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me.

39. Τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πέμψαντός με Πατρὸς, ἵνα πᾶν, ὃ ἐδώκε μοι, μὴ ἀπολέσω ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ ἀναστήσω αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ἐσχάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ.

40. Τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πέμψαντός με, ἵνα πᾶς ὁ θεωρῶν τὸν υἱόν, καὶ πιστεύων εἰς αὐτόν, ἔχη ζωὴν αἰώνιον· καὶ ἀναστήσω αὐτόν ἐγὼ τῇ ἐσχάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ.

41. Ἐγόγγυζον οὖν οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι εἶπεν· Ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ ἄρτος ὁ καταβὰς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ·

42. Καὶ ἔλεγον· Οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν Ἰησοῦς ὁ υἱὸς Ἰωσήφ, οὗ ἡμεῖς οἶδαμεν τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὴν μητέρα; Πῶς οὖν λέγει οὗτος· ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καταβέβηκα;

43. Ἀπεκρίθη οὖν ὁ Ἰησοῦς καὶ εἶπεν αὐτοῖς· Μὴ γογγύσετε μετ' ἀλλήλων.

44. Οὐδεὶς δύναται ἔλθειν πρὸς με, εἰὰν μὴ ὁ Πατὴρ ὁ πέμψας με ἐλκύσῃ αὐτόν, καὶ ἐγὼ ἀναστήσω αὐτόν ἐν τῇ ἐσχάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ.

39. Hæc est autem voluntas ejus, qui misit me, Patris; ut omne, quod dedit mihi, non perdam ex eo, sed resuscitem illud in novissimo die.

40. Hæc est autem voluntas Patris mei, qui misit me: ut omnis, qui vidit Filium, et credit in cum, habeat vitam æternam, et ego resuscitabo eum in novissimo die.

41. Murmurabant ergo Judæi de illo, quia dixisset: Ego sum panis vivus, qui de cælo descendi.

42. Et dicebant: Nonne hic est Jesus filius Joseph, cujus nos novimus patrem et matrem? Quomodo ergo dicit hic: Quia de cælo descendi?

43. Respondit ergo Jesus, et dixit eis: Nolite murmurare in invicem.

44. Nemo potest venire ad me, nisi Pater, qui misit me, traxerit eum: et ego resuscitabo eum in novissimo die.

39. And this is the Father's will which hath sent me, that of all which he hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day.

40. And this is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life: and I will raise him up at the last day.

41. The Jews then murmured at him, because he said, I am the bread which came down from heaven.

42. And they said, Is not this Jesus, the son of Joseph, whose father and mother we know? how is it then that he saith, I came down from heaven?

43. Jesus therefore answered and said unto them, Murmur not among yourselves.

44. No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him: and I will raise him up at the last day.

45. Ἔστι γεγραμμένον ἐν τοῖς προφήταις· Καὶ ἔσονται πάντες διδακτοὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ. Πᾶς οὖν ὁ ἀκούσας παρὰ τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ μαθὼν, ἔρχεται πρὸς με.
46. Οὐχ ὅτι τὸν Πατέρα τις εἶδρακεν· εἰ μὴ ὁ ὢν παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ, οὗτος εἶδρακε τὸν Πατέρα.
47. Ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ὁ πιστεύων εἰς ἐμέ, ἔχει ζωὴν αἰώνιον.
48. ^a Ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ ἄρτος τῆς ζωῆς.
49. ^b Οἱ πατέρες ὑμῶν ἔφαγον τὸ μάννα ἐν τῷ ἐρήμῳ. (cf. v. 31.)
^c Καὶ ἀπέθανον.
50. ^a Οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἄρτος
^b Ὁ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καταβαίνων
^c Ἴνα τις ἐξ αὐτοῦ φάγη καὶ μὴ ἀποθάνῃ.
51. ^a Ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ ἄρτος ὁ ζῶν,
^b Ὁ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καταβάς·
^c Ἐάν τις φάγη ἐκ τούτου τοῦ
45. Est scriptum in prophetis: Et erunt omnes docibiles Dei. Omnis, qui audivit a Patre et didicit, venit ad me.
46. Non quia Patrem vidit quisquam, nisi is, qui est a Deo, hic vidit Patrem.
47. Amen, amen dico vobis: qui credit in me, habet vitam æternam.
48. ^a Ego sum panis vitæ.
49. ^b Patres vestri manducaverunt manna in deserto. (cf. v. 31.)
^c Et mortui sunt.
50. ^a Hic est panis
^b De cælo descendens:
^c Ut si quis ex ipso manducaverit, non moriatur.
51. ^a Ego sum panis vivus,
^b Qui de cælo descendi.
- 52.* ^c Si quis manducaverit

45. It is written in the prophets, And they shall be all taught of God. Every man therefore that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father, cometh unto me.

46. Not that any man hath seen the Father, save he which is of God, he hath seen the Father.

47. Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that believeth on me hath everlasting life.

48. ^a I am the bread of life.

49. ^b Your fathers did eat manna in the wilderness, (cf. v. 31.)

^c and are dead.

50. ^a This is the bread

^b Which cometh down from heaven,

^c That a man may eat thereof, and not die.

51. ^a I am the living bread

^b Which came down from heaven;

^c If any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever:

* The Vulgate here differs in its division from the Greek, so as to have a verse more in the chapter. In the Lectures the texts are quoted according to the Vulgate numeration.

ἄρτου, ζήσεται εἰς τὸν αἰῶ-
να.

Καὶ ὁ ἄρτος δὲ, ὃν ἐγὼ δώσω, ἡ σὰρξ μου ἐστίν, ἣν ἐγὼ δώσω ὑπὲρ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ζωῆς.

52. Ἐμάχοντο οὖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι, λέγοντες· Πῶς δύναται οὗτος ἡμῖν δοῦναι τὴν σάρκα φαγεῖν;

53. Εἶπεν οὖν αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς· Ἄμην ἀμην λέγω ὑμῖν, ἐὰν μὴ φάγητε τὴν σάρκα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ πίνητε αὐτοῦ τὸ αἶμα, οὐκ ἔχετε ζωὴν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς.

54. Ὁ τρώγων μου τὴν σάρκα, καὶ πί-
νων μου τὸ αἶμα, ἔχει ζωὴν αἰώνιον· καὶ ἐγὼ ἀναστήσω αὐτὸν τῇ ἐσχάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ.

55. Ἡ γὰρ σὰρξ μου ἀληθῶς ἐστὶ βρω-
σις, καὶ τὸ αἶμά μου ἀληθῶς ἐστὶ πόσις.

56. Ὁ τρώγων μου τὴν σάρκα, καὶ πί-
νων μου τὸ αἶμα, ἐν ἐμοὶ μένει, καὶ ἐγὼ ἐν αὐτῷ.

57. Καθὼς ἀπέστειλέ με ὁ ζῶν Πατήρ, καὶ ἐγὼ ζῶ διὰ τοῦ Πατέρα. Καὶ ὁ τρώγων με, καὶ κεῖνος ζήσεται δι' ἐμέ.

ex hoc pane, vivet in æter-
num :

Et panis quem ego dabo, caro mea est pro mundi vita.

53. Litigabant ergo Judæi ad invicem, dicentes: Quomodo potest hic nobis carnem suam dare ad manducandum?

54. Dixit ergo eis Jesus: Amen, amen dico vobis: nisi manducaveritis carnem Filii hominis, et biberitis ejus sanguinem, non habebitis vitam in vobis.

55. Qui manducat meam carnem, et bibit meum sanguinem, habet vitam æternam: et ego resuscitabo eum in novissimo die.

56. Caro enim mea verè est cibus; et sanguis meus verè est potus.

57. Qui manducat meam carnem, et bibit meum sanguinem, in me manet, et ego in illo.

58. Sicut misit me vivens Pater, et ego vivo propter Patrem: et qui manducat me, et ipse vivet propter me.

And the bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world.

52. The Jews therefore strove among themselves, saying, How can this man give us *his* flesh to eat?

53. Then Jesus said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you.

54. Whoso eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last day.

55. For my flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed.

56. He that eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, dwelleth in me, and I in him.

57. As the living Father hath sent me, and I live by the Father: so he that eateth me, even he shall live by me.

58. Οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἄρτος ὃ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καταβάς· οὐ καθὼς ἔφαγον οἱ πατέρες ὑμῶν τὸ μάννα, καὶ ἀπέθανον· ὁ τρώγων τοῦτον τὸν ἄρτον, ζήσεται εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα.

59. Ταῦτα εἶπεν ἐν συναγωγῇ, διδάσκων ἐν Καπερναούμ.

60. Πολλοὶ οὖν ἀκούσαντες ἐκ τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ, εἶπον· Σκληρὸς ἐστιν οὗτος ὁ λόγος· τίς δύναται αὐτοῦ ἀκοῦειν;

61. Εἰδὼς δὲ ὃ Ἰησοῦς ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ὅτι γογγύζουσι περὶ τούτου οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ, εἶπεν αὐτοῖς·

62. Τοῦτο ὑμᾶς σκανδαλίζει; Ἐὰν οὖν θεωρῆτε τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀναβαίνοντα, ὅπου ἦν τὸ πρότερον;

63. Τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστι τὸ ζωοποιῶν, ἡ σὰρξ οὐκ ὠφελεῖ οὐδέν. Τὰ ῥήματα, ἃ ἐγὼ λαλῶ ὑμῖν, πνεῦμά ἐστι καὶ ζωὴ ἐστίν.

64. Ἄλλ' εἰσὶν ἐξ ὑμῶν τινὲς οἳ οὐ πιστεύουσιν. (Ἦδε γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὃ Ἰησοῦς, τίνες εἰσὶν οἳ μὴ πιστεύοντες, καὶ τίς ἐστιν ὃ παραδώσων αὐτόν.)

59. Hic est panis, qui de cœlo descendit. Non sicut manducaverunt patres vestri manna, et mortui sunt. Qui manducat hunc panem, viret in æternum.

60. Hæc dixit in synagoga docens in Capernaum.

61. Multi ergo audientes ex discipulis ejus, dixerunt: Durus est hic sermo, et quis potest eum audire?

62. Sciens autem Jesus apud semetipsum, quia murmurarent de hoc discipuli ejus, dixit eis: Hoc vos scandalizat?

63. Si ergo videritis Filium hominis ascendentem ubi erat prius?

64. Spiritus est, qui vivificat: caro non prodest quidquam. Verba, quæ ego locutus sum vobis, spiritus et vita sunt.

65. Sed sunt quidam ex vobis, qui non credunt. Sciebat enim ab initio Jesus qui essent non credentes, et quis traditurus esset eum.

58. This is that bread which came down from heaven; not as your fathers did eat manna, and are dead: he that eateth of this bread shall live for ever.

59. These things said he in the synagogue, as he taught in Capernaum.

60. Many therefore of his disciples, when they had heard *this*, said, This is a hard saying; who can hear it?

61. When Jesus knew in himself that his disciples murmured at it, he said unto them, Doth this offend you?

62. *What* and if ye shall see the Son of man ascend up where he was before?

63. It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing: the words that I speak unto you, *they* are spirit, and *they* are life.

64. But there are some of you that believe not. For Jesus knew from the beginning who they were that believed not, and who should betray him.

65. Καὶ ἔλεγε· Διὰ τοῦτο εἶρηκα ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐδεὶς δύναται ἐλθεῖν πρὸς με, εἰὰ μὴ ᾧ δέδομένον αὐτῷ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς μου.

66. Ἐκ τούτου πολλοὶ ἀπῆλθον τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ εἰς τὰ ὀπίσω, καὶ οὐκέτι μετ' αὐτοῦ περιεπάτουσαν.

67. Εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ἰησοῦς τοῖς δώδεκα· Μὴ καὶ ὑμεῖς θέλετε ὑπάγειν;

68. Ἀπεκρίθη οὖν αὐτῷ Σίμων Πέτρος· Κύριε, πρὸς τίνα ἀπελευσόμεθα; ῥήματα ζωῆς αἰωνίου ἔχεις·

69. Καὶ ἡμεῖς πεπιστεύκαμεν, καὶ ἐγνώκαμεν, ὅτι σὺ εἶ ὁ Χριστὸς, ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ζῶντος.

70. Ἀπεκρίθη αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς· Οὐκ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς τοὺς δώδεκα ἐξελεξάμην, καὶ ἐξ ὑμῶν εἰς διάβολός ἐστιν;

71. Ἐλεγε δὲ τὸν Ἰούδαν Σίμωνος Ἰσκαριώτην· Οὗτος γὰρ ἤμελλεν αὐτὸν παραδίδοναι, εἰς ὧν ἐκ τῶν δώδεκα.

66. Et dicebat: Propterea dixi vobis, quia nemo potest venire ad me, nisi fuerit ei datum a Patre meo.

67. Ex hoc multi discipulorum ejus abierunt retro: et jam non eum illo ambulabant.

68. Dixit ergo Jesus ad duodecim: Numquid et vos vultis abire?

69. Respondit ergo ei Simon Petrus: Domine, ad quem ibimus? verba vitæ æternæ habes.

70. Et nos credidimus, et cognovimus, quia tu es Christus Filius Dei.

71. Respondit eis Jesus: Nonne ego vos duodecim elegi: et ex vobis unus diabolus est?

72. Dicebat autem Judam Simonis Iscariotem: hic enim erat traditurus eum, cùm esset unus ex duodecim.

65. And he said, Therefore said I unto you, that no man can come unto me, except it were given unto him of my Father.

66. From that *time*, many of his disciples went back, and walked no more with him.

67. Then said Jesus unto the twelve, Will ye also go away?

68. Then Simon Peter answered him, Lord, to whom shall we go? thou hast the words of eternal life.

69. And we believe and are sure that thou art that Christ, the Son of the living God.

70. Jesus answered them, Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?

71. He spake of Judas Iscariot *the son* of Simon: for he it was that should betray him, being one of the twelve.

NOTE.—The above texts are given for facility of reference. In the Lectures, the English texts are quoted from the Douay version.



LECTURE I.

Proposition of the Catholic Belief.—Systems of other Communions.—Method of conducting the examination of the subject.—Statement of the argument drawn from our Saviour's discourse in the sixth chapter of St. John.—Proof of a transition to a new section of it, at the forty-eighth verse, from the structure of the passage.

NUMEROUS as are the differences between the Catholic and Protestant religions, we may safely assert, that not one is more frequently discussed, or more frequently made the touchstone of the two systems' respective claims, than their doctrine respecting the Sacrament of the B. Eucharist. The unity and authority of the Church, or the supremacy of the Pope, are subjects which more directly affect the grounds of separation between us, and are better calculated to reduce our many differences to one single decision; yet, we shall, I believe, find more persons brought to the true faith, by satisfying their minds with the Catholic belief respecting the B. Sacrament, than by being convinced upon any

of those subjects.* Indeed so essentially does this dogma seem to involve the truth or falsehood of the entire religion, that Transubstantiation was, until within these few years, considered the test whether one professed or rejected the entire Catholic creed. These considerations will alone sufficiently prove the necessity of seriously studying the arguments whereon doth rest the truth of our belief.

This belief is clearly defined by the Council of Trent, in the following words:—"Whereas, our Redeemer Christ did declare that to be truly his body which he offered under the appearance of bread, therefore hath it always been held in the Church of God (and this holy Synod once more declareth it) that by the consecration of the bread and wine, a change is wrought of the bread's whole substance, into the substance of Christ our Lord's body, and of the wine's whole

* Dr. Whately has observed this connection, but drawn the exactly opposite conclusion. "It is probable," he observes, "that many have been induced to admit the doctrine of Transubstantiation, from its clear connection with the infallibility of the Romish Church; and *many others, by the very same argument, have surrendered their belief in that infallibility.*"—*Elements of Rhetoric, Oxford, 1828, p. 33.* I apprehend that every one who has had any experience, will have found the latter member of this sentence totally inaccurate, and the first not so generally correct as the observation in the text.

substance, into substance of his blood's; which change hath been, by the Holy Catholic Church, suitably and properly called Transubstantiation."* Such is the dogma which we have to prove against those, who assert, that in the Eucharist, nothing more is presented to the faithful than a type, or figure, of our Redeemer's body and blood.

But if the doctrine of the Catholic Church is so clear and explicit, as these words testify, it is by no means easy to understand the curious shades of difference observable in the doctrines of the separated churches. Luther started with the determination to preserve the real corporal presence of the body and blood of our Saviour in the Eucharist; nay, he did not seem intentionally to abandon even the doctrine of Transubstantiation; for, he does not so much impugn it, as leave it aside, by adopting phrases used accidentally by Petrus de Alliaco. Hence, the tenth article of the Confession of Augsburg, as presented to the Emperor Charles V. in 1530, ran as follows:—

“De Coena Domini docent, quod corpus et sanguis Christi *vere adsint et distribuuntur* vescentibus, in coena Domini, *sub specie panis et vini, et improbant secus docentes.*” As the his-

* Sess. xiii., c. iv. See also canon ii.

tory of this article is curious, I will continue to trace it for you. In the following year, Melancthon altered it, by striking out the words “*sub specie panis et vini;*” thus effacing the implied absence of their substance, or the doctrine of Transubstantiation. After the disputes concerning the Eucharist had become serious in the Reformers’ camp, and had involved them in a civil feud, the same disciple of Luther, anxious to bring about a conciliation, still farther modified the article, both by erasure and by change. For in 1540, it was produced in the following strangely disfigured form:—

“De cœna Domini docent, quod *cum* pane et vino vere *exhibeantur* corpus et sanguis Christi, vescentibus in cœna Domini.”

The clause condemnatory of those who held a different doctrine is here suppressed; the elements are introduced again into the proposition, with the important change of “*sub specie*” into “*cum;*” and “*adsint et distribuantur,*” dwindle into one equivocal verb, “*exhibeantur.*” And thus did *consubstantiation* or *companation* come forth from the chrysalis proposition, in which we must try to suppose it originally contained!

But while this theory was thus going through this curious process, others had sprung up, as progressive modifications of one another. Carl-

stadt first conceived the idea of a purely spiritual presence, or rather of a real absence of our Lord's body; but as he had no arguments whereby to support his opinion, he was obliged to yield the glory of it to Zwingli and *Æcolampadius*, whose arguments we shall see in their proper place. The former illustrates his system by this comparison:—"When the father of a family travels abroad, he presents his wife with his best ring, whereon his image is engraved, saying: 'Behold me, your husband, whom you must hold and cherish.' Now that father of the family is the type of Christ. For, departing, he gave to his spouse the Church his image, in the Sacrament of the Supper."* Even these two, however, could not agree upon the right interpretation of the words of institution. Zwingli maintained that in them *ἐστὶ* signified "represents;" *Æcolampadius* asserted that the metaphor was in *σῶμα*, which meant "the figure of the body!"

Between the two opposite opinions of the literal and the figurative meaning of Christ's expressions, in other words, of his presence and absence in the Eucharist, there arose a middle system, which pretended to hold both, and reconcile the true receiving of our Saviour's body,

* "Huldricli Zwinglii Opera," tom. ii. p. 549.

with the fact of its not being there. This required a boldness unparalleled perhaps in the annals of interpretation, except among those Arians of old, who would call Christ the Son of God, yet not allow him to be consubstantial to the Father.

This attempt was made in two ways. The first was Calvin's, who ingeniously supposed that the body of Christ, present in heaven, communicated such virtue to the elements, when partaken of by the worthy receiver, that he might be said to partake of the very body. Capito and Bucer were content to halt between the two opinions, without any explanatory theory: asserting at once the presence and the absence of Christ's body.*

From the latter, unfortunately, the Church of England learnt her belief; and, accordingly, we find it fraught with the contradictions which it necessarily involves. A modern writer thus expresses himself on this subject:—"If the Roman (Catholic) and Lutheran doctrines teemed with unmasked absurdity," (this we shall see by-and-by,) "this middle system (if,

* For this sketch of the sacramental history in Germany, I am indebted to the golden book of my learned friend, Professor Möhler, "Symbolik oder Darstellung der dogmatischen Gegensätze der Katholiken und Protestanten." Third edition, 1834, pp. 323-330.

indeed, it is to be considered a genuine opinion, and not, rather, a political device)* had no advantage but in the disguise of unmeaning terms; while it had the peculiar infelicity of departing as much from the literal sense of the words of institution, wherein the former triumphed, as the Zwinglian interpretation itself. I know not whether I can state, in language tolerably perspicuous, this jargon of bad metaphysical theology. . . . It can hardly fail to strike every unprejudiced reader, that a material substance can only in a very figurative sense be said to be received through faith; that there can be no real presence of such a body, consistently with the proper use of language, but by its local occupation of space;" (this observation is inaccurate;) "and that as the Romish (*Catholic*) tenet of Transubstantiation is the best, so this of the Calvinists is the worst imagined of the three, that have been opposed to the simplicity of the Helvetic explanation."†

* Author's note. "The truth is, that there were but two opinions at bottom, as to this main point of the controversy: nor in the nature of things was it possible that there should be more; for what can be predicated concerning a body, in its relation to a given space, but presence and absence?"

† "Hallam's Constitutional History of England," vol. i. e. 2; vol. i. p. 119, ed. *Par.* 1827. I do not quote this writer as an authority, but merely on account of the correctness of most of the cited remarks.

Hence it was some time before the Established Church made up her mind regarding her belief upon this subject. In the first liturgy, framed by some of her most zealous Reformers, in 1548, it is stated that "the whole body of Christ is received under each particle of the Sacrament." In 1552, the same men—Cranmer, Ridley, and others—produced their forty-two articles, in which the real presence was clearly denied, and a reason given for the denial, which allowed no room for variety of opinion; namely, that Christ, being in heaven, could not be in the Eucharist. When the articles were reduced to thirty-nine, under Elizabeth, this condemnatory clause was omitted.* At present, therefore, this Church, in her twenty-eighth article, teaches that "Transubstantiation cannot be proved by Holy Writ; but is repugnant to the plain words of Scripture, and overthroweth the nature of a Sacrament." At the same time it is stated, that in the Lord's Supper, "to such as rightly, worthily, and with faith, receive the same, the bread, which we break, is a partaking of the body of Christ; and likewise, the cup of blessing is a partaking of the blood of Christ." Farther, we

* See Burnet, "Hist. of Reformation," b. ii. p. 105. type, ii. 121, 208. Milner's "End of Controversy," let. xxxvii.

are told, that "the body of Christ is given, taken, and eaten, only after a heavenly and spiritual manner, and the mean whereby the body of Christ is received and eaten in the Supper is faith." The catechism stands in the same form of uncertain contradiction: for in it the child is taught, that the "body and blood of Christ are verily and indeed taken and received by the faithful in the Lord's Supper."

This variation in the doctrine was necessarily accompanied by a corresponding variation in the liturgy of the Establishment. At the end of the communion service, there is at present a declaration, which runs more like a magistrate's warrant than an ecclesiastical definition; that no adoration is intended by the act of kneeling to receive the Lord's Supper. This existed in the oldest liturgy under Edward VI., but was expunged under Elizabeth, and only restored under Charles II.

With this curious vacillation and repeated change of opinion in the English Church, we cannot wonder that there should be as great difference of theory in its teachers and divines. In fact, many of them, in the clearest terms, teach the real and corporal presence, while others are violent against it. The testimonies of the former have been so often given in popu-

lar Catholic works, that it would be foreign to my plan and purpose to repeat them here. But the class which is most worthy of our attention, is of those who try to reconcile the two opinions, of absence and presence, by pretending to admit a *real* to the exclusion of a *corporal* presence. Of these there will be, however, a proper place to speak hereafter.

What I principally reprehend in most of them is, that while they decry and abuse the Catholic faith, and bring arguments to prove it false, they never think of positively constructing their own, or establishing it on Scripture proofs. And this point also will be touched upon hereafter.

Having thus briefly reviewed the principal opinions on this dogma, I do not intend to trace its history at an earlier period, either in the east or west; as this will be more properly treated of when we come to speak of the tradition of the Church upon our dogma. Instead of such a discussion, I will, this evening, premise a brief and simple view of the method in which our examination of the Scriptural testimonies will be conducted. To those who have already gone through our biblical course, it will present nothing new or unexpected; but its repetition will still serve to prepare them more immediately for the practical application of hermeneu-

tical principles To such as have not yet studied in detail the science of biblical hermeneutics, the observations I am about to make will be necessary for our present inquiry, and may be useful as a compendium of what they will hereafter have to study more at length.

1. I suppose you will immediately agree, that, when we speak of interpreting an author, or speaker, we understand the discovering of that sense which he meant to convey, or, in other words, our conceiving the same ideas, while we read him, which he entertained when he wrote or spoke.* The whole science of such interpretation, or, as it is technically called, *hermeneutics*, whether applied to a sacred or profane author, depends upon one simple and obvious principle:—*The true meaning of a word or phrase is that which was attached to it at the time when the person, whom we interpret, wrote or spoke.* Language is intended only to convey to our hearers, as nearly as possible, the ideas which pass in our own thought; and that person possesses the best command of it, who most exactly transfuses,

* “Cum enim *interpretari* scriptorem aliquem, ipsa rei natura declarante, nihil aliud sit, quam docere, quamnam sententiam ille singulis libri sui verbis loquendique formulis subjecerit, vel efficere, ut alter librum ejus legens eadem cogitet, quæ *ipse* scribens cogitavit.”—Keilii *Opuscula Academica*, Lips. 1821, p. 85.

by his expressions, into the minds of others the impressions which exist in his own. But, as words and phrases have certain definite meanings at any given period, it follows that the speaker necessarily selects such, as his knowledge of their exact force teaches him will represent precisely his thoughts and feelings. From this we deduce, that the impression naturally made by any expressions upon the hearer, or, in other words, the sense in which he must have understood them is, generally speaking, the proper criterion of the sense intended by the speaker. I have said *generally* speaking, because words are occasionally misunderstood. But this is an extraordinary case,—it supposes a defect in the speaker or hearer; and we always take it for granted that our words are rightly understood, unless there is a special reason to suppose the contrary. Still, even this case does not affect my observations, nor the principles of hermeneutics, which are based upon them, because this science does not decide by impressions actually made, but by those which the words were necessarily calculated to make at that time, upon that audience; and this is the sense in which the word *impression* is to be understood. Whatever I say of speakers and hearers, applies, with trifling modifications, to

writers and readers. These modifications result from tone, countenance, gesture, incidents proper to the former. Of course, when I speak of our Saviour's discourses being *understood*, I do not mean to say they were comprehended.

To illustrate this criterion by a simple comparison;—as, from the lines engraven upon a copper-plate, we can argue with certainty to the exact representation which will be made upon the paper, provided the regular process of communication be properly gone through, so can we, *vice versâ*, from the printed engraving, reason conclusively to the traces marked upon the plate which produced them. In like manner, therefore, as the speaker, from the thoughts which he entertains, and from his possessing the power of correctly communicating them, can conclude what are the corresponding ideas which will be produced in others, so can we, from the knowledge of the impression necessarily made, argue conclusively back to the ideas and intentions of the agent who produced it. “For what is conversation between man and man?” asks the philosophic author of *Hermes*; “’Tis a mutual intercourse of speaking and hearing. To the speaker ’tis to teach; to the hearer ’tis to learn. To the speaker ’tis to descend from ideas to words; to the hearer ’tis to ascend from

words to ideas. If the hearer, in this ascent, can arrive at *no* ideas, then he is said *not to understand*: if he ascend to ideas dissimilar and heterogeneous (from the speaker's), then he is said to *misunderstand*. What, then, is requisite that he may be said to understand? That he should ascend to certain ideas, treasured up within himself, correspondent and similar to those within the speaker. The same may be said of a writer and a reader.* Thus, therefore, the only true interpretation of any person's words, is that which must necessarily have been affixed to them by those whom he addressed, and by whom he primarily desired to be understood.

It is obvious that, in order to arrive at an acquaintance with this interpretation, we must analyze every word and phrase, if their import be doubtful; or we must, at least, take into calculation the exact meaning of each, if simple and intelligible, before we can pretend to understand the continuous sense of a passage. Nothing is more common, and yet nothing more pernicious to accuracy of judgment, than the habit of reading an entire context, and, seeing that a certain vague meaning results from it,

* Harris's *Hermes*, b. iii. c. iv. p. 393, *Lond.* 1765.

remaining content with that, though each of the expressions which compose it is not distinctly understood. How many, for instance, read the Epistles of St. Paul, again and again, without ever perceiving the necessity of accurately understanding the exact signification of many of his terms, as *the law, justification, calling, election, the flesh, the spirit*, and many others? And yet, if every one of such terms does not convey an exact idea to the mind, and moreover, if that idea be not precisely the one mutually understood by St. Paul and those to whom he wrote, it is evident that we do not, and cannot, understand his doctrines as he meant them to be understood; or, in other words, that we do not understand them at all. This exact determination, therefore, of the meaning of words and phrases, which is the basis and substance of all commentary, is justly called the *grammatical interpretation*.*

2. But, then, words and phrases are variable in their signification, according to time and place. The course of a few centuries alters the signification of words; and the person who interprets an older writer, by the meaning which his expressions bear in his own times, will fre-

* Ernesti, *Institutio Interpretis N. T.* ed. Ammon, Leipzig, 1809, p. 26



quently fall into error and absurdity. When, for instance, he finds in some old English version of Scripture, the Canticle of Canticles entitled the *Ballad of Ballads*,* he must perceive that the word *ballad* once bore a very different signification from that which it bears at présent. If he lost sight of this reflection, he would charge the author, most unjustly, with a gross impiety, and misinterpret his words. But we need not go so far back to see the variable nature of signification. Many terms common in Shakspeare, and the writers of his age, have now a totally different, sometimes an opposite meaning to what they have in older writers. To *let*, for instance, then signified to *impede*, instead of to *permit*. Even the writers in Queen Anne's age employed words in a very different sense from what we now attach to them. Thus the term *wit* has, in their writings, a much nobler and wider signification than with us, as it there signifies genius or abilities. It is evident, that in reading authors of these different ages, we shall not understand them aright, unless we know the exact meaning of their words *as then used*; in other words, unless, upon reading them, they make the same impression upon us, and convey

* D'Israeli's "Curiosities of Literature," second series, 2d ed. 1824, vol. i. p. 395.

to us the same idea, as they did to those whom, as contemporaries, they especially addressed.

In languages now dead, the same variations took place, while they were vernacular; and hence, we should misunderstand and misinterpret an ancient author, if we calculated not the chronological vicissitudes of his terms. And, though oriental idioms vary less in this manner than the languages of the west, yet, even in them, this attention must not be neglected. For example, the Hebrew word 'ס (*i*), in the later period of Hebrew literature undoubtedly signified an *island*.* Hence, the translators who learned the language when it was in this stage, as the authors of the Alexandrine and Syriac versions, Symmachus, Theodotion, and Aquila, did not reflect that the word might have changed from its ancient signification; and so translated it by *island* in the older books, where it has no such meaning, and where such a rendering produces the most glaring absurdities.†

* In Daniel xi. 18, Antiochus is said to invade and subdue many ׀'ס, and we know from history that he so dealt with Samos, Rhodes, and many other *islands*. In Esther x. 1, the king of Persia is said to have imposed tribute upon the land, and the *islands of the sea*; where this word is used.

† For instance (Isa. xlii. 15), “the *islands* shall be converted into *rivers*.” Septuag. Targ. Syr. Gen. x. 5.—The same versions make Greece, Thrace, and Media to be islands!

The conclusion therefore is, that it is not sufficient to understand the meaning of words and phrases in general, but that it is necessary to ascertain it precisely for the time when they were written or spoken. This is called by hermeneutists the *usus loquendi*, which is considered by them the true test of an author's meaning.

3. But this *grammatical* meaning may have to undergo considerable modifications, in consequence of local or individual circumstances. 1. The manners and habits of a nation, the peculiar character of its political or social constitution, the influence of accidental agents, may cause the idea attached to a term to differ greatly from what its corresponding one will represent in our own language. Thus, the words which we are obliged to translate by *harvest and sowing time*, point out in Hebrew different seasons of the year from what are suggested to us by those words. How complicated is the idea of a *bed* to a European conception! An ingenious framework to support multiplied mattresses and pillows, sheets and blankets, and coverlets to compose, with curtains and hang-

See the interesting dissertation upon this word in Michaelis's "Spicilegium Geographiæ Hebræorum extera," *Götting*. 1769, pars prima, p. 136.

ings to adorn it—such is the image which the word suggests to us. How different from the simple *mat* or *carpet*, or at most mattress, spread upon the floor, which the corresponding Hebrew word represented to the Jew! When, therefore we hear our Saviour say to a sick man, “Arise, *take up thy bed*,”* we should be much mistaken if we fancied to ourselves the cumbersome piece of furniture which we designate by that name, and might justly consider the order, in that case, rather a severe test, even of a miraculously restored health. So, likewise, when we hear the royal prophet protest that he will not *ascend* his bed,† we may be tempted to imagine something still more magnificent and lofty, in the form of a state couch, instead of the divan or elevated platform at the upper end of an oriental chamber, on which the couch is spread for the night’s repose.

II. Besides such *local* modifications as these, in the signification of words or forms, I said others might arise from personal circumstances. For instance, every teacher has his own peculiar method of conveying instruction, resulting from his character, his intention, his principles, his situation; and it is obvious, that any explana-

* Matt. ix. 6.

† Ps. cxxxii. 3.

tion of his words, at variance with his well-known methods and character, cannot for a moment be admitted. Any interpretation of a passage in Plato, which supposed him to abandon his inductive and discursive method, and argue in a synthetical and formal manner, or which made him represent Socrates as a haughty, overbearing despot in discussion, would be instantly rejected, as incompatible with the known character and principles of that philosopher. In like manner, any explanation of words spoken by our B. Saviour, which should be at variance with his usual and constant method of instructing, or which should suppose him to be aught but meek, humble, conciliating, and charitable, must be unhesitatingly rejected.

III. These considerations will necessarily lead us also to take into account such data as may be presented by the circumstances in which the words were spoken,—the feelings, the habits, the very prejudices of the audience addressed. For Burke has well observed, that “in all bodies, those who will lead, must also, in a considerable degree, follow: they must conform their propositions to the taste, talent, and disposition of those whom they wish to conduct.”* Of course,

* “Reflections on the Revolution in France,” 11th ed. Lond. 1791, p. 59.

you will not for a moment confound this supposition with the doctrine of the rationalists, that our Saviour framed his dogma so as to accord with the errors and prejudices of the Jews,—an opinion as *unhermeneutical* and absurd as it is blasphemous. I speak of the *manner*, and not the *matter*, of his instructions. It is evident that a kind and skilful teacher will ever select words and phrases which, while they are most intelligible, may, at the same time, least shock the natural feelings and *just* prejudices of his audience; he will never study to make his doctrines as repulsive and odious as possible; he will, on the contrary, divest them of these qualities, if they appear to have them, so far as is compatible with their substance. In like manner, he will address himself very differently to friends or to enemies, to those who are hearkening in order to learn, or those who are listening only to find fault. He will reason in a different strain with a learned or an uninstructed auditory; he will never argue with the latter from principles of which he knows them to be completely ignorant, or which he is aware could not recur to their minds at that moment, as criterions for interpreting his expressions.

It is thus evident, that the inquiry into the

meaning of words and phrases at any given period, and also into the local or personal circumstances which modify them, is an inquiry into a matter of fact, and consequently partakes, especially as to the latter research, of an historical character.* Hence, the learned Keil proposed to modify the term which I used above, of *sensus grammaticus*, and adopt that of *sensus historicus, interpretatio historica*.† In order, however, to explain his meaning more clearly, he compounded the two terms, and called it the *historico-grammatical interpretation*.‡

* “Scire autem et docere, quid cogitaverit aliquis, verisque significaverit, nonne erit *rem facti* intelligere? Summa igitur similitudine cum historici munere conjunctum est interpretis munus.”—Keil, ubi sup. p. 86.

† Tittman had justly observed that the terms *historical* and *grammatical*, when applied to interpretation, mean precisely the same.—Opuscula Theologica, Lips. 1803, p. 661.

‡ “Hinc eadem (historico-grammatica interpretatio) primum omnium postulat hoc, ut *verba* quibus auctor mentem expressit, accurate examinentur, quo non solum significatio et sensus singularum vocum et enunciationum, sed earum invicem junctarum nexus etiam et ambitus singulis locis obtinens recte constituatur. Deinde animum advertere illa jubet ad *genus orationis* . . . item ad *consilium* . . . nec non ad *argumentum* libri explicandi . . . Denique eadem etiam interpretem graviter monet, ut ad Scriptoris a se explicandi omnem *indolem* et *rationem*, quantum eam noverit, semper respiciat, neque in enucleando ejus libro de eo quærere negligat, qua ille *scientia ingenio, animo, moribus, quo loco, qua conditione*, quibus *hominibus* usus sit.”—Keil, p. 380.

4. The sum of all these remarks is, that, if we wish to understand an author, for instance the New Testament, we must transport ourselves from our age and country, and place ourselves in the position of those whom our Saviour or his disciples addressed. We must understand each phrase just as they must have done; we must invest ourselves with their knowledge, their feelings, habits, opinions, if we wish to understand the discourses which were addressed primarily and immediately to them. This we will attempt in the lectures which will be addressed to you on the real Presence. We will sift every phrase, when necessary, till we discover the exact ideas which it must have conveyed to the Jews or the Apostles; and for this purpose, we must enter into minute and detailed reasoning,—from parallel passages, from the genius of the language used, from the context, and every other philological source within our reach. We will study diligently and exactly our Saviour's character, and discover his constant line of conduct, and we will pry, too, into the habits and character of those whom he addressed.

1. Proceeding thus by a perfectly analytical method, when we have discovered a signification for a text, which alone can be reconciled with all these data, I shall feel justified in con-

cluding that signification to be the *only* true one.

2. We will apply the same principles as a test to try the validity of objections. We shall simply have to ask the question, could the hearers of Christ, or the readers of St. Paul, have understood him in that manner? If not, we shall be authorized to conclude, that such interpretations are of no value whatsoever. This method of proceeding will strip from our researches much of their controversial form, and reduce them to a literary and impartial inquiry.

But, at the same time, I must entreat you not to be discouraged by the apparent prospect of barren verbal disquisition, or the idea of having to discuss words or passages of languages unknown to you. I flatter myself, that you will find our inquiry interesting and satisfactory, in a sufficient degree to compensate any difficulties which may at first sight appear to encumber it; and I even dare to hope, that such difficulties will, as we proceed, be discovered to be merely imaginary.

Before, however, proceeding to our theological discussion, I feel it prudent to notice two objections, which may occur to you upon the method I have promised to pursue. Your own reflec-

tion will, I dare say, anticipate my reply the moment I state the difficulties.

The first is, do I mean to say that the method, which has been followed by controvertists is not sufficiently exact, or that their arguments have not satisfactorily demonstrated the real Presence? Most assuredly not. The texts whereby any dogma is proved may be so clear, that they demonstrate it, at first sight, yet may consistently be submitted to the most rigid examination. For instance, is not the Divinity of our Lord so clear in Scripture, that an unprejudiced mind is satisfied with the simple recital of the texts relating to it; yet, who has ever blamed the learned treatises which submit them to a more rigid analysis? Several properties of mathematical figures might be pointed out, which strike the mind almost immediately, upon inspecting the diagram, or which may be proved by the most simple methods; still who has ever criticised the mathematical course which makes them the subject of severe and minute demonstration? Our case is precisely similar. If the texts for the real Presence appear to you to be intuitively convincing, this arises, as in the instances adduced, from the internal evidence of their truth, and is of itself an indication that they will bear the

severest scrutiny; nor does the attempt to bestow this, here, any more than in those cases, imply the slightest denial of that primary evidence, nor any censure upon those who have so ably displayed it. Not a single argument which I shall adduce will tend to contradict or weaken the views which others have taken. As, however, we have seen that these views have not always produced conviction upon others, it is only fair to try what the more rigid course of exegetical discussion may effect, especially upon those who are learned, and able to appreciate it.

But I am far from believing that this method can have weight only with these men. There is a natural logic in every mind which will enable it to seize the most rigid form of demonstration, when presented in a simple and progressive manner. The principles of hermeneutics, which I have laid down, are obvious and intelligible to the very lowest capacity, and all that will follow, may be rendered the same. I may say, that I have more than once tried to reduce the arguments which I shall deliver to a popular form in private conference, and have been perfectly satisfied that they were fully understood.*

* These words were written long before I thought an op-

A second objection may be brought to the method I have proposed to adopt. Does it not tend to diminish the divine authority of the Church and of Tradition, by making the interpretation of Scripture depend upon human ingenuity and learning, rather than upon the authority of an infallible guide? Undoubtedly not. Before replying to this objection, I must observe that I willingly make the two following concessions. First, I fully subscribe to the sentiment of an acute and amiable Protestant philosopher, who says, "Luther treated Christianity in the most capricious manner, misunderstood its spirit, and introduced a new alphabet and a new religion; namely, the holy all-availableness (*Allgemeingültigkeit*) of the Bible; and thereby, came unfortunately to be mixed up with the concerns of religion another perfectly foreign and earthly science—philology,—whose destructive influence cannot but be recognised from that moment."* I fully agree, therefore, that this philological method of learning religion is one of the most pernicious evils we owe to the reformation, and that far better

portunity would ever be afforded me, of trying this method upon so large an audience as attended the lectures at Moorfields Chapel.

* Novalis, Schriften, 2 Th. s. 195, 4 Ausgabe.

would it have been, had the plain and only true rule of Church authority continued in its legitimate force. Secondly, I will acknowledge the truth of what a modern French divine has convincingly proved, that Catholic controvertists, especially in England and Germany, have greatly erred by allowing themselves to be led by Protestants into a war of detail, meeting them as they desired in partial combats for particular dogmas, instead of steadily fixing them to one fundamental discussion, and resolving all compound inquiries into their one simple element—Church authority. But fully and cordially as I make these concessions, the state of controversy at the present day renders it necessary to treat these questions separately, and expedient to treat them philologically.

And therefore, in reply, I would first observe, that all our controvertists treat the arguments from Scripture distinctly from Tradition; that they corroborate them from all the sources of interpretation, and do not even allude to their basing that interpretation upon the next argument, which will follow from the Fathers. But in the second place, the Church decides the dogma, and in some, though few instances, has decided the meaning of texts; but, generally speaking, it leaves the discussion of individual

passages to the care of theologians, who are not at liberty to adopt any interpretation which is not strictly conformable to the dogmas defined. Farther, and principally, I would add, that as I can never consider it possible for a proposition to be theologically true and logically false, so can I never allow that a dogma can be drawn from a text by a mere theological argument of authority, but that it must be, at the same time, the *only* interpretation which sound hermeneutical principles can give. It is the property of truth to be able to resist the action of the most varied tests. When, therefore, I find the signification of a text definitively settled by the Church, upon the authority of Tradition, I am at once fully satisfied that the decision must be correct; but then I am so much the more fully satisfied in consequence, that the text will give the same result after the strictest investigation. Hence, we may approve the axiom of Melancthon, one, of all the reformers, whose deviation from truth excites most our compassion and regret, “non potest Scriptura intelligi theologice, nisi ante intellecta sit grammatice.”*

Having premised thus much on the method

* Ernesti Institutis, p. 29.

which I intend to follow, I proceed to state the first argument in favor of the Catholic belief of a real Presence of the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ in the B. Eucharist.

The first passage which every Protestant must acknowledge to favor, at least at first sight, our doctrine, is the latter portion of the sixth chapter of St. John's Gospel. You are aware that most Catholics divide the chapter into three portions, while most Protestants consider the two last portions as only composing one whole. From the first to the twenty-sixth verse, we have an historical detail of the splendid miracle whereby our Saviour fed five thousand persons with five loaves, and of his subsequent occupation until next day, when the crowd once more gathered around him. At the twenty-sixth verse his discourse to them commences, and with its consequences occupies the rest of this long chapter, consisting of seventy-two verses. The discourse is a striking counterpart to the whole of our Redeemer's life: it opened amidst the wonder, the admiration, the reverence of multitudes; it closed with the scoffs and persecution of the Jews, the desertion of his disciples, and the vacillating perplexity of his chosen twelve.

It was a practice with our Saviour and his

apostles to adapt their discourses to the circumstances in which they were placed, and more especially to draw them from the miracles which they had wrought. Thus Christ opens his conference with the Samaritan woman at the well, by allusions to his request that she would allow him to drink.* Thus in the fifth chapter of St. John, he takes occasion to teach the doctrine of the resurrection, from the miracle he had wrought in the cure of a long-languishing man.† In the twelfth of St. Matthew, (v. 43,) he borrows his figures and lessons from the miracle he had previously performed, in casting out a devil. In the same manner, he reproves the *blindness* of the Pharisees, after having restored sight to a man who had been born blind.‡

Conformably to his Master's practice, St. Peter preached the efficacy of the name of Christ, and the consequent necessity of belief in him, upon having wrought a miracle, through the invocation of that name.§ It will be acknowledged at once, that if our Saviour ever

* Jo. iv. 10.

† v. 24.

‡ Jo. ix. 39. See Bp. Newcome's Observations on our Lord's conduct as a Divine Instructor, 3d ed. Lond. 1820, pp. 101, seqq.

§ Acts iii 6-16.

intended to propound the doctrine of the real Presence, a more appropriate and favorable opportunity never occurred, in the course of his entire ministry, than the one exhibited in the sixth chapter of St. John.

The introduction of the whole discourse, and of this topic in particular, becomes still more natural, when we consider that, according to a tradition believed by the Jews, the Messiah, among other points of resemblance to Moses, was, like him, to bring down manna from heaven. The Midrasch Coheleth, or exposition of Ecclesiastes, thus expresses it :—“ Rabbi Berechiah said, in the name of R. Isaac : As the first *Goel* (deliverer) so shall the second be. The first *Goel* brought down manna, as it is written, ‘ I will cause bread to rain upon you from heaven.’ So, likewise, will the later *Goel* cause manna to descend.”* As the Jews therefore demanded a sign of his mission (v. 29), similar to that which proved the divine legation of Moses, who brought down manna from heaven, (xv. 30, 31,) our Saviour was naturally led to show that he was the second *Goel* who could rival *that miracle*, by giving a food which really came down from heaven.

*Schoettgen, *Horæ Hebraicæ et Talmudicæ*. *Dresd. et Lips.* 1733, tom. i. p. 359.

On the signification of his discourse as far as the forty-eighth or fifty-first verse, Protestants and Catholics are equally agreed, it refers entirely to believing in him. It is at one of the verses just mentioned, that we begin to differ most materially upon the subject of his doctrine.

The Catholic maintains that, at this point, a total, though natural change of subject takes place, and a perfect transition is made from believing in Christ, to a real eating of his Body and drinking of his Blood, in the Sacrament of the Eucharist. The generality of Protestants maintain that no such transition takes place, but that our Saviour really continues to discourse upon the same subject as before, that is, on faith. I have said the generality of Protestants, because there is a variety of opinion among them. Not only Calixtus, Hackspan, Grünenberg, and others abroad,* but several distinguished Anglican divines have referred the latter part to the Eucharist, though they do not allow the real Presence, at least in clear terms. Dr. Jeremy Taylor takes it quite for granted, and reasons upon texts from this part

* See Wolfii's *Curæ philologicæ et criticæ in iv. SS. Evangelia*, ed. 3a, *Hamburg*, 1739, pp. 864.



of the chapter, as proving points connected with the Lord's Supper.* Dr. Sherlock goes farther, and undertakes to demonstrate that it can refer to no other subject.† On the other hand, many Protestant expositors suppose the latter portion of the chapter to relate more specifically than the preceding part to belief in the passion or atonement of our Saviour.‡

The point at issue, therefore, between us and our adversaries, is twofold. First, is there a change of subject at the forty-eighth verse? secondly, is the transition to a real eating of the body of Christ? The double affirmative reply which we give is a fair and obvious point of hermeneutical inquiry, and as such I shall proceed to treat it in our next lectures.

It will appear from what I have said, that I am not satisfied with the transition being placed, as it usually is, at the fifty-first verse. Before closing this lecture, therefore, it is proper that I clear up this point; the more so, as the determination of such a transition must materially advance the strength of the arguments which

* Worthy Communicant, *Lond.* 1660, pp. 27, 37, &c.

† Practical Discourse of Religious Assemblies, 3d ed. *Lond.* 1700, p. 364.

‡ As Dr. Waterland, "Review of the Doctrine of the Eucharist," in the collection of his Works by Dr. Van Mildert, *Oxf.* 1823, vol. vii. p. 105.

I shall bring forward at our next meeting. For if it shall be shown that the portion of the discourse comprised between the forty-eighth and fifty-second verses is a complete section of itself, we shall not unreasonably conclude that a new subject may likewise be therein treated. I have no hesitation in placing the transition at the forty-eighth; and my reasons are the following:—

1. Verse 47 seems to me to form an appropriate close to a division of discourse, by the emphatic asseveration *amen* prefixed to a manifest summary and epilogue of all the preceding doctrine. “Amen, amen, I say unto you; he that believeth in me hath everlasting life.” Compare vv. 35, 37, 45. Verse 48 lays down a clear proposition: “I am the bread of life,” suggested by the preceding words, and just suited for the opening of a new discourse.

2. But these words are exactly the same as open the first part of our Saviour’s lecture, at v. 35. Now, I find it an ordinary form of transition with him, when he applies the same images to different purposes, to repeat the very words by which he originally commenced his discourse. I will give two or three instances. In John x. 11, he says, “I am the good shepherd;” and he then expatiates upon this cha-

acter, *as it regards himself*, contrasting himself with the hireling, and expressing himself ready to die for his sheep. At v. 14, he repeats the words once more, "I am the good shepherd;" and explains them *with reference to the sheep*, how they hear and obey him, and how his flock will be increased. Again, John xv. 1, he commences his discourse, by—"I am the true vine," and applies the figure *negatively* to the consequences of *not* being united to him. Then at v. 5, he repeats the same words, and explains them *positively* of the fruits produced by those who *do* abide in him.* Exactly in the same manner, in our passage, our Saviour, having

* I consider the latter clause of v. 15, of the first passage, and v. 6, with the last member of v. 5, in the second, as merely incidental and parenthetical; as I think it will be allowed that the division, which I have suggested of each parable, is manifest and natural. In this remark, I have joined the last member of v. 5 (Jo. xv.) with v. 6, because it has long struck me that the common division of the verses there, is not correct. The reasoning seems hardly conclusive, "he that abideth in me . . . beareth *much* fruit, because without me, ye can do *nothing*," (v. 5.) But if we put the stop after "much fruit," and join what follows to the next verse, we have a most expressive argument. "Because without me, ye can do nothing, if any one remain not in me, he shall be cast forth as a worthless branch," &c. Of course, I need not remind my readers that we owe our present division into verses to the elder Stephanus, who made it for his relaxation *inter equitandum*.

spoken of himself as bread, "I am the living bread," and expatiated on this thought, in respect to his being the spiritual nourishment of the soul by faith, makes the same form of transition, to treat of himself as *bread* in another sense, in as much as his flesh is our real sustenance.

3. The motive, however, which principally induces me to see a clear separation between v. 47 and 48, and which forbids me to allow any other transition or break in the discourse, till its complete interruption at v. 53, is the connection of the entire passage in what is known by the name of the *poetical parallelism*. This is not the place to enter into an explanation of this system; for that I must refer you to Dr. Jebb's interesting work upon the subject.* Suffice it to say, that he has extended to the structure of the New Testament, the principle which Lowth and Herder had laid down as characteristic of Hebrew poetry, that a sentence or portion of a discourse is arranged in parallel members, to any number, and in varied order, but always on a symmetrical structure. Now, nothing to me can be more striking than the regular arrangement of

* "Sacred Literature." London, 1820.

this discourse from v. 48 to v. 52, inclusively; and whoever understands the principle, and is accustomed to its application, will immediately, upon inspecting the passage, as I have transcribed it, in the original and the version, acknowledge that it stands wholly detached from what precedes down to v. 47, and that no transition can be allowed at any point but that. The following is the whole section of our Saviour's discourse, versicularly arranged.

(a) "I am the bread of life.

(b) Your fathers did eat manna (*bread from heaven*, see v. 31, 32) in the desert.

(c) And are dead.

(a) This is the bread

(b) Descending from heaven (such),

(c) That if any one eat of it he may not die.

(a) I am the living bread

(b) Which came down from heaven.

(c) If any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever.

And the bread which I will give is my flesh for the life of the world."*

You cannot avoid remarking the nice balance of these lines. All those marked (a) contain

* See the sixth chapter, as prefixed to this Lecture.

the same ideas of *bread* and generally of *life*; the second ones (*b*) speak of the descent of this bread from heaven, contrasted with the manna; the third (*c*) impress its worth in the same comparative view.* The last clause sums up and imbodyes the substance of the preceding. That repetition of the same idea and phrase, which at first sight appears superfluous in this passage, entirely vanishes upon viewing this arrangement, and there is a beautiful progression of sentiment, which gives a value to every repetition. Not to detain you with too many remarks, I will only instance the progressive character of the lines marked (*c*). The first speaks of the want of an immortalizing quality in the manna; the second attributes such a quality to the manna of the new Covenant, but in negative terms, "that if any one eat of it, he *may not die*;" the third expresses the same sentiment in a positive and energetic form. "If any man eat of this bread, he *shall live for ever*."

This attempt to prove—I trust not unsuccessfully—that there is a marked division of the discourse at verse the forty-eighth, is not,

* The passage given by Dr. Jebb, which has an arrangement most resembling this, is Matt. xxiii. 16–22, which is explained by him at p. 356.

as I before observed, of mean importance in our researches. It removes an objection made *in limine* by our adversaries, that it is doing a violence to our Saviour's discourse, to suppose that he passes from one subject to another where there is nothing to indicate such a transition.* I have shown that the structure of this portion of the passage detaches it from the preceding; and my next lectures will demonstrate the remarkable change of phraseology which takes place at the same time.

To remove that preliminary objection still farther, I will refer you to a perfectly parallel instance of such a transition. I allude to the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth chapters of St. Matthew. In treating of the evidences of Christianity, I proved to you that the first part of the discourse contained in those chapters referred entirely to the destruction of Jerusalem.† It is acknowledged that its concluding portion is referable only to the final judgment;‡ now where does the transition between the two occur? Why, some of the best commentators,

* See Bishop Porteus's Lectures on St. Matthew. *London*, 1823, pp. 342, 383.

† St. Matthew xxv. 31.

‡ *Commentarius in Libros N. T. historicos*, vol. i. ed. tert. *Lips.* 1823, p. 653.

as Kuinoel,* and after him Bloomfield, place it at the forty-third verse of the twenty-fourth chapter. Now, if you read that passage attentively, you will be struck with the similarity of this transition to the one I have laid down for the sixth chapter of St. John. In the preceding verse (42) our Lord sums up the substance of the foregoing instruction, just as he does in John vi. 47: "Watch ye, therefore, because ye know not at what hour your Lord will come." "Amen, amen, I say unto you, he that believeth in me hath everlasting life." He then resumes, apparently, the same figure drawn from the necessity of watching a house, as he does that of bread in our case; but then the conclusion of the discourse points out, that the "coming of the Son of man" now mentioned (v. 44) is no longer the moral and invisible one spoken of in the preceding section (vv. 30, 37), but a real and substantial advent in the body (xxv. 31).

* *Recensio Synoptica Annotationis Sacrae. Lond. 1826, vol. i. p. 396.* Rosenmüller, whom Mr. Bloomfield quotes as coinciding in opinion with Kuinoel, differs essentially from him. His words are, "Equidem omnia, quæ a cap. xxiv. 42, usque ad e. xxv. 30, dicuntur, ad *utrumque* Christi adventum referenda esse puto." (D. Jo. Geor. Rosenmülleri Scholia in N. T. ed. 6ta. *Norimb.* 1815, vol. i. p. 495.) So that he considers this portion of the discourse as intermediate and common to both the others.

Such are the grounds which I conceive not merely authorize, but convincingly oblige, us to suppose a transition to a new section of our Lord's discourse at the forty-eighth verse. I may remark, in conclusion, that a learned and acute modern Protestant commentator has observed, that it is manifest that our Saviour cannot have been understood to continue the same subject at verse fifty-one.*

* "Leitet darauf, dass Christus hier nicht dasselbe, was in Vorhergehenden, sagen wolle."—Tholuck, "Commentar zu dem Evangelio Johannis." *Hamb.* 1828, p. 129.

LECTURE II.

First Argument for the Real Presence, from the sixth chapter of St. John's Gospel: from the change of phraseology after the forty-eighth verse.

I CLOSED my last lecture by resolving the controversy between ourselves and Protestants, upon the sixth chapter of St. John, into a proposition strictly within the limits of hermeneutical investigation; and I endeavored to show, from the construction of the discourse after the forty-eighth verse, from the practice of our Saviour, and from parallel instances, that there were sufficient indications of a new section of the discourse commencing at that point. I have now to demonstrate that a complete change of topic also takes place, and that our Lord, who had hitherto spoken of believing in him, now treats of receiving his flesh and blood.

The first argument which I shall bring, and which will fully occupy this evening's lecture,

may be simply stated thus:—The phrases which occur in the first part of the discourse were calculated to convey to the minds of those who heard our Saviour, the idea of listening to his doctrines and believing in him, the more so, as he positively explained them in that sense. But after the transition I have pointed out, a totally different phraseology occurs, which *to his hearers could not possibly convey that meaning, nor any other, save that of a real eating of his flesh, and drinking of his blood.* In order to prove these assertions, we shall have to descend into a minute examination of the forms of expression employed, respectively, in the two parts of the discourse.

In the first part, our Saviour speaks of himself as *bread* which came down from heaven, (vv. 32–35.) The figurative application of *bread* or *food* to wisdom or doctrines, by which the mind is nourished, was one in ordinary use among the Jews, and other orientals; consequently it could present no difficulty here. The figure is used by Isaiah, (lv. 1, 2,) “All you that thirst, come to the waters, and you that have no money, make haste, buy and eat. Why do you spend your money for that which is not *bread*, and your labor for that which doth not satisfy you? *Hearken diligently to me, and*

eat that which is good." Perhaps the passage from Deuteronomy (viii. 3) quoted by our Saviour (Matt. iv. 4) contains the same idea: "Not on *bread* alone doth man live, but on every *word* that proceedeth from the mouth of God."* Jeremiah (xv. 16) has the same image: "Thy *words* were found, and I did *eat* them." Hence also in Amos, (viii. 11,) the Almighty places these two ideas in a striking contrast, when he says, that he "will send forth a famine into the land, not a famine of *bread*, nor a thirst (drought) of water, but of hearing the *word* of God." The same figure occurs still more strikingly in the sapiential books. Solomon represents to us Wisdom as thus addressing herself to all men: "Come, eat *my bread*, and drink the wine which I have mingled for you."† The book of Ecclesiasticus (xv. 3) has precisely the same image: "With the *bread of life* and *understanding* she shall feed him, and give him the water of wholesome *wisdom* to *drink*."

All these passages show that this was an ordinary phraseology to the Jews, as it is an obvious one to all men, to represent wisdom, the word of God, or heavenly doctrines, as *food*, or more specifically, according to the Hebrew

* Compare Eccles. xxiv. 5.

† Prov. ix. 5.

idiom, *bread* for the soul.* But among the later Jews this figure had become a regular and admitted form of speech. Philo tells us *Τὸ γὰρ φαγεῖν σῖμβολόν ἐστι τροφῆς ψυχικῆς.*† The Talmud and Rabbins teach the same. The Midrash Coheleth says, that whenever eating and drinking are mentioned in the book of Ecclesiastes, they are to be understood of the law and good works. In the treatise *Hagigah*, the words of Isaiah, (iii. 1,) “the whole strength of bread,” are thus commented upon. “These are the masters of doctrine, as it is said, ‘Come, eat my bread.’” Again, in the Glossa on the treatise *Succah*: “Feed him with bread; that is, make him labor in the battle of the law.”‡

In fine, the same image occurs in other oriental languages, and especially in one, from whose philosophy numerous expressions in the later Hebrew literature may be happily illustrated. In a Sanscrit hymn to the sun, trans-

* Bread is used for any enjoyment. See Prov. iv. 17; ix. 17; (col. Eccles. xxii. 17;) xx. 17, etc. Comp. Osee, x. 13. See “Sal. Glassii Philologia sacra his temporibus accommodata, a D. Jo. Aug. Dathe,” tom. i. Lips. 1776, pp. 1185, 1256.

† Allegor. lib. i. tom. i. p. 63, ed. Mangey. Cf. p. 120, ‘Ὁρῆς τῆς ψυχῆς τροφὴν οἷα ἐστί; λόγος Θεοῦ.

‡ Apud Lightfoot, *Horæ Hebraicæ*, Oper. tom. ii. Roterd. 1686, p. 626. Maimonides says the same of the book of Proverbs. More Nevoch. p. i. c. 30.

lated by Colebrooke, we have the following remarkable expressions:—"Let us meditate on the adorable light of the divine ruler; may it *guide our intellects*. *Desirous of food*, we solicit the gift of the splendid sun, who should be studiously worshipped."*

These examples demonstrate that *to the Jews* it was no unusual image, no harsh phrase, to speak of doctrines under the form of bread or food. But the figure could not be pushed farther than that. Jeremiah or Isaiah could not have been represented in the passage quoted from them, as saying, "Come and eat *me*." The only passage which could for a moment be compared with this form of expression is Eccles. xxiv. 29, where wisdom is supposed to say, "They that eat me shall yet hunger, and they that drink me shall yet thirst;" which is paraphrased literally of hearing in the following verse. But there is a two-fold difference between this passage and our Saviour's expressions: 1. Wisdom is speaking as an abstract personage, an allegorical being, to which imagi-

* Colebrooke on the Vedas, *Asiat. Researches*, vol. viii. *Lond.* 1808, p. 408. Guigneaut (*Religions de l'Antiquité*, tom. i. pa. ii. *Paris*, 1825, p. 600) translates food by *pain de vie*, and so produces a stronger analogy. Bopp (*Ueber das Conjugationssystem der Sanskritsprache*, *Frankf.* 1816, p. 272) has given the sense more accurately.

nary life is given; and consequently to whom the terms could not, by possibility, be literally applied. 2. Even this ideal person speaks of herself under the image of a plant: "*As the vine, I have brought forth a pleasant odor; and my flowers are the fruit of honor and riches. . . . Come over to me, all ye that desire me, and be filled with my fruits,*" (vv. 23, 26, cf. 16-20.) The figure is thus manifest, and in perfect harmony with the context.

Now mark well, that thus it is in the first part of Christ's discourse. Our Saviour, the Word and Wisdom of the Father, identifying himself with his doctrines, calls himself the *bread of life*; but it is very remarkable that never once, through this part of the discourse, does he suffer the idea of *eating him* to escape his lips. On the contrary, so careful is he to avoid it, that when the current of his discourse seemed almost to force him to use it, he breaks through the proprieties of figurative language, and mingles literal with metaphorical expressions, rather than employ so unusual and so harsh a phrase. "And Jesus said to them, I am the bread of life; he *that cometh to me* (not he *that eateth me*) shall not hunger, and he *that believeth in me* (not he *that drinketh of me*) shall never thirst" (v. 31). This care in avoiding,

even at the expense of rhetorical propriety, any mention of *eating him* throughout this portion of our Lord's discourse, is an important circumstance, and will form a strong point of contrast when we examine the phraseology of the second; and it demonstrates how completely our Redeemer kept within the bounds of the usual metaphor, which I have illustrated from the Old Testament and other sources.

Nay, I must notice a still more remarkable reserve in our Saviour's phraseology. Not once, through this section of the discourse, does he use the expression to *eat* even the bread of life, or the spiritual food which came down from heaven. He simply says that the Father *gave* them the true bread from heaven, (v. 32,) and that the bread of God *giveth life* to the world, (v. 33.)

But even if the expressions, hitherto used by our Saviour, had not been so consonant with customary language, the pains which he takes to explain his words must have removed any possible obscurity. In the verse which I have just quoted, (v. 31,) this explanation is given in terms so clear, as to preclude all danger of misunderstanding. The expression *coming to Christ*, being determined by the parallelism in that verse to be the same as the *believing in him* of

its second member, almost every verse from that to the forty-eighth, now speaks of this doctrine under one or the other of these phrases. (See vv. 36, 37, 40, 44, 45, 47.) The last of these verses contains, as I last evening observed, a complete and striking compendium and epilogue of the whole passage. And it must be remarked, that from the moment he begins to explain his words by literal phrases, at v. 35, until he has made that summary at v. 47, after which I have before proved that a new section of his discourse commences, he does not once return to the figure of bread, nor make use of any other such metaphorical expression, but always speaks clearly and simply of belief.

We are therefore authorized to conclude, that whether we consider the customary meaning of the phrases as in use among the Jews of our Saviour's time, or the clear and decisive explanation which he himself gave to them, those who heard him could not possibly misunderstand this portion of his discourse, nor give any other interpretation to the figure there used, than that of being spiritually nourished by the doctrines which he brought down from heaven.

Let us now proceed to examine the phraseology which occurs in the remaining portion of the discourse, that is, from verse 48 to the con-

clusion of the chapter, in order to discover whether the expressions therein used are such as could possibly continue, in the minds of the hearers, the same ideas as were excited by the first, or must not rather have been calculated necessarily to suggest one totally distinct. I assert, therefore, that if we accurately consider the phraseology of this portion of the chapter, *according to the only manner in which it could possibly be understood by the Jews whom Christ addressed*, we must conclude that they would necessarily infer a change of topic in it, and be convinced that the doctrine now delivered was of a real eating of the flesh and drinking of the blood of him who addressed them.

For our Saviour does now, in fact, say to them, “and the bread which I will give is *my flesh*, for the life of the world,” (v. 52.) After this verse, he again and again repeats this extraordinary phraseology, in even more marked terms. “Amen, amen, I say unto you, unless ye eat *the flesh* of the Son of man, and drink his blood, ye shall not have life in you. He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood, hath everlasting life; and I will raise him up at the last day. For my *flesh* is *meat indeed*, and my *blood* is *drink indeed*; he that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood, abideth in me and I in

him. As the living Father hath sent me, and I live by the Father, so he that *eateth me*, the same also shall live by me. This is the bread that came down from heaven. Not as your fathers did eat manna in the desert, and are dead; he that eateth this bread shall live for ever," (vv. 54-60.)

There are various peculiarities in this phraseology which oblige us to consider the topic which it treats, as totally distinct from that which occupies the former portion of the chapter.

1. We have seen above that after our Saviour, in consequence of difficulties found by the Jews, had commenced, at verse 35, to explain his sentiments literally, he never returns again to the figurative expression, until after he closes that section at verse 47. If we suppose him to continue the same topic after this verse, we must believe him, after having spent thirteen verses in doing away with the obscurity of his parabolic expressions, and in giving the explanation of its figures, to return again to his obscure phrases, and to take up once more the use of the same parable, which he had so long abandoned for its literal explanation.

2. We have seen likewise how carefully our

Lord avoids, throughout the first part, the harsh expression to *eat him*, even where the turn of his phrase seemed to invite him to use it; on the contrary, in the latter section, he employs it without scruple, and even repeats it again and again. This is a remarkable difference of phraseology between the two sections.

3. So long as Christ speaks of himself as the object of faith, under the image of a spiritual food, he represents this food as given by the Father, (vv. 32, 33, 39, 40, 44;) but after verse 47, he speaks of the food, which he now describes, as to be given by *himself*. “The bread *which I will give*, is my flesh for the life of the world,” (v. 52.) “How can *this man* give us his flesh to eat?” (v. 53.) This marked difference in the *giver* of the two communications, proposed in the two divisions of the discourse, points out that a different *gift* is likewise promised. If faith is the gift in both, there is no ground for the distinction made in them; if there is a transition to a real eating, the whole is clear. While we consider Jesus Christ and his doctrine as the object of our faith, he is justly described as sent and presented to us by the Father; when we view him as giving his flesh to eat, it is by the precious bounty of his own love towards us.

4. The difference here discernible between the givers, is no less marked regarding the effects of the gift. To both are attributed the having everlasting life, and being raised up at the last day, (vv. 40, 44, 47, 52, 55, 59.) But beyond this, there is a marked distinction. In the first part of the discourse, our B. Saviour always speaks of our *coming to him*, through the attraction or drawing of the Father, (vv. 35, 36, 44, 45.) Now, this expression is ever used when speaking of faith, to which we apply that part of his discourse. For example:—“*Come unto me* all you that labor,” (Matt. xi. 28, cf. 27;)—“*Every one that cometh to me*, and heareth my words, and doth them, I will show you to whom he is like,” (Lu. vi. 47;)—“Search the Scriptures, for you think in them to have everlasting life; and the same are they that give testimony of me; *and ye will not come to me*, that ye may have life,” (Jo. v. 40;)—“If any man thirst, *let him come unto me* and drink. He that believeth in me,” &c. (vii. 37)—where the same image is used as in the first part of the discourse in the sixth chapter. Hence, our Redeemer, at the conclusion of his discourse, says, “But there are some of you that *believe not . . . therefore* did I say to you, *that no man can come unto me*, unless it be given him by the

Father." In this manner, the qualities of the first method of receiving Christ's food, are precisely what we should expect if he treated of *belief*.

But, after the place where we suppose the transition made, he speaks no longer of our coming to him, but of *our abiding in him, and he in us*, (vv. 57, 58.) And this is a phrase which always intimates union *by love*. Thus, (John xiv. 23,) "If any one love me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him, and will make our abode with him." In the 15th chapter, (vv. 4-9,) the figure drawn from the necessity of the branches being united to the vine, gives the same result. "As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine, so neither can you, unless *you abide in me* Abide in my love." In the First Epistle of St. John, it is distinguished from faith, as an effect from the cause. "If that abide in you which you have heard from the beginning, (the word of faith,) you also shall abide in the Son and in the Father," (ii. 24.) "And now, little children, abide in him, that when he shall come, we may have confidence, and not be confounded by him at his coming." These words are more clearly explained in the 4th chapter, (vv. 16, 17,) "He

that *abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him.* In this is the charity of God perfected within us, that we may have confidence in the day of judgment." In addition, compare iii. 24 ; iv. 12, 13.

Thus, we have the effects of the doctrine inculcated after the 48th verse, given as quite different from those before rehearsed; and as the latter apply to *faith*, these are such as describe a union with Christ through *love*. Something, therefore, is here delivered, or instituted, which tends to nourish and perfect this virtue, and not faith; the topic, therefore, is changed, and a transition has taken place. And what institution more suited to answer this end than the Blessed Eucharist? What could be more truly an instrument or means for our abiding in Christ, and Christ in us?

5. Our opponents suppose the phrases in the two portions of the discourse to be parallel, and to refer equally to faith. By this reasoning it follows, that to eat his flesh, (vv. 54, 55, 56, 57,) means the same as to possess the bread of life mentioned in the former section, (vv. 32, 33, 35.) I will not revert to the observations already made, that in it our Saviour never once uses the word *to eat*, as applied either to himself or his doctrines; but will allow, for a moment,

that the expressions there used are equivalent to a declaration, that the bread of life, which he identifies with himself, is to be eaten; in other words, that he is our food, and that by this is signified, that we must believe in him. But, if to feed on Christ mean to believe in Christ, then, to eat the flesh of Christ (if the phrase has to be considered parallel) must signify to believe *in the flesh* of Christ. This is absurd; for the flesh and blood of Christ were not an object of faith to those who really sinned by believing him too literally to be only a man; nor can our belief in them be the source of eternal life. Protestants say, that as to feed on Christ signifies to believe in him, so to eat his flesh, and drink his blood, means to believe in his passion. But they do not bring a single argument to show that such a phrase was in use, or could have been intelligible to his hearers. The expressions, therefore, used in the second part of our Lord's discourse are in no-wise parallel to those of the first, nor can they bear the same meaning. In fact, the only one they will bear is the literal signification.

6. But all the differences which I have hitherto pointed out are mere *præludia* to the real, and, I trust, decisive examination of the point which yet remains. By discussing the meaning which

the Jews attached to the phrases employed by our Saviour in the first part of his discourse, we found that he kept perfectly within the limits of established language, that the expressions which he used were sufficiently ordinary and intelligible. We must now descend to a similar investigation of the phrases used in the second part, and discover what was the only meaning which the persons whom he addressed could attach to his words. The line I intend to pursue is simply this:—

Protestants say, that the expression, “to eat the flesh of Christ,” is to be taken figuratively. I will therefore inquire if ever it bore a figurative meaning. If I discover that, among the persons whom Jesus addressed, it did bear a figurative signification, besides its literal sense, then I must conclude, that those persons could only select between *that established figurative sense*, and the *literal* import of the words.

To place the strength of this course of inquiry in its clearest light, I will indulge in a few brief remarks. The explanation of tropical phraseology, as Jahn has well remarked, must depend entirely upon the *usus loquendi*, or the sense attached to it by the persons to whom it was addressed.* In fact, there is no style of language

* “Quemadmodum omnis interpretatio, ita quoque et ag

in which we are left less at liberty in attaching signification to phrases, than in employing metaphorical terms which are in daily use. Take, for instance, the word *lion*. So long as by it we describe objects which fall under the senses, we apply it to things of very different forms; the animal of that name, or its Egyptian, Chinese, or heraldic representation, though differing equally from their prototype, and from one another, all these are equally called by the same name. But when you come to the figure, and say that "such a man is a lion," you have no choice of meaning; and though the lion might be justly distinguished for his agility, his lofty gait, his generous disposition, and his noble instincts, yet would no one ever understand the figure of any of these, but only of that overpowering strength, joined to unyielding courage, of which he is the emblem.* And if, in like man-

nitio et interpretatio troporum, ab usu loquendi tropico, *qui cuilibet nationi, instituto, ætati, etc. proprius est, pendet.*" "Sicuti omnis sermonis, ita etiam, tropici, suprema lex est usus et consuetudo loquendi!"—Enchiridion Hermeneut. generalis. *Vien.* 1812, pp. 106, 107.

* As an instance of the utility of recurring to the ideas of a peculiar country, in order to understand figures of this sort, we may refer to Cant. i. 9, (al. 8,) which may be rendered more literally than in the Vulgate, by "Equabus in curribus Pharaonis assimilabo te." In what does the comparison consist? Lowth illustrates it from Theocritus, Idyll xviii. 30,

ner, I said of a warrior chief that he was a *tiger*, nobody would ever understand me, if thereby I intended to describe his strong limbs, or his soft gait, or his amazing power of leaping and running. For, although these are all qualities of that animal, usage has attached an invariable meaning to the metaphor, which we all understand at once, and from which no one who wishes to be understood may lawfully depart. The same must be said of all established figurative phrases; besides their literal signification, they can only bear that metaphorical one which use has given them, and the moment we give them another totally new, we must cease to be understood. You may verify this remark, by trying it upon any proverbial metaphor.

Once more, then, if the phrase *to eat the flesh*

(De Sacra Poesi, Ox. 1810, vol. i. p. 397;) and then it only expresses loftiness of stature. Rosenmüller thinks it refers to the caparisons worn by the horse, as compared to the trinkets which adorned the bride. (Solomonis regis et sapientis quæ perhibentur scripta. Lips. 1830, p. 314.) But the poetry of the East, even at the present day, uses the figure, though in neither of these senses. Among the images under which female charms are yet described in the pastoral poetry of the Bedouins, all bearing a striking resemblance to the expressions in the Canticle, we have this very one: "Il n'omet ni sa démarche légère comme celle d'une *jeune port-line*," &c. (Volney, Voyage en Egypte et en Syrie, cinquième éd. Paris, 1822, tom. i. p. 373)

of a person, besides its literal sense, bore among the people whom Jesus addressed a fixed, proverbial, unvarying, metaphorical signification, then, if he meant to use it metaphorically, I say, that he could use it only in that one sense; and hence, our choice can only lie between the literal sense and that usual figure. Now, I do assert that, whether we examine (1) the phraseology of the Bible, or (2) the ordinary language of the people who still inhabit the same country, and have inherited the same ideas, or (3), in fine, the very language in which our Saviour addressed the Jews, we shall find the expression to eat the *flesh of a person* signifying, invariably, when used metaphorically, to *attempt to do him some serious injury, principally by calumny or false accusation*. Such, therefore, was the *only* figurative meaning which the phrases could present to the audience at Capernaum.

1. It is so in Hebrew—"While the wicked," says the Psalmist, "draw near against me, to eat my flesh."* This expression, as commentators have remarked, describes the violent rage of his enemies, and the lengths to which they were ready to go against him.† Job xix. 22, is the

* Ps. xxvii (*Heb.*) 2.

† "Rosemüller, Psalmi," 2a ed. *Lips.* 1822, vol. ii

same phrase, but spoken of calumniators: "Why do you persecute me, and are not *satisfied with* (eating) *my flesh?*"* Again, Micheas iii. 3, we have, "Who also *eat the flesh* of my people." Ecclesiastes iv. 5, we find the mischief which a foolish man does to himself described by the same figurative phrase: "The fool foldeth his arms together, and *eateth his own flesh.*" These are the only passages in which we meet this expression throughout the Old Testament, in its figurative sense; and in all, the idea of inflicting grievous injury, under different forms, and specifically by calumny, is strongly and decidedly marked.

In the New Testament, the expression is used by St. James in the same sense, though it seems

p. 724.—"Gesenius's Heb. Lexicon," translated by Leo. Camb. 1825, p. 35. Michaelis understood the phrase of *calumny*.

* Allusion is made to the same idea, (xiv. 10,) "They widen their jaws against me, *they fill themselves with me.*" Job xxxi. 31, "The men of my tabernacle have said, *who will give us of his flesh, that we may be filled,*" must not be compared; as Schultens has satisfactorily proved, after Ikenius, that the pronoun is not personal, but possessive; and that the phrase is more correctly rendered, "*quis dabit de carne ejus non saturatum;*"—"where is the man who is not filled with his meat?" (*Liber Jobi cum nova versione. Lugd. Batav. 1737, tom. ii. p. 875.*) Rosenmüller approves of this interpretation.

to me that it rather bears the more limited import of *accusation*, which, I will presently show you, it subsequently acquired. The parallelism between the members of the sentence seems to indicate this: "Your gold and silver are rusted; and the rust of them shall be for a *testimony against you*, and *shall eat your flesh* as (destructively as) fire." St. Paul undoubtedly alludes to this common figure, when he says to the Galatians, then involved in party quarrels, "But if you bite, and *eat one another*."*

2. The language and literature of the Arabs form one of the most fruitful sources of Scriptural illustration. Words and phrases are still in current use among them, which occur in the sacred writings, for their language is but a dialect of that which the Jews spoke; and the tenacity in Eastern nations of customs and ideas, preserves them through ages, almost unalterable and fresh. Among the Arabs to this day, and from time immemorial, *to eat the flesh of a person* means figuratively to *calumniate* him. This strong expression takes its rise clearly from the horror which the Orientals entertain for calumny and detraction.

This idea is expressed most strikingly in the

* Gal. v. 15.

Koran, where the sentiment occurs as follows:

ولا يعتب بعضكم بعضا أيحجب أحدكم أن يأكل لحم أخيه

ميتا فكرهتموه

“And *speak* not *ill* one of the other in his absence. Should any of you like to *eat the flesh of his brother* (neighbor) when dead? Truly you would abhor it.”* The inference is clear. “In the same manner you ought to abhor calumny.” The poet Nawabig uses the same expression: تقول انا صائم وانت في لحم اخي ساءم. “Thou sayest, I am fasting, and thou art *eating the flesh of thy brother*.”† In the Hamasa, لا نزقا للحاء ولا اللحم صد يقي لاسرلا, “I am not given to *detraction*, and to *eating the flesh of my friend*.”‡ Again,

ونسرب من موالى السو ذي حسد
تفتلت لحمي ولا يشغبه من قرم

* “Koran,” Sura, xlix. 12, ed. Maracci, p. 667.

† Elnawabig, No. 146, ed. Schultens. There is a passage remarkably resembling this of Nawabig, in the elegant and pious Lewis of Granada; and it might be interesting to inquire whether this phraseology passed from the Arabs into Spanish literature. His words are as follows:—“Y otros hallereis que por todo el mundo no comeràn carne el miercoles, y con esto *murmuran y deguellan crudelissimamente los proximos*. Demanera que siendo muy escrupulosos en no comer carne de animales, ningun escrupulo tienen de *comer carne y vidas de hombres*.” Obras del Ven. P. M. Fray Luis de Granada. Tom. i. *Barcel.* 1701, p. 174.

‡ Ap. Schultens, Com. in Job, p. 480.

“The rich *calumniator*, who is allied to the envious, *has taken my flesh for food*, and has not been cured of his appetite for flesh.”* The eighth proverb of Meidan† contains, I believe, the same expression, but I have not the work within my reach. The poet Schanfari too expresses the same idea.

طريد جنایات قداسین لحمه

“He has been persecuted by falsehoods, which have *divided his flesh among them for food*.”‡ In fine, not to multiply examples, the thirtieth fable of Lokman the Wise contains the same sentiment, where the dog that gnaws the dead lion is made the emblem of the calumniator of the dead.§

I must observe, in reference to these expressions, that they clearly do not belong to the verbal idioms of the language, but that their meaning descends from the ideas and feelings of the people. For they are not like our own corresponding term *backbite*, which, however

* Excerpta Hamasæ in Schulten's Anthology, at the end of his Erpennius, *Lugd. Batav.* 1748, p. 591. See also Michaelis's *Chrestomathia Arab.* p. 133.

† “Meidani Proverb.” *Lugd. Batav.* 1795, p. 7.

‡ “Sacy, *Chrestomathie Arabe*,” tom. i. *Paris*, 1806, p. ۳۱۸.

§ “*Fabulæ Loemani Sapientis*,” at the end of Erpennius's *Grammar*, *Romæ*, 1829, p. 165.

figurative in its origin, could not warrant us in now expressing calumny by any other term similarly compounded, nor by any phrase equivalent to it. The Arabic figure, on the contrary, exists not in the terms or body, but in the spirit of the language. The verbs employed, as well as the turn of the phrase, differ in almost every one of the examples I have given; but the same idea prevails in all, and warrants us in concluding that to eat or feed upon the flesh of another, means figuratively, among the Arabs, to calumniate or falsely accuse that person.

There are passages in Martial, which bear a striking resemblance to the phrases I have given you from Oriental poets. They are generally in epigrams expressly entitled *in Detractorem*. For instance,

—————“*Vacua dentes in pelle fatiges
Et tacitam quæras quam possis rodere carnem.*”*

Again,

“*Non deerunt tamen hæc in urbe forsar,
Unus vel duo, tresve, quatuorve,
Pellem rodere qui vellent caninam.*”†

In fine,

—————“*Quid dentem dente juvabit
Rodere? carne opus est, si satur esse velis.*”‡

* Lib. vi. epig. 64, v. 31.

† Lib. v. epig. 50, v. 8.

‡ Lib. xiii. epig. 2. Martial's meaning is simply, that it is folly for the detractors to attack him, who has been

The resemblance, however, is more in the words than in the sentiment.

3. Let us now pass to the language which our Saviour himself spoke, and which was vernacular among the Jews whom he addressed. In Chaldaic, the most common expression for to *accuse falsely*, *calumniate*, is to *eat a morsel*, or *the flesh of a person*, אכל קרצ' די;* and in Syriac, exactly the same, ܐܚܠ ܩܪܘܨܝܢܐ. Hence the name *διαβολος* is translated throughout the Syriac version of the New Testament, by ܐܚܠ ܩܪܘܨܝܢܐ, *Ochel Kartzo, the eater of flesh*. The

as severe a critic on himself; whence to attack him was like one tooth trying to gnaw another, which was of course foolish and vain. The figure is, therefore, used in another sense from the Arabic expression, as *flesh* in Martial only serves to indicate a softer material in opposition to the tooth. The idea, however, of *gnawing*, *biting*, &c., is applied to calumny in most languages. So Horace, (Ep. lib. ii. ep. i. 150,)

—————“doluere cruento
Dente laecessiti.”

And again, (Sat. i. lib. i. v. 81,) “absentem qui rodit amicum;” St. Isidore (Offic. lib. ii. cap. 5,) “Cujus præ ceteris officium est . . . cum fratribus pacem habere, nec quemquam de membris suis discernere.” The Italians use the term, to *devour a person by calumnies*. The Greeks use, in like manner, the verb *ενδαουμαι*, Æschyl. Sept. adv. Theb. 580 Sophocl. *Trachin*, 788. Ed. Lond. 1819, tom. i. p. 326,—where see the Scholiast.

* Dan. iii 8; vi. 24.

older philologists, probably from not being acquainted with the expression as preserved in the Arabic idiom, gave to this phrase a most forced and unwarrantable interpretation. They rendered the word אכל, *to eat*, by *proclaim* (as *edo* in Latin), and קרצא, a *morsel cut out*, by *calumny*,* without any authority, etymology, or reason, except the necessity of accounting for the meaning of every thing, whether they understood it or not.

Aben Ezra, however, had long since seen the true meaning of the expression, observing that the calumniator was the same as one who eats the flesh of his neighbor.† Modern philology has totally exploded the old interpretation, and established the one, which, while it gives to each word its natural signification,‡ coin-

* See Buxtorf's Lexicon, "Rabbin," *Basil*, 1639, p. 85, Castell sub voce אכל, Parkhurst, *Lond.* 1813, p. 661, where his etymological reasoning is a fair specimen of his usual taste and judgment. What an idea, that a language should draw its *usual* expression for an accusation, from the *winks* and *nods* which might *occasionally* accompany such an action! Only the imagination of a Hutchinsonian in philology could make this leap

† Gesenius, "Thesaurus philologicus-criticus Linguæ Hebrææ et Chaldææ," tom. ii. fascic. i. *Lips.* 1829, p. 91.

‡ No doubt can exist of the literal meaning of the verb אכל, אָכַל which always means to eat. The word קרצא is

cides so strongly with the Hebrew, and more especially the Arabic, idioms already quoted. I shall content myself with citing the authority of some of the most eminent philologists in the Semitic languages of the present age. Michaelis, on more than one occasion, gives this explanation of the phrase, which he considers fully warranted by the analogy of the Arabic language.* Jahn gives the same as perfectly established. “**בָּ, אֲכַלְתֶּם מִצֶּמֶת**, *cum comederent frusta, seu carnem ejus*, i. e. eum accusarent, calumniarentur, Matt. xxvii. 12. Hebræi id exprimunt per **אָכַל בָּשָׂר**, *comedit carnem alterius.*”†

Ammon, the annotator of Ernesti, without any hesitation renders the phrase in the same manner. “Difficilius expediuntur tropi ex

double root; for in Arabic, we have two corresponding ones, **قَرَصَ** *compressit*, whence to *press* the lips, (Prov. xvi. 30,) the *eyelids*, (ib. x. 10.—Ps. xxxv. 9,) *clay*, so as to shape it, (Job xxxiii. 6.) The other is **قَرَضَ** *rescuit, excidit*, obsolete in Heb., but found in its derivative **קָרַץ** (Jer. xlvi. 20,) and in the Chald. **קַרְצָא**, *a morsel cut out*. See Winer’s “*Lexicon Manuale Hebr. et Chald.*” Lips. 1828, p. 874. His words will be found in the text.

* “*Beurtheilung der Mittel die Hebräische Sprache zu verstehen*,” p. 230, and in his edition of “*Castell’s Syriac Lexicon.*” Götting. 1788, p. 35.

† *Johannis Jahn “Elementa Aramaicæ seu Chaldæo-Syriacæ Linguae.” Vionnæ, 1820, p. 173.*

translatione rhetorica orti, verbi causa *διαβολος*,
 אכל אצל סניז *comedens carnem.*”*

Winer, perhaps the most complete sacred philologist of the present day, agrees in the same explanation. These are his words: “Hinc tropice, אכל קרצ' ד', *alicujus frusta comedere*; qua phrasi, etiam in Targum, et in N. T. Syriaco frequentata, *obtrectatio* et *calumnia* exprimitur. Assimilantur, scilicet, calumniatores, obtrectatores, et sycophantæ *canibus rabidis*, qui *frusta* corporibus *avulsa* avide *devorant.*”†

I will close this list of authorities, by that of Gesenius, the most learned Hebrew scholar, and perhaps the most sagacious in penetrating the spirit of the Semitic languages; whenever his peculiarly free doctrines do not prejudice him in his interpretation. Both in his first and second Hebrew Lexicons, he agrees with the interpretation of the philologers whom I have quoted. In his first work he renders the phrase by “to eat *pieces of any one*, a metaphorical expression, for, to *calumniate*, to bring to trial:”‡

* Ernesti, “Institutio interp. N. T.” p. 42.

† *Ubi supra*. He repeats his interpretation in another work, as follows: “Die Stücken jem. fressen, d. h. jem. verleumden, denunciren.” Erklärendes Wortregister, in his “Chaldäisches Lesebuch,” *Leipz.* 1825, p. 75.

‡ “Hebräisches und Chaldäisches Handwörterbuch,” zw. Ausg. *Leipz.* 1823, p. 677.

In his last work, he repeats his opinion. "Veram formulæ rationem dudum recte intellexit Aben Esra, eum qui clam alterius famam lacerat, instar ejus esse monens, qui *carnem ejus arrodit*; ac sane non erat, cur alias rationes ingrederentur interpretes, ex parte plane ἀπροσδιονυσους."*

The conclusion, from all that I have said, is obvious. Whether we consult the phraseology of Scripture, the spirit and ideas of the Semitic nations, or the current use of the language employed by our Saviour, the expression to *eat the flesh of a person*, had an established metaphorical meaning. The phrase, therefore, could not be used metaphorically, in any other sense; so that if the hearers found themselves compelled to fly from its literal meaning, and take refuge in a figurative interpretation; so long as they had to interpret words and phrases by the *only* meanings which they had ever heard given to them, they could only recur to this. Nor is it consistent with the first elements of civilized society, of good intentions, nay, of common sense, for any speaker to use forms of language, having established and conventional significations, in a sense never before heard, noways intelligible

* Thesaurus, loc. cit.

from the nature of the phrases, and unattainable by any conjecture which might be expected from the habits, feelings, or ideas of those to whom they are addressed.

While, therefore, upon a minute analysis of the expressions used in the former part of the discourse, we discovered that every phrase, as in common use among the Jews, was adapted to convey the doctrine there taught, and so our Saviour explained himself, we have no less discovered that the phrases used in the second portion never could have the same meaning, consequently that a transition must have taken place to another subject. Furthermore, we have seen that the phrases used in the latter portion were such as left the hearers, and consequently us, no choice between the literal sense, and an established metaphorical one of *calumniating* our Saviour. This must instantly be rejected, nor has any one ever so much as thought of it; and we must therefore conclude that our Lord, after the forty-eighth verse, teaches the necessity of really eating his body and drinking his blood.

In order to complete this first argument in favour of the Catholic interpretation of this passage, it will be necessary to examine an objection which may be brought against it: I mean

the attempt made to find expressions among the Jews, tending to show that they might have well understood our Saviour in a figurative sense. And I will introduce the objection by the words of an adversary, which will serve to show how correct principles may be perversely or ignorantly brought to produce false conclusions. After having noticed the passages of the Rabbins where food is used for doctrine, Mr. Townsend, the writer to whom I allude, proceeds as follows:—"It may be observed here, that an acquaintance with the Jewish traditions would materially assist the theological student to form a more accurate notion of many subjects of controversy between the Church of Rome and the Protestants. This discourse of our Lord in John vi., has been insisted upon by the Romanists, as defending and supporting the doctrine of transubstantiation. This notion originated in the sixth century, and is founded on the *literal* interpretation of passages which were commonly *used by the Jews*, to whom the Scriptures were addressed, and by the inspired writers who primarily wrote for their use, *in a metaphorical sense.*"* Now, this principle of examining the

* "The New Testament arranged in Chronological and Historical Order, with Copious Notes." *Lond.* 1825. Vol. i. p. 268. The words printed in italics are so in the original.

meaning of scriptural phrases, only in reference to the time when they were written, and the persons to whom they were addressed, is exactly the one whereon I have proceeded in all this investigation. So far, therefore, I agree with Mr. Townsend: great light will be thrown upon the controversy, by the theological student's attending to the Jewish traditions.

But now, mark the bold assertion, that Catholics err by interpreting, in a literal sense, passages which the original writers and readers of Scripture *commonly used in a metaphorical one*. For, has Mr. Townsend, or any other Protestant writer, brought a single passage from them to prove this? Will he argue from the former part of the chapter, where Christ calls himself the food of life? But, then, he must prove that to *eat the flesh* of Christ means the same thing. And, in language which is purely conventional, and more so in figurative language, which is only intelligible inasmuch as it is conventional, such extraordinary substitutions must be *proved*. That this one cannot, has been sufficiently evinced by this lecture, which has shown that the two phrases had conventional meanings essentially distinct: and I have already shown the passages, for which he refers the theological

student to Lightfoot, to belong to the illustration of the first part of the discourse.

But while Mr. Townsend thus refers to imaginary passages which nowhere exist, but by which he wishes to make his readers believe that the figurative sense of our Redeemer's words would be established, and the Catholic interpretation confuted, and while Dr. Lightfoot, as you will see later, endeavors, but feebly, to supply some such; more learned or more candid Protestants acknowledge, that this discourse, as explained by them, is interpreted contrary to the *usus loquendi*; or, in other words, that the sense put on our Lord's words by Protestants, is not the one which his hearers could apply to them. Tittman, for instance, rejects all the attempts to illustrate them by similar phrases in classical writers; but the conclusions which he draws are general, and apply to all other authors, sacred and profane.

"They appeal," he writes, "to the *usus loquendi* of profane authors, who use the words *to eat* and *drink*, speaking of a person who is imbued with the doctrines of any one, so as to receive and approve of them. It is, indeed, true, that Greek and Latin writers use the words *to eat* and *drink* in this sense; but that they so used the phrases *to eat the flesh* and *drink*

the blood of any one, cannot be proved by a single example. These forms of expression were clearly unheard of, by any authors, and are peculiar to our Lord alone; therefore can we nowise appeal to their custom of speech.* This candid admission from such an authority, must more than counterbalance the unsupported assertions of the English divine.

There is, in fact, only one passage brought from Jewish writings, any way calculated to establish a parallelism with the expressions in the *latter* part of our Saviour's discourse.† It is a

* "Provocant ad usum loquendi scriptorum profanorum, qui usi fuerint verbis *edere* et *bibere* de eo qui imbuitur alicujus doctrina, ut eam suscipiat et probet. Atque id quidem verissimum est, scriptores græcos et latinos usurpasse verba *edere* et *bibere* hoc significatu; eos vero hoc tali modo usos fuisse formulis *edere carnem* et *bibere sanguinem* alicujus id doceri potest ne uno quidem exemplo. Istæ formulæ planè inauditæ fuerunt scriptoribus omnibus, et tantum uni Domino propriæ; quare adeo ad illorum loquendi consuetudinem provocari nullo modo potest."—*Meletemata Sacra. Lips.* 1816, p. 274.

† I presume I shall not be expected to examine the ridiculous passage given by Meusehen, or rather Scheid, as illustrative of Jo. vi. 51. It is as follows: "What, is there such a thing as flesh descending from heaven? Yes. For behold, when R. Chilpetha was journeying, he was met by some lions, which, by their roar, seemed going to devour him. Upon his reciting Ps. civ. 21, *two thighs came down to him*, one whereof the lions eat, the other they left to him: Upon relating this event to the school, the scholars asked

saying of Hillel's, mentioned more than once in the Talmud, in the following words:

אין משיח להם לישראל שכבר אכלוהו בימי הזקיה

“Israel will have no Messiah, because they *eat him*, in the days of Ezechiah.” These words Lightfoot quotes in a tone of triumph. “Behold, *eating the Messiah*, and yet no complaints upon the phraseology. Hillel is indeed blamed,” (in the commentary which I will quote just now,) “for saying that the Messiah was so eaten that he will no longer be for Israel: but on the form of speech not the slightest scruple is expressed. For they clearly understood what was meant by the *eating of the Messiah*; that is, that in the days of Ezechias, they became partakers of the Messiah, received him with avidity, embraced him joyfully, and, as it were, absorbed him; whence, he was not to be expected at any future period.”*

him, was that clean or not? whereupon he replied, nothing unclean comes down from heaven. R. Zira asked R. Abhu: It the apparition of an ass descended to him, what would he say of that? to which he answered: Thou foolish dragon, behold it has been said to thee, that nothing unclean descends from heaven.” “Novum Test. ex Talmude illustratum.” *Lips.* 1736, p. 152. If the word of God can be said to receive illustration from such profane nonsense as this, I would say it should have been rather placed as a commentary on Acts x. 15, than on Jo. vi. 51.

* “Lightfoot,” *supra cit.* p. 626.

The least that can be said of the phrase of Hillel is, that it is so obscure as to be unintelligible, and in this respect forms a good commentary upon our controversy: for it demonstrates that words cannot be understood, the moment we apply them differently from their usual determinate meaning. But in order to demonstrate the fallacy of Lightfoot's argument, it will be sufficient to show that the celebrated passage of Hillel does not bear the meaning which he gives it, nor any other which can render it parallel to the phrases in John vi.

1. The words of Hillel expressly say, that the Messiah was so eaten in the day of Ezechiah, that he cannot appear again; in other words, he was destroyed or consumed at that time. This could not be by receiving him, embracing him, &c., as Lightfoot would have it. For it would be absurd to reason that the Messiah, promised solemnly by God, was to be withheld because persons loved, embraced, and absorbed him spiritually before his coming.

2. The Jewish doctors themselves did not understand the words of Hillel in Lightfoot's sense; and from their reply, who were certainly the best judges, it follows that either they did not understand Hillel's expression, so that he must be said to have departed from the *usus*

loquendi or intelligible forms of speech, or else that their meaning was one every way inapplicable to John vi. In either case the passage can have no weight against us. These are the words of the Talmud:—"Rab said, Israel will eat the years of the Messiah. (The gloss explains this by 'the abundance of the times of the Messiah will belong to Israel!') Rab Joseph said truly, but who will eat of it? (the abundance.) Will Chillek and Billek eat of it? This was said to meet the saying of Hillel," &c.*

The Rabbins, therefore, understood the words of this doctor, not as applying to the Messiah, but to the *abundance of his times*; and then the figure is not in the *eating*, but in the word *Messiah*. Did they understand him rightly? Then Lightfoot's interpretation is totally wrong, and no parallelism exists between these words and those of our Saviour. For he certainly did not mean to inculcate the necessity of eating the abundance of his times. Did they misunderstand Hillel, and was it only Dr. Lightfoot who first arrived at his meaning? Then it follows that Hillel, in these phrases, departed from the intelligible use of language, and consequently ceases to be a criterion for explaining it. Add

* Sanhedrim, fol. 98, 2. Apud Lightfoot, *ibid*.

to this, that even allowing that Hillel could have meant, by *eating* the Messiah, *receiving* and *embracing* him, the expression, to eat the *flesh* of the Messiah, is totally different. For I have already observed repeatedly, that, in conventional metaphors, the least departure from established phraseology plunges us into obscurity and nonsense. Take a parallel instance which comes across my mind. When Pope says—

“He kept the money, so the rogue was *bit*,”

we understand immediately what *to bite* means in this passage, for it is a conventional metaphor; but had he made here the alteration above supposed, and said the “rogue’s *flesh* was *bit*,” would the phrase have been any longer vernacular or intelligible? In like manner, if to *eat the Messiah*, could have been understood by Hillel and his Rabbins, in Lightfoot’s sense, because it was a conventional phrase, the addition of “eating the *flesh* of the Messiah,” would totally change the phrase, and make it no longer comprehensible. I have, in fact, demonstrated, that to *eat the flesh* of a person had its own determinate, invariable, and conventional figurative signification; and from this, if you turn to figures, you have no right to depart.

If I had to give an opinion upon the words

of Hillel, I should say that they belong to that class of inexplicable things wherewith the Talmud abounds, most aptly indeed contrived for amazing, mystifying, and utterly confounding its readers, but not much calculated to instruct or to enlighten them. It is one of those hard shells which the Rabbins seem to delight in throwing into their scholars' laps, so hard, indeed, that they cannot by any possibility be cracked; and consequently there is no danger of their ever bringing it to a decision, whether they contain a kernel,—

“For true, no meaning puzzles more than wit.”

For us, it suffices that we can prove them utterly worthless, when used against us by even such powerful men as Dr. Lightfoot.

LECTURE III.

Second Argument for the Real Presence, from the Sixth Chapter of St. John; from the prejudices of the Jews regarding human flesh and blood. Third argument; from the manner in which the Jews understood our Saviour's words, and from his reply: Objections to this proof answered.

IN my last lecture I analyzed the phrases used by our divine Saviour in the two divisions of his discourse, in order to discover the ideas which they could convey to his hearers; and the result was, that while the expressions used in the first part were well selected to teach the necessity and advantages of listening to his doctrines, those of the second must have led the Jews astray, if they were meant to convey any doctrine but that of the Real Presence.

The second argument, which I now proceed to treat, is founded upon a reflection which you will remember in my first lecture, and the just-

ness whereof I believe no one will deny. I quoted to you the remark of Burke, that in addressing popular assemblies, it is necessary, in some respect, to adapt ourselves to the weaknesses and prejudices of those who hear us.* "The preacher," says an able writer, whom I have before had occasion to quote, "who is intent upon carrying his point, should use all such precautions as are not inconsistent with it, to avoid raising unfavorable impressions in his hearers."†

Our Saviour's object in his discourses to the Jews, was to gain them over to the doctrines of Christianity, and he, therefore, must be supposed to propose those doctrines in the manner most likely to gain their attention, and conciliate their esteem. At least it is repugnant to suppose him selecting the most revolting images, wherein to clothe his dogmas, disguising his most amiable institutions under the semblance of things the most wicked and abominable in the opinion of his hearers, and inculcating his most saving and most beautiful principles, by the most impious and horrible illustrations. Yet, in such manner must we consider him to have acted, if we deny him to have been teach-

* Page 38.

† Dr. Whately's "Elements of Rhetoric," p. 152.

ing the doctrine of the real presence, and suppose him to have been simply inculcating the necessity of faith.

For the ideas of *drinking blood* and *eating human flesh* presented something so frightful to a Jew, that we cannot allow our Saviour, if a sincere teacher, to have used them as images for consoling and cheering doctrines; nor, in fact, to have used them at all, under any other circumstances than an absolute necessity of recurring to them, as the most literal method of representing his doctrines.

1. *Drinking blood*, even though of a clean animal, was, in the Jews' idea, a weighty transgression of a divine precept, given originally to Noah,* and frequently repeated in the law of Moses.† Indeed, the most awful form of threatening ever employed by God, is uttered against those who eat blood:—"If any man whosoever of the house of Israel, and of the strangers that sojourn among them, eat blood, I will set my face against his soul, and will cut him off from among his people."‡ Hence, we find the drinking of blood, or the eating of meat with which blood was mixed, ever mentioned in Scripture

* Gen. ix. 4.

† Levit. iii. 17; vii. 26; xix. 26. Deut. xii. 16; xv. 23

‡ Levit. xvii. 10.

as a most heinous crime. When the army of Saul slaughtered their cattle on the ground, it was reported to him, "that the people had sinned against the Lord, eating with the blood. And he said, You have transgressed."* Ezechiel is commanded to proclaim—"Thus saith the Lord God: you that eat with the blood . . . shall you possess the land by inheritance?"† Indeed, no necessity was supposed to justify the drinking of the blood of an animal, as appears from a passage in Judith—"For drought of water they are already to be counted among the dead. And they have a design even to kill their cattle, and *to drink the blood of them . . . therefore, because they do these things, it is certain they will be given up to destruction.*"‡ If, then, it was reckoned so guilty among the Jews to taste the blood of even a clean animal, in a case of necessity, how impious must it have seemed to them to drink the blood of man?

2. The drinking of blood, and, more especially, the feeding upon human flesh and blood, is always mentioned in Scripture as the last and most dreadful curse which the Almighty could possibly inflict upon his enemies:—"For, instead of a fountain of an ever-running river,

* 1 Reg. (Sam.) xiv. 33.

† Ezech. xxxiii. 25.

‡ Judith xi. 10, 11, 12.

thou gavest human blood to the unjust," says the book of Wisdom.* The same is mentioned in the Apocalypse:—"Thou hast given them blood to drink, for they have deserved it."† In Isaiah, we have the eating of flesh joined to the drinking of blood:—"I will feed them that oppress thee, with their own flesh, and they shall be drunk with their own blood;"‡—that is, with the flesh and blood of one another. The fourth book of Esdras, though apocryphal, bears unexceptionable testimony to the same idea:—"They shall eat their own flesh, and drink their own blood, for hunger of bread and thirst of water."§ In fine, Jeremiah mentions, as a plague which should astonish all men, that the citizens should be obliged to "eat, every man the flesh of his friend."||

While the Jews attached two such dreadful ideas as these to the eating of human flesh and the drinking of human blood, while they considered them a crime and a curse, it is repugnant to suppose that our blessed Saviour, anxious to draw them all to himself, should have clothed doctrines, no ways repulsive, under imagery drawn from such an odious source. As well might we suppose him inculcating the necessity

* Wisd. xi. 7. † Apoc. xvi. 6. ‡ Is. xlix. 26.

§ 4 Esd. xv. 58.

|| Jer. xix. 8, 9.

of belief in his death, by figures drawn from murder; and imagine him saying, "Amen, amen, I say unto you, unless you slay or murder the son of man, you shall not have life in you," as suppose him to clothe the same doctrine under the figure of eating his flesh and drinking his blood. For, as to the correctness of the metaphor, the revolting one which I have just given would have been equally appropriate, or much more so; while the one he used was as repugnant to Jewish feelings, as the other would be to ours. As, therefore, we could not have supposed him, or any other sincere teacher, to use imagery so revolting as this, if addressing us, so neither can we allow Jesus to have used the other when addressing the Jews. Nothing, consequently, but the absolute necessity of using such phrases, could justify the recurrence to them. Now, there could be no necessity, save their being the most simple way of conveying his doctrine. But any other doctrine, except that of receiving as food the body and blood of Christ, could have been literally expressed in other terms; or, if a figure was to be preferred, a thousand other metaphors were at hand, which might have been adopted; and therefore, we must conclude, that our Lord used these expressions, because it was his wish to teach the doc-

trine which they literally convey,—that of the Real Presence.

It may be objected to this line of reasoning, that our Saviour, on other occasions, clothed his lessons in figures almost equally odious to his hearers.

For instance, how frequently does he inculcate the necessity of patient suffering, under the repulsive image of *carrying the cross*,*—an instrument used in the execution of the meanest culprits, and intimately connected with hateful bondage to strangers.

But I must deny all parallel between the cases. 1. The cross might be ignominious, and as such odious,—but it was not necessarily criminal. To eat blood was considered essentially wicked; and to teach a doctrine figuratively, by ordering a person to commit what he deems a heinous crime, is very different from telling him to submit to what is merely disgraceful. 2. I have never said that our Saviour was bound to soften his *doctrines* in teaching them to the Jews, only that he could not consistently render repulsive by his *expressions* such as were not so in themselves. Now, the doctrine of mortification is necessarily and essentially harsh, disagreeable,

* Mat. x. 38, xvi. 24; Mar. viii. 24; Lu. ix. 23, xiv. 27

humiliating, and painful. Our Redeemer, therefore, must represent it as such; nor could he have selected a metaphor which so exactly comprised all these qualities, as did that of the cross, which, at the same time, would include within it the encouragement of his own example. But then, the same sincerity which made him “extenuate nought” in the asperity of his severe doctrines, would not allow him to “set aught down in malice,” or give an air of revolting harshness to those which were, in themselves, amiable and attractive. And of all the principles of Christianity, faith in the death of its Divine Author and Finisher is considered by Protestants as the most cheering and most delightful.

I proceed now to the third, and most important proof of the Real Presence, drawn from the sixth chapter of St. John. Our inquiries are entirely directed to discover what was the meaning which our Saviour’s audience must necessarily have attached to his words. Now, it seldom happens that similar investigations can be carried on, with the singular advantages which we enjoy in this instance. For, generally, we must be content to proceed, as we have hitherto done, by seeking indirect evidence of the meaning of words and phrases, together with collateral historical attestations of the circumstances under

which they were uttered. But here, we have it in our power to advance a step, and an important step, farther. We have the direct testimony of those addressed, to how they understood our Saviour, and we have his warrant for the correctness of their interpretation. Such is the argument on which I am about to enter: and I beg of you to follow me with your most earnest attention.

We have before seen, that, upon the Jews misunderstanding our Saviour's metaphorical expressions, in the former part of his discourse, he clearly explained them, at v. 35, as relative to faith; and that after this, he continues in a literal train of instruction through the rest of that discourse. Hence we find, that on this head the Jews were satisfied, for they now only object to his saying that he came down from heaven, (v. 41, 42.) It is evident, that if the audience had understood him, after v. 48, to continue the same topic as before, they could have had no farther objections to make: or, at least, that they could not have returned to the same difficulties.

Yet we find, that no sooner had our Saviour mentioned the eating of his *flesh*, (v. 52,) than they again raise a third objection (v. 53)—“How can this man give us his flesh to eat?”

From these words we must necessarily draw two conclusions.

First, that the Jews considered the expressions just used, as totally different from those in the first portion of the discourse. For if they had understood, by *eating his flesh*, the same as *having him, the bread of life*,—this having been already explained by himself, of believing in him,—they could not ask, in what manner this manducation was to take place. We have, therefore, the testimony of the very persons addressed, that a transition had taken place in our Lord's discourse.

Secondly, we must conclude that the Jews understood the transition to be to the doctrine literally expressed, of feeding upon Christ; for their objection supposes him to be teaching a doctrine impossible to be practised:—“How *can* this man give us his flesh to eat?” Now, no other but the literal signification could possibly give rise to this objection. But, in fact, this requires no proof. Most commentators agree that the Capharnaites took our Saviour's words in their literal sense :* and, in fact, the common

* See Rosenmüll. in loc. p. 417. Kuinoel, however, (sup. cit. p. 370,) has imagined a very pretty scene; for he has given us an account of the different sentiments which formed the dispute of the Jews, (ἐμάχοντο, v. 53,) as accurately as a

outcry against the Catholic interpretation, that it is carnal like that of the Jews, and the popular explanation of our Lord's words from his expression "the flesh profiteth nothing," are concurrent testimony that the Capharnaïtes took them literally.

Thus far, then, we have the strongest testimony we can require, to our Saviour's having passed, in his discourse, to the literal eating of his flesh. One thing now only remains to decide the question finally: were the Jews *right* in so understanding him, or were they *wrong*? If they were *right*, then so are the Catholics, who likewise take his words literally; if *wrong*, then Protestants are right, when they understand him figuratively.

In order to decide this important point, now become the hinge of the question between the two religions, we will have recourse to a very

writer of romance could have done it. I am surprised that a sober English commentator, like Bloomfield, should have copied this fiction, (p. 217;) for he ought to have been aware, that it is by this *psychological* method of interpretation, as it is called in Germany, or, in other words, by supplying from imagination facts and conversations supposed to have been omitted by the Evangelists, that such men as Paulus Gabler, Schuster, and others of the Rationalist school, pretend to overthrow every miracle in the Gospels. Verses 61, 71, form the best, and a complete confutation of this imagined scene.

simple process. First, we will collect and examine all passages where the hearers of our Saviour *erroneously* take his figurative expressions in the literal sense, and raise objections in consequence of it, and see what is his conduct upon such occasions. Secondly, we will examine instances where the Jews rightly understand his words in their literal sense, and object to them, and see how he acts in such circumstances. We will then apply the rules thus drawn from our Master's usual conduct, to the instance before us, and see to which of the two classes this belongs—to that where the audience was *wrong*, or where it was *right*, in understanding him literally. Once more I entreat your most earnest attention.

1. I say, then, that whenever our Lord's hearers found difficulties, or raised objections to his words, from taking them in their literal sense, while he intended them to be taken figuratively, his constant practice was to explain them instantly, in a figurative manner, even though no great error could result from their being misunderstood. The first example which I will give, is a well-known conversation between our Saviour and Nicodemus. "Jesus answered and said to him : Amen, amen, I say to thee, unless a man be *born again*, he cannot enter the kingdom of God." This expression

was one in ordinary use, among the Jewish doctors, to express proselytism.* Nicodemus, whether from wilfulness or error, took the words in their literal import, and made an objection precisely similar in form to that of the Jews: “How *can* a man be born when he is old?” Our Saviour instantly explains the words in their figurative meaning to him, by repeating them with such a modification as could leave no farther doubt of the sense in which he spoke them. “Amen, amen, I say to thee, unless a man be born again of *water* and the *Holy Ghost*, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.”†

Mat. xvi. 6. Jesus said to his disciples, “Take heed and beware of the leaven of the Pharisees and Sadducees.” They took his words literally; “but they thought within themselves, saying, Because we have taken no bread.” But Jesus

* See Lightfoot, *ubi sup.* p. 610; Schoetgen, on 2 Cor. v. 17, vol. i. p. 704; Selden, *De Jure Nat. et Gent.* lib. ii. c. 4. The Brahmans are said to use the same expression, of persons who come over to their sect. See Creutzer, or Guignau, *ubi sup.* 2e partie, p. 585.

† Jo. iii. 3-5. Compare the following expression of the Jal-kut Rubeni, (fol. 101, 1,)


בר"יה הכהן נעשה המשחה שמן ירי על חרשת.

“By means of the oil of unction, the priest is made a new creature.” So the priests are called (Zac. iv. 14,) בני־היצרה “Sons of oil.” This, however, is a common Semitic idiom.

lost no time in correcting the mistake, (v. 11 :) “Why do you not understand that it is not concerning bread I said to you, Beware,” &c. “Then they understood that he said not that they should beware of the leaven of bread, but of the doctrine of the Pharisees and Sadducees.” This remarkable example of our Saviour’s care not to be misunderstood becomes much more interesting when we view it in reference to another passage in St. Luke, (c. xii. 1.) There we have a discourse of our Lord, which all the harmonists agree in placing long after that of St. Matthew.* Our Divine Master wished to employ before the crowds the same figure as we have just heard; but he had perceived that it was not easily understood, and he therefore adds the explanation, “Beware ye of the leaven of the Pharisees, which is hypocrisy.”

Jo. xv. 32. Jesus said to his disciples, “I have food to eat which you know not.” They erroneously took his words literally; and he lost no time in explaining them figuratively. “The disciples, therefore, said to one another, Hath any man brought him any thing to eat?”

* See Townsend’s New Testament. The passage of St. Matt. is p. 277, chap. iv. sec. 13, that of St. Luke, p. 328, chap. v. sec. 13. Also De Wette and Lucke, “Synopsis Evangeliorum.” Berlin, 1818, pp. 84, 211.



Jesus saith to them: My food is to do the will of him that sent me."

Jo. xi. 11 is a similar instance, and important, because our Saviour is not even engaged upon doctrinal matters. He said to the apostles, "Lazarus, our friend, sleepeth." Mistaking his meaning, by understanding him literally, they reply, "Lord, if he sleepeth, he will do well. But Jesus spoke of his death, and they thought that he spoke of the repose of sleep. Then, *therefore, Jesus said to them plainly, Lazarus is dead.*"

Mat. xix. 24. The disciples understood literally his words, "that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of Heaven," so as to conclude that salvation was absolutely incompatible with wealth. Jesus loses no time in removing their error by telling them that, "With men this is impossible, but with God all things are possible."

Jo. viii. 21. Jesus said, "Whither I go, you cannot come." The Jews took his words in a gross material sense, and asked, "Will he kill himself, because he said, whither I go, you cannot come?" Jesus, with the greatest meekness, removes this absurd interpretation of his words: "You are from beneath, I am from

above; you are of this world, I am not of this world.”

Ibid. v. 32. He tells the Jews, that the truth should make them free. They take his words literally, and raise an objection accordingly. “We are the seed of Abraham, and we have never been slaves to any man; how sayest thou, you shall be free?” He once more interrupts his discourse to contradict this erroneous interpretation, by replying, that he spoke of a spiritual slavery. “Amen, amen, I say unto you, that whosoever committeth sin, is the servant of sin—if therefore the son shall make you free (of sin), ye shall be free indeed.”

Ibid. v. 40. Jesus observes, that if the Jews were children of Abraham, they would do the works of Abraham; but that, instead of this, they acted in a totally opposite manner, and thereby did the deeds of their father. They understand him to say literally, that they were not the legitimate descendants of their patriarch, and replied accordingly: “We are not born of fornication.” Jesus, without hesitation, explains his meaning of their spiritual descent, however harsh it might appear, (v. 44.) “You are of your father, the devil, and the desires of your father you will do.”

Jo. vi. 33. In fine, in the very discourse

which forms the subject of all our inquiries, we have another, and a striking instance of our Saviour's constant practice. Jesus having said that "the bread of God is that which cometh down from heaven, and giveth light to the world;" his hearers take his words literally, contrary to his intentions, and say to him: "Lord, give us always this bread." True to his rule of action, Jesus explains himself spiritually: "I am the bread of life; he that cometh to me shall not hunger; and he that believeth in me shall not thirst."

From these examples, three whereof, like that under discussion, refer to images drawn from food, we may, I think, deduce a very certain corollary or canon; that whenever our Saviour's expressions were erroneously taken in their literal sense, and he meant them to be figurative, it was his constant practice instantly to explain himself, and let his audience understand that his words were to be taken figuratively. The eighth chapter of St. John, from which I have quoted three examples,* is a striking proof, that even when malice and perverseness were the sources of misinterpretation, he was not to be

* V. 13 is another example of our Saviour's unwearied and meek attention to remove the misapprehension of his hearers. See also Jo. xvi. 18-22.

wearied out by its repeated recurrence, but un-deviatingly adhered to this mild, prudent, and conciliating rule of ever correcting the misapprehensions of his audience.

2. Let us now examine our Saviour's practice in the opposite case. Secondly, therefore, I say, that when his words were *rightly* understood in their literal sense, and by that correct interpretation gave rise to murmurs or objections, it was his custom to stand to his words, and repeat again the very sentiment which had given the offence. The following instances well demonstrate this rule.

Mat. ix. 2. Jesus "said to the man sick of the palsy, Son, be of good heart, thy sins are forgiven thee." The hearers took these words in their literal meaning, and were right in doing so; still they expressed their displeasure with them, saying, "This man blasphemeth." Our Lord does not abate the least in the expression, which, being rightly understood, had caused the objections, but in his answer repeats it again and again. "Which is easier to say, *Thy sins are forgiven thee*, or to say, Rise up and walk. But that you may know that the Son of man hath power on earth to *forgive sins*," &c.

Jo. viii. 56. Our Redeemer said to the Jews: "Abraham your father rejoiced that he might

see my day : he saw it, and was glad." His auditors *correctly* took his words in their literal import, as equivalent to an assertion that he was coeval with Abraham; and they murmured accordingly. "The Jews then said to him, Thou art not yet fifty years old, and hast thou seen Abraham?" Our Saviour, though he fore-saw that personal violence would be the consequence of his conduct, did not seek to modify his words, but exactly repeated with his usual intrepidity the very sentiment which had caused so much offence. "Jesus said to them, Amen, amen, I say unto you, before Abraham was made, I am." Thus does the eighth chapter of St. John afford us marked exemplification of our blessed Redeemer's manner of acting in both cases, when rightly and when erroneously understood to speak in the literal sense.

Jo. vi. 42. Once more, the very chapter under discussion affords us a striking example of this rule. Our Saviour having said that he had come down from heaven, is correctly understood, yet murmured against. "And they said, Is not this Jesus, whose father and mother we know? How then saith he, I came down from heaven?" He acts in his usual manner. As they had understood him rightly,

he cares not for the objection ; but, having premised the reasons why they did not believe in him, goes on, in the second part of his discourse, to repeat again and again the very phrase which had caused complaint, by saying that he came down from heaven. (Vv. 50, 51, 59.)

The two rules, then, are sufficiently clear ; when his hearers, *misunderstanding* his words, raise objections, Jesus *explains* them ; when *understanding* them *right*, they find fault, he *repeats* them. In order, therefore, to discover whether the Jews understood our Saviour wrong or right in our case, we have only to look at his answer to their objection, and see whether he explains his previous words, as in the eleven instances I first brought, or repeats the obnoxious expressions, as in the three last cases which I quoted. The answer to this question is sufficiently clear. In his answer, our Saviour repeats the same words *five times*, and, as we shall clearly see next evening, in phrases which add energy to his previous expressions. In order to bring the passage under consideration into more immediate contact with the two canons I have laid down, I will transcribe it in parallel columns, with a text of each class.

- | <i>Jo.</i> iii. 3-5. | <i>Jo.</i> vi. 52-54. | <i>Jo.</i> viii. 56-58. |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Unless a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God. | 1. If any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever; and the bread which I will give, is my flesh for the life of the world. | 1. Abraham your father rejoiced that he might see my day: he saw it, and was glad. |
| 2. Nicodemus saith to him: How can a man be born again when he is old? | 2. The Jews therefore debated among themselves, saying: How can this man give us his flesh to eat? | 2. The Jews then said to him: Thou art not yet fifty years old, and hast thou seen Abraham? |
| 3. Jesus answered: Amen, amen, I say to you, unless a man be born again <i>of water and the Holy Ghost</i> , he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. | 3. Then Jesus said to them: Amen, amen, I say to you: unless you eat the flesh of the Son of man and drink his blood, you shall not have life in you. | 3. Jesus said to them: Amen, amen, I say to you, before Abraham was made, I am. |

A slight inspection of the three passages will leave no doubt regarding the class to which our text is to be referred. Thus, therefore, the objection of the Jews proves that they understood our Redeemer's words in their literal sense, of a real eating of his flesh; his answer, illustrated by his invariable practice, demonstrates that they were right in so understanding. We, therefore, who understand them as they did, are right also.

I must detain you a little longer, in order to reply to some objections which may be brought against the train of argument I have been pursuing. It may be said that I have laid down as a rule, that it was our Saviour's constant practice to explain himself when, his meaning being mistaken, objections were raised against his doctrines; and if this rule be erroneous, all my reasoning falls to the ground. Now, we have many instances in the New Testament, where our Lord, far from giving such explanations, seems to be desirous rather of keeping his hearers in the dark.

In order to prove this, the method of teaching by parable was once pointed out to me by a controversial antagonist, as sufficiently indicative of our Lord's desire to enwrap his doctrines in mysterious obscurity. This objection is, in reality, so indirect, that I should not consider myself bound to be diffuse in answering it, even if I had not done so fully elsewhere. In our course of hermeneutics, and in a voluminous essay which I once delivered to you, I have proved, that teaching in parables, so far from being a course selected by Jesus for the purpose of concealing his real dogmas, was, in fact, a method of instruction forced upon him by the habits and feelings of his countrymen, and the

practice of the Jewish schools ; that his parables themselves were, of their own nature, sufficiently intelligible, being drawn from common sayings or habitual occurrences ; and that, in fine, they were sufficiently understood by his auditors.

Instead, therefore, of spending more time in answering an objection, which belongs more properly to another place, I will notice two passages, which appear to be at variance with the rule I have laid down, and discuss them as briefly as the subject will permit.

The first is Jo. ii. 18-22. Upon the Jews asking Jesus for a sign of his authority, in driving the tradesmen from the temple, he said to them, " Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up. The Jews then said : Six and forty years was this temple in building ; and wilt thou raise it up again in three days ? But he spoke of the temple of his body. When, therefore, he was risen again from the dead, his disciples remembered that he had said this ; and they believed the scripture, and the word that Jesus had said." Here the Jews understood his words literally, when he meant them to be understood figuratively ; yet he gives no explanation. On the contrary, the Jews retained their erroneous interpretation to the end ; for they

made it a charge against him at his trial;* and the Apostles themselves, as appears from the very text, did not understand it until after the resurrection.

1. I must commence by remarking, that the phrase used by our Lord in this passage, if referred to his body, was one in such ordinary use among the Jews, that he noways departed from established forms of language. Nothing was more common among those nations who had imbibed the oriental philosophy, and among them the Jews, than to consider the body as a *vessel*, a *house*, a *tabernacle*, a *temple*. It is called a *vessel* by St. Paul;† and the same appellation is given to it by Socrates, who, in his last discourse, calls it “the vessel and receptacle of the soul;”‡ and by Lucretius—

“Crede animam quoque diffundi multoque perire, . . .

Quippe etenim corpus, quod vas quasi constitit ejus,” etc.

De Rerum Nat. lib. iii. 438

“Sic animus per se non quit sine corpore et ipso,

Esse homine, olliis quasi quod vas esse videtur.”

Ibid. 553; *v. also* 794.

These expressions are justly referred by Bendtsen to the *antiquum orientalium judicium*.§

* Mat. xxvi. 61, xxvii. 40; Mar. xiv. 58, xv. 29.

† 2 Cor. iv. 7; 1 Thessal. iv. 4. Comp. 1 Sam. xxi. 5.

‡ Plato, Sympos. c. xxxii.

§ “Marmora Mystica, in Miscellanea Hafnensia, philologici maxime argumenti,” Fascic. ii. *Copenhagen*. 1824, p. 293.

Isaiah calls it a *house*, *בַּיִת*,* and Job a *house* of clay.† It is styled a *tabernacle* by the same Apostle;‡ and his words, as Dr. Lardner has observed,§ are strikingly illustrated by a passage in Josephus, who, as a Pharisee, was necessarily versed in the mystic language of Eastern philosophy.|| The same expression is to be found in Nicander, Hippocrates, and other physiological authors. To the examples already known, the late learned Dr. Münter has added some from Spohn and Wheeler's inscriptions, and an ancient hymn; and concludes—"et hæc loquendi formula procul dubio ex orientalium philosophorum disciplina profecta."¶ In fine, it is repeatedly called a *temple* by St. Paul.** Philo uses the same image, styling the body *ναον* and *ἱερον*;†† as does the philosopher Lucretius:—

—————"Via qua munita fidei
Proxuma fert humanum in pectus templeaque mentis."
Lib. iv. 102.

* xxxviii. 12.

† iv. 19.

‡ 2 Cor. v. 1, 2, 4, where it is also called a house.

§ Works, *Lond.* 1827, vol. i. p. 127.

|| "Joseph. de Bello Jud." p. 1114, ed. *Hudson*.

¶ "Miscellanea Hafnensia," tom. i. *Copenhag.* 1816, p. 23

** 1 Cor. iii. 16, 17, vi. 19; 2 Cor. vi. 16.

†† "De Opificio Mundi," pp. 93, 94, ed. *Pfeiffer*.

From all this, it is manifest that the expression used by our Saviour was one of such obvious occurrence that the Jews ought to have understood him without difficulty. This at once forms a strong contrast with Jo. vi. 53: for we have seen that the phrase there objected against was never in use among the Jews, in a figurative sense; so that there was no clue to guide them to such a sense, if Christ had intended it.

Hence it is that the commentators who adopt the ordinary interpretation, of referring the text wholly to the resurrection, suppose two things, which remove it still further from being a case in point for illustrating our controversy. 1. They suppose that our Saviour decided the meaning of *τον ναον τουτου*, by pointing with his finger towards himself.* 2. That the Jews did really understand Christ correctly, and that it was only malignity which made them raise an objection to his words. They suppose that the

* "The explanation given by John (v. 21) has in its favour, not merely the phraseology of the Bible, but also the circumstance which so observant an auditor as John may have noticed, that Jesus, at the *τουτου* (v. 19), *pointed to his own body*, which may have been overlooked by such stupid people as the adversaries of Jesus were." Gottlob. Christ. Storr, in his dissertation entitled "Did Jesus appeal to his miracles as a proof of his divine mission?" in Flatt's "Magazin für christliche Dogmatik und Moral," viertes Stück, *Tübing.* 1793, p. 19. See also Kuinoel, p. 205

Apostles fully *understood* them, as St. John only tells us that they did not *believe* them, till after the resurrection;* that is to say, they did not comprehend how they were to be verified. Now, the passage in the sixth chapter differs totally in both respects. No action which we can suppose our Lord to have used, could possibly have explained "the eating of his flesh" to signify believing in his death; and neither did the Jews understand them in that sense, nor did the Apostles, as we shall more clearly see in the sequel.

2. But marked as is the difference between the intelligibility of the expressions used in the two passages, there is another strong difference between them, which does not allow them to be compared. In John vi., our Saviour is delivering a *doctrine*, in the second chapter he is uttering a *prophecy*. It is the nature of the one, that it ought to be understood when delivered; of the other, that it should be explained by its accomplishment; the former ought to be all plain and intelligible; the latter is, of its nature,

* See Suskind's Observations on Henke's explanation of this passage, in a dissertation entitled "Remarks directed to answer the question, 'Did Jesus distinctly foretell his resurrection?'"—"Flatt's Magazin," siebentes St. 1801, p. 213

obscure and involved. Hence, Christ having, under a mysterious emblem, foretold his resurrection, was sure that the event itself would be a key to his words. And so we find it was; for St. John assures us, that “when he was risen again from the dead, his disciples remembered that he had said this, and they believed the Scripture, and the word that Jesus had said.” Thus, therefore, the words were understood, when they were fulfilled, and, accordingly, served the very purpose for which they were spoken.*

3. A third and principal difference between the two passages under investigation, is this. I have never said that our Saviour was bound to answer the objections of the Jews; but I have examined only his practice, when he did

* I find that Bishop Newcomb, after Grotius, has taken the same view of this text. “His hearers understood this literally; but our Lord alluded to the temple of his body; and probably intimated his true meaning by pointing to himself. Here the words would be explained by the event; and their intended obscurity subjected them to examination, and impressed them on the memory. Veracity, and every virtue, must be governed by prudence. A plain reference to his death and resurrection would have been unwise and dangerous before malignant hearers.”—*Observations on our Lord’s Conduct as a Divine Instructor. Lond. 1820, p. 454.* The whole chapter on our Lord’s veracity confirms strongly the line of argument pursued in this lecture.

answer or explain; and have found that his conduct was precisely that of an honest and upright teacher, who corrected mistakes, and enforced his doctrines without fear. But in the case of Jo. ii., he deems it right to give no answer at all. The passage, therefore, does not belong to either of the classes above mentioned, and cannot form a term of comparison for explaining Jo. iv. 53. It only proves that our Saviour sometimes declined answering an objection at all,—and the prophetic nature of his declaration is a sufficient reason for acting so in this case,—it cannot prove that he ever answered so as to mislead his hearers.

4. Finally, did our Lord speak altogether of his resurrection, so as to exclude all allusion to rebuilding the temple which stood before him? I must confess, that in spite of the reasoning of Storr, Süskind, Schott, and others, I cannot read the passage without being convinced that he spoke of both.

1. The circumstances under which he uttered these words, while standing in the temple, and upon his being asked to give a sign of his jurisdiction over it, seemed to require, or at least to render appropriate, a sign of authority drawn from that very temple. The pronoun *τουτου* would naturally denote the building in which

he spoke. 2. If he used the epithet attributed to him by the false witnesses in St. Mark xiv. 58, *τον ναον τουτον τον χειροποιητον*, "this temple built with hands," he can hardly be supposed to have alluded primarily to any thing but the real temple. St. Paul uses the negative of this word,* as Christ himself is said to have done in St. Mark, for the temple of Heaven: but could he have possibly applied either epithet to his body, before and after the resurrection? Nor do I see any reason to suppose that the witnesses added this epithet, for it was by no means common, and, moreover, tended to weaken their own testimony, by rendering our Saviour's words more enigmatical and obscure.

It seems to me clear, that one of the following explanations, both of which differ from those of Forberg, Henke, Gurlitt, or Paulus, must be followed. 1. Our Redeemer spoke of the power wherewith he was invested of rebuilding the temple, should it be destroyed; but, at the same time, selected such words as would aptly denote another proof of equal power, which was really to be given. The terms, *ναος, τουτο, εχειρειν, εν τρισιν ημεραις*, all suited most exactly this ob-

* *αχειροποιητον*. 2 Cor. v. 1. *ου χειροσ οητον*, Heb. ix. 11.

ject. Even those who are opposed to the double sense of prophecy, for the proofs of which I must refer you to our course of hermeneutics, even they could hardly be offended at this prophetic speech, veiled under such appropriate and natural imagery. 2. Or we may, without violence, take the temple not made with hands, in the same sense as St. Paul does, and then the sense will be: Destroy this temple and religion, and I, in three days, by my resurrection, will restore a more perfect temple, not built with hands, that is, not of this creation,* by opening the spiritual temple of God in Heaven.

Another instance which, at first sight, seems at variance with the rule which I have given of our Lord's conduct, might be taken from Jo. iv. 10-15. Our Saviour there speaks of giving living waters, in a figurative sense, and the Samaritan woman manifestly understands him literally; yet he gives no explanation.

To this instance I will briefly reply; 1. That, as in the last, our Saviour declines answering her difficulty at all, and therefore, the passage belongs to neither of the cases for which I have laid down a rule. 2. That, according to the opinion of the best commentators, the woman in

* Heb. ix. 11.

v. 15, received our Saviour's words with irony and levity, and did not so much solicit an explanation, as ridicule his words.

3. But passing over these two important differences between this example and Jo. vi., the real motive of our Saviour's not explaining himself here appears manifest, if we consider his situation and his design. Upon perusing this interesting chapter, it has often struck me as one of the most beautiful instances on record, of his amiable ingenuity in doing good. He desired to make an opening for his religion among the Samaritans. But had he presented himself among them uncalled, had he commenced his preaching of his own accord, he could have only expected to be rejected, to be ill-treated as a Jew, and punished as a religious innovator. He wishes, therefore, to be invited by the Samaritans themselves, and he selects the most favorable moment and means for effecting his purpose. He dismisses *all* his disciples to the city of Sichem, and seats himself at the well, where he was sure to find some of the inhabitants, and where the rules of hospitality in the East would give him a right to enter into conversation. A female accordingly comes, and he uses this right by asking her for water. Nothing can be more beautifully natural than the dialogue which fol-

lows this request; every reply of our Saviour's, in particular, is most aptly directed to his great object, *which was not to instruct*, but to excite the woman's interest in his regard, to stimulate her curiosity concerning him, (and her language at v. 11 showed that he had inspired her with respect,) and to make her his instrument for the consequences which followed. When he had wrought up these feelings to the highest point, till she asked (v. 15) at length, that he would give her the water whereof he spoke, he most ingeniously leads her to a still more interesting, and to her, intensely trying topic, by the natural suggestion that her husband ought to be present.* I am not giving you a commentary, and therefore must suppress many reflections, only to state that the knowledge which Jesus evinced of her most private domestic affairs, convinced her that he was a prophet, (v. 19.) This leads the way to a controversial discussion on the difference of the two religions; she appeals to the Messiah for a decision, and thus

* It seems plain that the woman fancied our Lord to insinuate that he could lead her to some running spring, which would save her the daily trouble of going so far, and drawing so deep, (v. 15.) She asks, therefore, was he greater than Jacob, who had been able to find no better well than that, (v. 12.)

gives him an opportunity of crowning her curiosity and astonishment, and of effecting all his wishes, by the concluding words, "I am he who am speaking with thee," (v. 26.) She acts exactly as he evidently desired; she runs into the city to communicate her curiosity to her fellow-citizens; they come out to invite him in; he tarries there two days, and many believe in him, (vv. 39-42.)

It is evident, from this rapid sketch, that the object of our Saviour, in this conference, was not to satisfy, but to excite curiosity: not to instruct, but to provoke inquiry. Had he answered the woman's question, by saying that he spoke of grace, and not of water, before he had made her confess, from her own conviction, that he was a prophet, she would most probably have left him in disappointment, and with ridicule or disgust; the great object for which he had sought and undertaken the interview, would have been frustrated, and the mission to the Schemites unaccomplished. Long before the end of the conference, certainly long before he left the city, the woman would know that he spoke not of earthly, but of spiritual waters. In fact, when she runs into the city, she does not say, "Come and see a man who has promised to give us a fountain of running water, more commodious

and more perennial than even the well of Jacob;" though this would have been a truly interesting motive to induce the citizens to invite him in; but, "Come and see a man who hath told me all things whatsoever I have done. Is not he the Christ?" (v. 29.) The discovery that Jesus was the Messiah, had absorbed, as he desired, every other consideration.

LECTURE IV.

Fourth Argument for the Real Presence from the Sixth Chapter of St. John, from the Analysis of our Saviour's answer to the Jews, and their Incredulity.—Fifth Argument; from His conduct to His Disciples and Apostles—Objections to the Catholic Interpretation of this chapter answered.

To complete our examination of our Saviour's discourse, nothing remains but to analyze the expressions whereby he answers the Jews, and his conduct towards his followers; then to reply to such objections as are brought against the Catholic explanation of this chapter. I will endeavor to be as brief as the subject will permit.

1. Our Lord commences his answer to the Jews, who had asked, "How can this man give us his flesh to eat?" by laying down his doctrine in the form of a precept, and that in the strongest manner. I say in the strongest manner, because the most marked and expres-

sive way in which a precept is ever given in Scripture, is by placing it in a double form, as negative and positive. The words of Jesus Christ are these: "Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink his blood, ye shall not have life in you; he that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood, hath everlasting life," (vv. 54-55.) Now, compare the words of St. Mark, (xvi. 16,) "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but he that believeth not, shall be condemned;" and we cannot but be struck by two reflections. 1. The beautiful similarity of form with which we find the two principal sacraments of the Christian religion inculcated, if with the Catholic Church we suppose the words of St. John to refer to the Eucharist. 2. The clearness of the expression in St. Mark, and the absolute absence of comprehensibility in that of St. John, the moment we take it in the Protestant sense; since our Lord would be giving a precept, with a promise of eternal life to its observers, or a threat of eternal death to its violators, which would be totally unintelligible to his hearers. For I have proved already, and have adduced the authority of the learned Tittmann, that our Saviour, if not speaking of the Real Presence, spoke not according to the received usages of language among his

hearers. And, in fact, such is the variety of interpretations among Protestant writers upon this discourse, that it is manifestly obscure and unintelligible, if we seek for figurative explanations. Now, it is evidently in the nature of a law or precept, with a threat of punishment annexed, that it should be clear, distinct, and well defined. Such is the one for baptisms, and such is this, if we understand it of the Real Presence.

2. In these words, our Lord makes a distinction between eating his body and drinking his blood: a distinction without any real signification or force, if he be not speaking of the Real Presence; for to partake of the blood of Christ by faith, adds nothing to the idea of partaking of his body. And this remark applies to all this discourse.

3. This sentence is, moreover, introduced by the peculiarly emphatic phrase, "Amen, amen, I say unto you." This expression is acknowledged by the best sacred philologers, to be a strong confirmatory asseveration, though not an oath. It is called by the Jews חזק חמאמר וקיומו "the corroboration and confirmation of a saying;" and is used, as Glassius has well observed, "in confirmando divino verbo et promisso."*

* "Philologia Sacra his temporibus accommodata." Tom. i. Lips. 1776, p. 397.

When the *amen* is doubled, additional emphasis is given to it. But, if our Saviour meant to be understood only of a belief in his death, there was surely nothing in the doctrine which required such a strong asseveration. For the objection of the Jews was not directed to that doctrine, of a belief in him which *they* certainly did not understand him to teach, when they said, "How *can* this man give us his flesh to eat?" Now, a strong asseveration of the truth of a doctrine objected to, in answer to a difficulty, must always be understood as an acknowledgment that the objection was indeed directed against the doctrine taught, though it has no force. But an asseveration of the truth of your proposition, in spite of an objection, when you know that the objection was not directed against it—because the objicient is speaking on a totally different subject; is not only misplaced, but absurd. To suppose our blessed Lord to insist upon the necessity of believing in him, in terms of the most emphatic asseveration, as if replying to an objection, when he knew very well that no one had meant to express a difficulty upon the subject of believing in him, is to imagine him acting wantonly and insincerely with their judgment and feelings, whom he had undertaken to instruct.

4. The next verse (56) goes on still confirming the literal meaning of his words. "For my flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed." *Αληθως*, *really*, is the word of the original. It may be worth while to observe, that many of the best manuscripts, several versions and fathers, read the adjective *αληθης*, *true*, instead of the adverb; so that Griesbach has marked this reading, in his inner margin, as of equal or superior value to the one in the text. Whichsoever we adopt, our Lord assures the Jews that his *flesh* is *truly meat*, and his *blood truly drink*. I own that the word *αληθως* is spoken, not merely of identity of things, but also of their qualities; so that Christ calls himself the true vine,* when he only spoke in parables; and the Greek version of Isaiah has the same word in the same sense, *αληθως χορτος ο λαος*, "truly the people are grass."† But without entering into any long discussion to prove how inapplicable these passages are to our case, it is sufficient to observe that philology is not conducted by taking the abstract meaning of words and applying them to any passage, but

* Jo. xv. 1.

† Is. xl. 7. Yet this passage is not much to the purpose; but I have brought it, because some Protestant writers have done so, as Tholuck, *loc. citand.*

by studying them as used in peculiar circumstances. While the Jews understood our Saviour to speak of *really* intending to give them his flesh to eat, if they were wrong, can we suppose him to answer them by saying that his flesh was *really* meat? Or can we, under these circumstances, imagine him to use the word at all, and that twice and emphatically—for the repetition of it in the two members of the sentence, forms a true emphasis—unless he wished to be taken literally? If so, there is no other conclusion to be drawn from the sentence, than that he was speaking of a real eating of his flesh, and drinking of his blood.

5. The change of expression in the succeeding verse (58) still further confirms our interpretation. Hitherto our Saviour had spoken of eating his flesh and drinking his blood; he now comprises the two under the harsh expression, “he that eateth *me*.” If, as most Protestants suppose, the former phrases were selected expressly to allude to his violent death;* the words which he now uses can have no such meaning, and cannot express the same *figure* as the others. Both, therefore, must have a

* Consult all the best commentators on the chapter,—Rosenmüller, Kuinoel, Tittman, Tholuck, Lampe, Schulz, Bloomfield, Elseley, &c.

common meaning, and that can only be the literal one.

Almost in every phrase this reply of our Saviour affords a strong confirmation of the Catholic doctrine, drawn from its general tendency. We have now to consider the effects which this answer produced upon his hearers.

1. Instead of removing their previous difficulties, it manifestly augmented, or at least confirmed them. "Many, therefore, of his disciples, hearing *it*, said, This saying is hard, and who can hear it?" (v. 61.) The phrase, *σκληρος εστιν ούτος ο λογος*, "this saying is hard," does not signify, "this proposition is difficult to be *believed*, or *comprehended*;" but "is *harsh*, or *revolting*." Cicero has a similar expression.—"In reipublicæ corpore, ut totum saluum sit, quicquid est pestiferum amputetur. *Dura vox*. Multo illa durior; salvi sint improbi, scelerati, impii."* Demetrius uses the Greek words of the text in the same sense,—*απηνης ούτος ο λογος και σκληρος*, "this word is cruel and hard,"†—speaking of the command to stand in the ranks to be killed by the enemy. Hence, *σκληρ' αληθη*, in Euripides, are *disagreeable*, or *repulsive truths*.‡

* Philippic viii. † Apud Stobaeum, Serm. vii. p. 97.

‡ See Kypke, "Observationes sacræ," tom. i. *Wratislav*, 1755, p. 371.

The second part of the sentence implies a similar meaning. The disciples do not ask, and *who shall believe it?* but, “who can *hear* it?” The verb *δυνασθαι*, as St. Chrysostom remarks, is equivalent in this phrase to *βουλευσθαι*,* and this sense has been ably illustrated by Raphel from very similar passages of classical writers.† The question, therefore, of the Jews, imports,—“this is a harsh and revolting proposition, and who can bear to listen to it?” From it we may draw two conclusions; first, that no doctrine but that of the Real Presence, supposed to have been taught by our Saviour, could have elicited this strong form of repulsive dissatisfaction at his words: secondly, that the preceding discourse had only served to increase the feelings expressed in their former inquiry, “How can this man give us his flesh to eat?” In other words, after the reply of our Lord, they were more convinced than ever, that he spoke of the real manducation of his flesh.

2. Jesus answered these murmurs by the following words, the meaning of which has been

* *Ἐνταυθα το μη δυνασθαι, το μη βουλευσθαι εστιν.* Com. on Jo. viii. 43, where a similar expression occurs,—*ου δυνασθε ακουειν τον λογον εμον.* The phrase occurs also Mar. iv. 33.

† “*Annotationes philologicæ in N. Testamentum ex Polybio et Arriano,*” *Hamb.* 1715, p. 274.

so much contested :—“Doth this scandalize you? If, then, ye shall see the Son of Man ascend up where he was before,” (vv. 62, 63.) Once more, as I am not writing a commentary, I will not attempt to discuss the opinions of others upon these words. Kuinoel, and, of course, Bloomfield, understand by them,—“When I shall have ascended to Heaven, you will then cease to be scandalized or offended.”* Others imagine our Saviour, on the contrary, to mean that the difficulties of his doctrine would be increased by his ascension; what, therefore, would his incredulous disciples say then? Upon examining other passages where our Blessed Lord makes the same, or a similar appeal, it seems to me plain, that his object is to refer his auditors to a great and striking proof, which he was to give, that he had divine authority to teach, and that his words were to be believed, whatever difficulties they might present. When Nathanael confessed him to be the Son of God, on account of his revealing some knowledge to him, which he knew could not have been acquired by human means, our Lord replied, “Because I said to thee, I saw thee under the fig-tree, thou believedst; greater things than these shalt thou

* Kuinoel, p. 374. Bloomfield, p. 220.

see Amen, amen, I say to you, you shall see the heavens opened, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of Man.”* This allusion to the ascension, is manifestly made to point out the superhuman motives upon which the important truth just confessed by Nathanael had to be received. In like manner, when the High Priest adjured him to say if he were the Christ, he gave in his answer a similar proof of the truth of his assertion and claims. “Hereafter, ye shall see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of the power of God, and coming on the clouds of heaven.”† We must, therefore, consider the appeal to his ascension, in the sixth chapter of St. John, in precisely the same light; and may fill up the apodosis of his sentence by, “would you not receive my word after such a confirmation?”

But this appeal to so strong an evidence confirms manifestly the Catholic belief. For it supposes that what Christ taught was truly something requiring the strongest evidence he could give of the divine authority of his mission. It is an acknowledgment, that, without such evidence, the difficulty of his hearers would be well grounded. Yet all this could not be


* Jo. i. 50, 51.

† Matt. xxvi. 63, 64.

the case, if nothing but belief in him or his death was signified, a doctrine repeatedly taught in the Scriptures, and, consequently, noways requiring such strong confirmatory appeals.

3. The consequence of this conference is, that “many of his disciples went back, and walked no more with him,” (v. 67.) Can we suppose that Jesus would have allowed things to come to this extremity, that he would cast away for ever *many* of his disciples, when an explanation in two words would have saved them? And yet even this did he, if the Protestant interpretation of his discourse be true.

4. Our Saviour’s conduct towards the twelve affords us additional assurance of the correctness of the literal interpretation of his discourse. He asks them, after the departure of other disciples, “Will ye also go?” Whoever reads the answer which Peter gives to this touching question, must be convinced that the Apostles were manifestly perplexed as to the nature of their Divine Master’s intentions. For Peter does not even allude to the doctrines taught, but throws himself entirely upon his belief in our Saviour’s authority, and answers accordingly,—“Lord, to whom shall we go? thou hast the words of eternal life,” (v. 69.) Now, when we consider, that to them it was given to know the mysteries of



the kingdom of God,* it must appear extraordinary that even to them he should not have condescended to give any explanation of this singular enigma, which Protestants suppose him to have been uttering. By one only hypothesis can we solve this difficulty, by acknowledging that they had really understood him right, but that he spoke of a mystery which only required faith,—and *that* they had clearly professed through Peter,—but which could not receive any explanation, so as to bring it within the comprehension of reason.

In order to condense and sum up the arguments which I have hitherto brought in favor of the Catholic dogma, I will propose a very simple hypothesis, and deduce them all from its solution.

It will be readily allowed, that nothing can be more beautifully consistent than the character of our Saviour. And yet what forms its principal and distinguishing peculiarity is, the superhuman manner in which traits of the most opposite nature, and apparently of the most unharmonizing qualities, blend together, in such just proportion as to make one perfect and consistent whole. In him we have an independ-

* Luke viii. 10.

vice which renders him superior to all the world, yet a humility which subjects him to the meanest of its inhabitants; an intrepid firmness in reproof, and a nervous eloquence in condemning, which humble and crush the most daring, yet a sweetness and gentleness in instructing, which encourage and win the timid and the prejudiced; a fortitude which could support the most excruciating tortures, yet a meekness which could suppress the slightest expression of triumph. There is not one passage in his entire life, which refuses to harmonize with the rest, however different it may appear, at first sight, from his usual conduct; there is no apparent shade in his character which does not beautifully mingle in with its brightest colors. Hence is there not a single transaction of our Lord's upon earth, which may not be dwelt upon by the Christian teacher, as a lesson of conduct, the most perfect and most instructive,—not one where the Christian apologist could not rest, to point out to the unbeliever a beauty and a sublimity more than human.

Let us, therefore, for a moment suppose, that the discourse of our Lord, which I have so fully analyzed, had to be the theme of such a twofold discussion; and let us see whether the Protestant or Catholic exposition of it would

alone harmonize with the character which the rest of the Scripture attributes to the Saviour of the world ; which would most strikingly convince the unbeliever of its perfection ; which would afford the only proper lesson for practical observance ?

The Protestant would have to describe how this model of all meekness, condescension, and sweetness, upon a certain occasion, undertook to expound one of the most beautiful and consoling of his doctrines, to a crowd of ardent and enthusiastic hearers, who had just before followed him into the wilderness, and fasted three days, in order to listen to his instructions. After having taught this doctrine, by a metaphorical expression, he saw that he was not well understood, (v. 34,) and that objections were raised ; and accordingly, with his usual condescension, he explained himself literally, and for some time continued to expound his doctrine in the clearest terms, (vv. 35-47.) Then all on a sudden, without changing his subject, he totally changes his expressions, (v. 52,) and conveys the same truths in phrases to which the language possessed no parallel, and which were used in a totally different sense by those who heard him, (above, pp. 79-89,) phrases which conveyed to them the most revolting and

sinful ideas, (pp. 102–106.) Having no other resource in the usages of their language, they necessarily took his words literally, and objected to his doctrine as quite impracticable, (v. 53.) It had, indeed, been the custom of Jesus, on all similar occasions, gently to reply to such objections, by explaining his meaning, (pp. 111–117.) But this time he preferred another method; which was, so to adapt his answer that every expression should exactly tend to corroborate their erroneous interpretation. For this purpose, he repeats the phrases which gave rise to their error, six times in as many verses (54–60,) with additional circumstances (drinking his blood), the best calculated to confirm their mistake; he tells them that what he commands is *verily* what they have taken it for, (v. 26,) and assures them, with an attestation little short of an oath, that if they do not put it in practice, they shall be eternally lost, (v. 54.) Yet by all these expressions, he still meant something quite different from what they thought; and the consequence was, that many of his disciples, shocked at the harshness of his doctrine, left him in disgust, and never more returned to his school, (vv. 61–67.) He let them depart, though one word of explanation, had he condescended to give it, would have saved them

from this apostasy. Neither does he deem it proper to explain himself further to his chosen twelve, (vv. 68-71.)

Such is the analysis of this passage, if interpreted according to Protestant views; and let me ask, could this conduct be represented to the infidel as a beautiful trait in the character of Jesus, calculated to win his affections, excite his admiration, and make him confess that it is just the conduct we should expect to meet in one who came down from Heaven to instruct and save man? Or is such conduct a model for imitation? Would any one propose it to those engaged in teaching others, as a perfect line of conduct? Would any Protestant Bishop instruct his clergymen to act thus; and tell them, that should any of the children misunderstand those words in their catechism, that "the body and blood of Christ are verily and indeed taken and received by the faithful in the Lord's Supper," so as to imagine the Real Presence to be thereby taught, they should, after the example of their Lord and Master, instead of explaining the phrases, go on repeating, that verily they must eat the flesh and drink the blood of Christ, and then let the children depart in the full conviction that their pastor had meant to teach them this extraordinary doctrine?

But on the other hand, how beautifully does the Catholic interpretation suit the well-known character of the Son of God upon earth! *Our* analysis of the discourse is soon made. Jesus takes the most suitable opportunity possible to teach a certain doctrine, and he does it in the most simple and expressive terms. The Jews object the impossibility of his doing what he promises; and, according to his usual practice, he replies to them by repeating, again and again, what he had asserted, and insisting that it must be done. Many of his disciples still refuse to believe him, after these clear protestations; and he, with his customary firmness and indifference to mere popularity, suffers them to depart, content to preserve those who, with the faithful twelve, believe him even when they cannot comprehend, because they know him to have the words of eternal life.

What a consistent line of conduct is here exhibited; how superior to the mere desire of having many hearers and followers, whether they believe or not, which so often characterizes popular teachers; how worthy of one who came to deliver doctrines revealed by God, and intended to exact for themselves man's homage, even when far superior to his understanding! And what a beautiful pattern for our imitation,

to propose our doctrines boldly and clearly, to admit no one as a true disciple who believes not all, however difficult, and to seek for converts, and not for followers!

I will now proceed to review, compendiously, the different arguments brought by Protestants, to prove that our Lord's discourse in the sixth chapter of St. John cannot be referred to the Eucharist. For greater clearness, I will divide them into two classes. First, I will examine those which are drawn from the nature and circumstances of the entire discourse; secondly, such as are deduced from particular expressions.

I. 1. The first, and I think most favorite, reason given for not understanding this discourse of the Eucharist, is, that it was not yet instituted. This is given as a decisive argument by Wolfius,* Beveridge,† Kuinoel,‡ Bloomfield,§ Scott,|| and many others. I will state this

* "Curæ philologicæ et criticæ in iv. Sacra Evangelia." Ed. 3a, *Hamb.* 1739, p 865. He quotes the opinion of Calvin also.

† "Thesaurus theologicus, or a Complete System of Divinity." *Lond.* 1710, vol. ii. p. 271.

‡ Ubi sup. p. 369.

§ Page 215.

|| "Scott's Bible," sixth ed. *Lond.* 1823, vol. v. Note on Jo. vi. 52-58.

objection, and answer it, in the words of Dr. Sherlock, intermingling such remarks as suggest themselves to me. "The only objection," says he, "I know against expounding this of eating the flesh of Christ, and drinking his blood, in the Lord's supper, is because the feast was not yet instituted, and therefore neither the Jews nor his own disciples could possibly understand what he meant. Now, there are several answers to this; as,

"Our Saviour said a great many things to the Jews in his sermons, which neither they nor his own disciples could understand, when they were spoken, though his disciples understood them after he was risen."

This first reply merits a short illustration. For it may appear at variance with the line of argument which I have been all along pursuing; that the hearers *did understand* our Saviour's words rightly. But it may be necessary, and certainly sufficient, to remind you of the distinction between *comprehending* and *understanding*. The latter refers to the meaning of the words, the former to the nature of the doctrine. The words used by our Saviour naturally led the Jews to believe that he commanded them to eat his flesh and drink his blood. How this was to be effected, they of course could

not comprehend. Hence our Lord was bound to take care that they *understood* his words, and they were bound to believe them, though they could not comprehend them. The Bishop then proceeds:—

“Suppose we should understand this eating the flesh and drinking the blood of the Son of Man, of feeding on Christ by faith or believing; yet they could understand this no better than the other. It is plain they did not, and I know not how they should. For to call bare believing in Christ, eating his flesh and drinking his blood, is so remote from all propriety of speaking, and so unknown in all languages, that to this day those who understand nothing more by it but believing in Christ are able to give no tolerable account of the reason of the expression.”*

To this reply, which is certainly satisfactory, we may add that we do not want for other instances of similar conduct in the course of our Lord’s mission. To give one, his important conversation with Nicodemus took place before baptism was instituted, and yet the necessity of it is there declared. Now, no one has ever

* “Practical Discourse of Religious Assemblies.” *Lond.* 1700, pp. 364–367.

yet thought of denying that the regeneration there mentioned referred to baptism, on the ground that this sacrament had not yet been instituted. The discourse in the sixth chapter of St. John, therefore, stands in the same relation to the institution of the Eucharist, as the conference with Nicodemus does to the institution of baptism.

2. A second reason for this discourse being taken figuratively is meant to be given in the following words of a commentator already more than once quoted, which contain the *only* argument upon the subject, besides the one I have just answered. "To the former," (that is, to most of the Fathers,) "it has been satisfactorily replied, that the context does not permit us to take the words of the Eucharist, since the phraseology is plainly metaphorical, and the metaphor is built on the preceding mention of natural food."* To this form of argument I cannot be

* Bloomfield, p. 215. It may amuse my readers to compare the two following passages: "Many interpreters take the words to have a reference also to the Eucharist. *So most of the Fathers.*" Ibid. "That we only eat the flesh of Christ spiritually by faith in his blood, and not orally or sacramentally, Whitby has here proved in an instructive argument against the Romanists. He concludes with the concurrent testimony of *most of the ancient fathers.*" Elsley's Annotations, 5th ed. Lond. 1824, vol. iii. p. 66. If the reader wish to see which is right, let him consult Water-

expected to reply. First, because it consists of a bare repetition of the point in dispute; for the question, whether these words are to be understood of the Eucharist or not, is identical with the inquiry, whether they are to be taken literally or figuratively; and therefore to conclude that they do not refer to the Eucharist, because they are figurative, is just as satisfactory an argument as if I had contented myself with the opposite course, and reduced all my proofs of our doctrines from this chapter to the following words:—"This discourse must refer to the Eucharist, because it must be taken literally!" Secondly, my answer to this daring and unproved assertion is contained in my former lectures, wherein I have minutely examined whether the words of Christ *can* be so plainly metaphorical.

I know of no other argument of any weight brought against the Catholic interpretation, from the whole structure of our Lord's discourse. But there is one commentator upon St. John, who, more candidly than any I have yet quoted, suffers to escape the real grounds upon which Protestants take this discourse in a figurative

land, vol. vii. pp. 110-135, though of course he attempts to prove that the Fathers did not teach the Real Presence,

sense. After having given the usual Protestant interpretation of *flesh, blood, eat*, and the rest, Professor Tholuck thus concludes his arguments:—"Still more, if the expressions are not tropical, they would prove too much, namely, the Catholic doctrine."* This sentence, indeed, says much; we are forced to take the words of our Saviour figuratively, because otherwise we must become Catholics! With great personal esteem and friendship for this learned and amiable professor, I cannot help remarking how most unhermeneutical this is—to make the interpretation of a passage of Scripture depend upon the controversial differences of Christians; and this in persons who profess to open their Bible, in order to draw from it, by an impartial examination, which of the different opinions is the truth!

II. Proceeding now to particular texts which have been used to prove that this discourse is not to be taken literally, I will notice the only two which I think can pretend to any weight.

1. First, it is argued that the universality of our Saviour's expressions regarding the effects of eating his flesh, precludes the possibility of

* "Vielmehr würde es, wann es nicht Tropus wäre, zu viel beweisen, nämlich die Katholische Lehre." *Commentar zu dem Evangelio Johannis.* 2 Aufl. *Hamb.* 1828, p. 131.

any reference to the Eucharist. "If any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever."—"He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood, hath everlasting life."—"He that eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, abideth in me, and I in him."—"Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink his blood, you shall not have life in you." "Hence arises an argument," says Dr. Waterland, "against interpreting the words of *sacramental feeding* in the Eucharist. For it is not true, that all who receive the communion have life, unless we put in the restriction of *worthy* and *so far*. Much less can it be true, that all who never have, or never shall receive, have not life, unless we make several restrictions. Now, an interpretation which must be clogged with a multitude of restrictions to make it bear, if at all, is such as one would not choose (other circumstances being equal) in preference to what is clogged with *fewer* or with *none*." These texts Dr. Waterland calls "a surer mark for interpreting our Lord's meaning in this chapter."* The same argument is insisted upon by Dr. Beveridge.†

* *Ubi sup.* p. 102.

† *Ubi sup.* p. 271. Lest my readers may imagine that I have concealed or glossed over the arguments used by Protestant writers against our interpretation of Jo. vi., I will

My reply shall be brief. First, Dr. Waterland himself observes, that this reasoning also overthrows the interpretation of the passage adopted by most Protestant divines, and among them by Dr. Beveridge, upon the very ground given by himself, namely, that the discourse of Jesus Christ refers to belief in him. For here also he remarks, "there must be restrictions too."* Secondly, I say that there is no restriction at all; because, whenever in any law, or promise in Scripture, or elsewhere, rewards or consequences are mentioned, the simple term, expressive of the act to be done, always essentially signifies that act *as duly done*. When faith is mentioned as having rewards attached

give the entire reasoning of this learned and pithy theologian upon the subject. "It is not the sacramental but spiritual eating his body and blood, our Saviour here speaks of. I mean, our Saviour hath no particular reference, in this place, to the representatives of his body and blood in the sacrament, but only to the spiritual feeding upon Him by faith, whether in or out of the sacrament, as appears,

1. In that the sacrament was not yet ordained. Jo. vi. 4, and vii. 2.
2. In that it is said, that he that eateth not of the bread here spoken of, shall die. Jo. vi. 53.
3. In that every one that doth eat of it, shall live. Jo. vi. 51, 54, 56."

In the text we shall see Dr. Waterland combating these conclusions upon these very premises!

* Page 103.

to it, a real, a sincere faith, a faith working by charity, is always implied, for "the devils also believe and tremble."* When it is said that all who believe and are baptized shall be saved,† much, surely, is understood relative to the proper dispositions. When efficacy is attributed to the sacrifices of the Old Law, we have no difficulty in understanding that this depended upon the interior feelings of repentance, gratitude, or humility, which accompanied them. The law, in short, always supposes the act well performed, and so it is, of course, with the law of the Eucharist.

2. A second text popularly adduced against us is the sixty-fourth verse. "The flesh profiteth nothing: the words that I have spoken to you, they are spirit and life." Our Lord is supposed to have intimated by these words that his phrases were to be taken *spiritually*, and not literally, and so to have intended them for a key to all the preceding discourses. This interpretation may be considered as fairly given up by all learned commentators; but as I have more than once observed that it has a popular influence, and that it is often used by ordinary

* St. James ii. 19. See Horne, vol. ii. p. 557, No. viii 7th ed.

† Mark xvi. 16; Jo. xi. 26.

controversialists, as the great ground for rejecting the Catholic explanation of this chapter, I will enter into a fuller exposition of them than otherwise I deem necessary. I will show you first, that this popular way of understanding these words has no foundation; and secondly, that the most learned Protestant commentators are with us in rejecting it.

I. 1. There is not a single instance in the Old or New Testament in which flesh means the literal sense of words. Yet this is necessary for us to understand, by *the spirit*, their figurative or spiritual signification. In some instances, indeed, the spirit is thus opposed to the *letter*,* but no one will consider flesh an equivalent term to this, especially in a chapter wherein it has been used twenty times in its ordinary meaning.

2. If by *the flesh* we are to understand the material flesh of Christ, by the spirit we must understand *his* spirit. If so, in what way does the phrase explain that the foregoing words are to be taken figuratively? For the assertion that Christ's spirit gives us life, is surely not equivalent to a declaration, that whatever had been said about eating his flesh and drinking his blood is to be understood of faith.

* Rom. vii. 6; 2 Cor. iii. 6. Particularly Rom. ii. 29, where *flesh* might have been used if an equivalent.

3. The terms *flesh* and *spirit*, when opposed to each other in the New Testament, have a definite meaning which never varies. A full explanation of these terms you will find in the eighth chapter of St. Paul to the Romans, from the first to the fourteenth verse. The beginning is as follows:—"There is now, therefore, no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not according to the flesh. For the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus, hath delivered me from the law of sin and of death. For what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh; God sending his own Son, in the likeness of sinful flesh, and of sin, hath condemned sin in the flesh; that the justification of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not according to the flesh, but according to the spirit. For they that are according to the flesh, mind the things that are of the flesh; but they that are according to the spirit mind the things that are of the spirit. *For the wisdom of the flesh is death; but the wisdom of the spirit is life and peace.* Because the wisdom of the flesh is an enemy of God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither can it be. And they who are in the flesh cannot please God. But you are not in the flesh, but in the spirit, if so be that the

spirit of God dwell in you," (vv. 1-9.) From this passage, were others wanting, it would be clear that *the flesh* signifies the corrupted dispositions and weak thoughts of human nature; and *the spirit* means the sentiments of man, as elevated and ennobled by grace. The qualities here attributed to these powers, or states, are precisely the same as are indicated in the text of St. John. "The wisdom of the flesh is death;" "the flesh profiteth nothing;" "the wisdom of the spirit is life;" "it is the spirit that quickeneth." Christ's words, then, are spirit and life, or "the spirit of life," by a grammatical figure common in sacred and profane writers.* in other words, such as the mere man cannot receive, but which require a strong power of grace to make them acceptable. If you desire more proofs of this being the only true signification of these terms in Scripture, you may turn over to the following texts:—Gal. v. 13-26; 1 Pet. iv. 6. You may consult, likewise, Mat. xxvi. 41; Jo. iii. 6; Rom. vii. 5, 6, coll. 25; 1 Cor. v. 5; 2 Cor. vii. 1; Gal. iii. 3, iv. 8; 1 Pet. iii. 18. The origin of the phrase will be further explained by Jo. viii. 15; Rom. xiii. 14; Gal. ii. 20; 2 Pet. ii. 10.

II. But I might have spared myself all the

* As "chalybem frænumque momordit;" "pateris libamus et auro." See Glassius, or any writer on sacred philology.

trouble of detailing the internal evidence concerning this text, as all modern Protestant commentators of any value, agree with us in this interpretation.

Kuinoel discusses the terms at length. After having stated the interpretation popularly given, which I am refuting, he thus comments on it:—
 “Sed hæc verborum interpretatio usu loquendi scriptorum Novi Test. comprobari nequit.
 Præplacet igitur mihi eorum ratio quibus *πνευμα* est perfectior, sublimior sentiendi et statuendi ratio quam doctrina Christi efficit; *σαρξ* humilis, vilis sentiendi ratio qualis erat Judæorum, qui præconceptas de Messia et bonis in ejus regno expectandis opiniones fovebant: ut adeo sensus sit, valedicere debetis opinionibus vestris præjudicatis, nam sublimior tantum sentiendi et statuendi ac operandi ratio, *πνευμα*, salutem affert; humilis, vilis statuendi ac sperandi ratio, Judaica illa ratio, *σαρξ* nihil confert ad veram felicitatem.”*

His transcriber Bloomfield repeats his remark; that “this translation,” (the popular one,) “cannot be proved from the *usus loquendi* of Scripture.”†

The lexicographer of the New Testament,

* In Joan. vi. 63, tom. ii. p. 400, ed. *Lond.*

† *Ubi sup.* p. 221.

Schleusner, agrees fully with them:—"Σαρξ : pravitas, vitiositas humana . . . altera vero (ratio) hæc quod sensus animi per religionem Christianam emendatos πνευμα nominare solebant apostoli."* Again:—"Πνευμα : Vis divina qua homines adjuti proni ac faciles redduntur ad amplectendam et observandam religionem Christianam. Jo. vi. 63."†

Mr. Horne coincides with these authors:—"The Holy Spirit is put for his effects, 2 Cor. iii. 6. Here, by the word *letter*, we are to understand the law, written in letters on stone. . . . By the *spirit*, is meant the saving doctrine of the gospel, which derives its origin from the Holy Spirit. In the same sense, Jesus Christ says, Jo. vi. 63—'The words that I speak they are spirit and life;' that is, they are from the spirit of God, and if received with true faith, will lead to eternal life."‡ Again, in his "Index of the symbolical language of Scripture," under the word *Flesh*, we have this meaning:—"2. External appearance, condition, circumstances, character, &c.—Jo. vi. 63, 'The flesh profiteth nothing.'"§

* *Sub voce* σαρξ, No. 17, tom. ii. p. 618, ed. Glasg. 1817

† *Sub voce* πνευμα, No. 21, p. 448.

‡ "Introduction," vol. ii. p. 455, 7th ed.

§ *Ib.* vol. iv. p. 522.

There would be, however, no end, were I to attempt giving you all the authorities on this subject. I shall, therefore, content myself with referring you to the following Protestant works :—Koppe, “Excursus ix. in Epist. ad Galatas.”—Sartorius, “Dissertatio theologica de notione vocis *σαρξ* in N. T.” *Tübingen*, 1778.—Storr, “Commentatio de vocum carnis et spiritus genuino sensu.” *Ib.* 1732.—Schmid, “De potestate vocabulis *σαρκος* et *πνευματος* in N. T. subjecta.” *Viteb.* 1775.—Röller, “De vocum *σαρξ* et *πν.* in Pauli Ep. ad Galatas sensu.” *Zwic.* 1778.

These terms are referred by Bendsten, whom I have already quoted, as belonging to the oriental philosophy.* And, in fact, the learned Windischmann has pointed out a strong analogy between the doctrines which they contain, and the opinions of the Sankhja theology.†

I might be allowed to dwell, after having answered all objections, upon the variety of interpretation into which Protestant divines have necessarily run, in consequence of their abandoning the literal sense. Hardly two of them can be said to agree in their explanation; and terms of condemnation sufficiently harsh are used in

* “Miscell. Hafn.” *ubi sup.*

† “Die Philosophie im Fortgang der Weltgeschichte,” Erst. Th. 2 Buch. *Bonn*, 1832, p. 1889.

their mutual confutations. But I have been already so diffuse, that I dare not detain you longer upon this chapter; and must, therefore, omit likewise, what would not be devoid of interest, the exhibition of the laboured and lengthy, and often not very intelligible, paraphrases, by which they are compelled to explain our Saviour's expressions.

One instance may suffice. Dr. Hampden, in his "Inaugural Discourse," as Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Oxford, thus expresses himself:—"Our Church, indeed, has rejected the fond notion of transubstantiation, but does not, therefore, the less hold *a real vital* presence of Christ in the Sacrament. The Church forbids our holding the doctrine of a *corporal* presence, and yet does not presume to overlook the strong words of Christ declaring 'this is my body,' 'this is my blood,' and, 'he that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood, dwelleth in me and I in him;' and will not therefore incur the impiety of emptying this holy sacrament of its gifted treasure of grace. And thus it is asserted in the catechism, that the body and blood of Christ are verily and indeed taken and received by the faithful in the Lord's supper."*

These words might furnish matter for multiplied remarks. 1. Dr. Hampden applies the sixth chapter of St. John to the Eucharist; for he defends the faith of his Church on the Lord's supper, by a quotation from it. 2. This quotation is strong enough to prove a *real* presence, but yet does not prove a *corporal* presence, which he tells us is rejected by his Church. Now, Jesus Christ exists in the body, from which he is no more separable. How words, which prove his *real* presence anywhere, exclude his *corporal* or bodily presence, it is not easy to understand. 3. This real presence, according to the learned professor, is demonstrated by the assertion, that the flesh and blood, the constituents of a body, are there, and yet the real presence differs from a corporal presence, or from the presence of the body, whose flesh and blood *are* there. 4. Christ is present, because he said, "This *is* my body;" and upon this we are to ground a doctrine that Christ is there, but not his body! 5. Where in Scripture is this nice distinction drawn between a real vital presence, and a corporal presence?

I will conclude this subject by quoting the opinions of a late Protestant philosopher in our country, who was probably as pious a divine as the Church of England has lately possessed, but

who unfortunately betrays, when occasion occurs, as miserable an ignorance of our religion, and as narrow a prejudice against it, as would have disgraced talents of a much lower order. "There is, believe me, a wide difference between *symbolical* and *allegorical*. If I say that the flesh and blood (*corpus noumenon*) of the incarnate word, are power and life, I say likewise, that this mysterious power and life are *verily* and *actually* the flesh and blood of Christ. *They* are the allegorizers, who term the 6th chapter of the gospel according to St. John—the *hard saying*—*who can hear it?* After which time many of (Christ's) disciples, who had been eye-witnesses of his mighty miracles, who had heard the sublime morality of his sermon on the Mount, had glorified God for the wisdom which they had heard, and had been prepared to acknowledge, 'this is indeed the Christ,'—went back and walked no more with him!—the hard sayings, which even *the twelve* were not yet competent to understand further than that they were to be spiritually understood; and which the Chief of the Apostles was content to receive with an implicit and anticipative faith!—*they*, I repeat, are the allegorizers who moralize these hard sayings, these high words of mystery, into a hyperbolic metaphor *per catachresin*, that only means



a belief of the doctrines which Paul believed, an obedience to the law, respecting which Paul 'was blameless,' before the voice called him on the road to Damascus! What every parent, every humane preceptor, would do when a child had misunderstood a metaphor or apologue in a literal sense, we all know. But the meek and merciful Jesus suffered many of *his* disciples to fall off from eternal life, when to retain them, he had only to say,—O ye simple ones! why are ye offended! my words, indeed, sound strange; but I mean no more than what you have often and often heard from me before, with delight and entire acquiescence!—Credat Judæus! Non ego.”*

* Coleridge, “Aids to Reflection.”

LECTURES
ON
THE REAL PRESENCE.

SECTION II.

EXAMINATION OF THE WORDS OF INSTITUTION.

WORDS OF INSTITUTION
OF THE
BLESSED EUCHARIST.

GREEK TEXT.

MAT. XXVI. 26-28.

Ἐσθιόντων δὲ αὐτῶν λαβῶν ὁ Ἰησοῦς τὸν ἄρτον, καὶ εὐλογήσας, ἔκλασε, καὶ ἐδίδον τοῖς μαθηταῖς, καὶ εἶπε· Λάβετε, φάγετε. ΤΟΤ᾽-ΤΟ᾽ ἜΣΤΙ ΤΟ᾽ ΣΩ᾽ΜΑ᾽ ΜΟΥ. Καὶ λαβῶν τὸ ποτήριον, καὶ εὐχαριστήσας, ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς, λέγων· ΤΟΤ᾽ ΤΟ ΓΑ᾽Ρ ἜΣΤΙ ΤΟ᾽ Αἶ᾽-ΜΑ᾽ ΜΟΥ, τὸ τῆς καινῆς διαθήκης, τὸ περὶ πολλῶν ἐκχυνόμενον εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν.

LUKE XXII. 19, 20.

Καὶ λαβῶν ἄρτον, εὐχαριστήσας ἔκλασε, καὶ ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς, λέγων, ΤΟΤ᾽ ΤΟ᾽ ἜΣΤΙ ΤΟ᾽ ΣΩ᾽ΜΑ᾽ ΜΟΥ, τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν διδόμενον· τοῦτο ποιεῖτε εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν. Ὡσαύτως καὶ τὸ ποτήριον μετὰ τὸ δειπνήσαι, λέγων· ΤΟΤ᾽-ΤΟ ΤΟ ΠΟΤΗΡΙΟΝ, ἢ ΚΑΙΝΗ᾽ ΔΙΑΘΗΚΗ, ἘΝ Τῶ Αἶ᾽-ΜΑΤΙ ΜΟΥ, τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐκχυνόμενον.

MAR. XIV. 22-24.

Καὶ ἐσθιόντων αὐτῶν λαβῶν ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἄρτον, εὐλογήσας ἔκλασε, καὶ ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς, καὶ εἶπε· Λάβετε, [φάγετε.] ΤΟΤ᾽ ΤΟ᾽ ἜΣΤΙ ΤΟ᾽ ΣΩ᾽ΜΑ᾽ ΜΟΥ· καὶ λαβῶν τὸ ποτήριον, εὐχαριστήσας ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς· καὶ ἔπιον ἐξ αὐτοῦ πάντες, καὶ εἶπεν αὐτοῖς· ΤΟΤ᾽ ΤΟ᾽ ἜΣΤΙ ΤΟ᾽ Αἶ᾽ΜΑ᾽ ΜΟΥ, τὸ τῆς [καινῆς] δεαθήκης, τὸ περὶ πολλῶν ἐκχυνόμενον.

1 COR. XI. 23-25.

(Ἰησοῦς) ἔλαβεν ἄρτον, καὶ εὐχαριστήσας ἔκλασε, καὶ εἶπε· [Λάβετε, φάγετε] ΤΟΤ᾽ ΤΟ᾽ ΜΟΥ ἜΣΤΙ ΤΟ᾽ ΣΩ᾽ΜΑ, τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν κλύμενον· τοῦτο ποιεῖτε, εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν. Ὡσαύτως καὶ τὸ ποτήριον, μετὰ τὸ δειπνήσαι, λέγων· ΤΟΤ᾽ ΤΟ ΤΟ ΠΟΤΗΡΙΟΝ ἢ ΚΑΙΝΗ᾽ ΔΙΑΘΗΚΗ ἜΣΤΙ᾽ ἘΝ Τῶ ἘΜῶ Αἶ᾽ΜΑΤΙ. τοῦτο ποιεῖτε, ὅσακις ἂν πίνητε εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν.

The words in brackets are wanting in many manuscripts and ancient versions.

VULGATE.

MATT. XXVI. 26-28.

Cœnantibus autem eis, accepit Jesus panem, et benedixit, ac fregit, deditque discipulis suis, et ait: Accipite et comedite; HOC EST CORPUS MEUM. Et accipiens calicem gratias egit, et dedit illis dicens: Bibite ex hoc omnes. HIC EST ENIM SANGUIS MEUS NOVI TESTAMENTI, qui pro multis effundetur in remissionem peccatorum.

MAR. XIV. 22-24.

Et manducantibus illis accepit Jesus panem, et benedicens fregit, et dedit eis, et ait: Sumite, HOC EST CORPUS MEUM. Et accepto calice gratias agens dedit eis; et biberunt ex illo omnes. Et ait illis: HIC EST SANGUIS MEUS NOVI TESTAMENTI, qui pro multis effundetur.

LUKE XXII. 19, 20.

Et accepto pane gratias egit, et fregit, et dedit eis, dicens: HOC EST CORPUS MEUM, quod pro vobis datur; hoc facite in meam commemorationem. Similiter et calicem postquam cœnavit, dicens: HIC CALIX NOVUM TESTAMENTUM EST IN SANGUINE MEO, qui pro vobis fundetur.

1 COR. XI. 23-25.

(Jesus) accepit panem, et gratias agens, fregit, et dixit: Accipite et manducate; HOC EST CORPUS MEUM, quod pro vobis tradetur; hoc facite in meam commemorationem. Similiter et calicem, postquam cœnavit, dicens: HIC CALIX NOVUM TESTAMENTUM EST IN MEO SANGUINE. Hoc facite quotiescumque bibetis in meam commemorationem.

VERSION AUTHORIZED BY THE ENGLISH PROTESTANT CHURCH.

MATT XXVI. 26-28.

And as they were eating, Jesus took bread, and blessed *it*, and brake *it*, and gave *it* to the disciples, and said,—Take, eat; THIS IS MY BODY. And he took the cup, and gave thanks, and gave *it* to them, saying: Drink ye all of it; FOR THIS IS MY BLOOD OF THE NEW TESTAMENT, which is shed for many for the remission of sins.

MAR. XIV. 22-24.

And as they did eat, Jesus took bread, and blessed, and brake *it*, and gave to them, and said: Take, eat, THIS IS MY BODY. And he took the cup, and when he had given thanks, he gave *it* to them; and they all drank of it. And he said unto them, THIS IS MY BLOOD OF THE NEW TESTAMENT, which is shed for many.

LUKE XXII. 19, 20.

And he took bread, and gave thanks, and brake *it*, and gave unto them, saying, THIS IS MY BODY, which is given for you; this do in remembrance of me. Likewise, also, the cup after supper, saying: THIS CUP IS THE NEW TESTAMENT IN MY BLOOD, which is shed for you.

1 COR. XI. 23-25.

(Jesus) took bread; and when he had given thanks, he brake *it*, and said: Take, eat; THIS IS MY BODY, which is broken for you; this do in remembrance of me. After the same manner, also, *he took* the cup, when he had supped, saying; THIS CUP IS THE NEW TESTAMENT IN MY BLOOD; this do ye as oft as ye drink in remembrance of me.

LECTURE V.

Statement of the Proof of the Real Presence from the Words of Institution, Matt. xxvi. 26–29; Mark xiv. 22–25; Luke xxii. 19, 20; 1 Cor. xi. 23–26.—Strong dogmatical ground of this argument from the decision of the Council of Trent.—*Onus probandi* thrown upon Protestants, who are obliged to demonstrate two things: 1. That these words may be taken figuratively; 2. That we are obliged so to take them.—Examination of the first point.

WE have seen, at some length, the Blessed Eucharist promised in the sixth chapter of St. John; and the terms of this promise demonstrated the Catholic doctrine of the Real Presence: we must now examine the history of its institution, and discover whether the same doctrine be there taught.

You are aware that the history of this institution is given by the three first Evangelists and by St. Paul in his first Epistle to the Corinthians. The differences in their narrations are so slight, that a very few remarks will

suffice to note them. From the harmony which I have laid before you, you at once perceive that the two first Evangelists agree not only in substance, but almost in every word. The only difference consists in St. Mark's insertion of the parenthetic phrase in the 23d verse, "and they all drank of it," and in his using a participial form in the narrative. On the other hand, St. Luke and St. Paul agree in a no less remarkable manner, in some slight variations from the other two. First, they both mention the circumstance of the institution being after supper; the reason of which seems to be clearly, to distinguish the sacramental cup from the legal one which Christ divided among his apostles, (Luke v. 17,) of which he had said he would no more drink. Secondly, both add to the words of consecration of the bread an important clause; St. Luke having, "This is my body (*τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν διδόμενον*), which is given for you," and St. Paul adding, *τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν κλάμενον*, "which is broken for you." Thirdly, both agree in subjoining a clause commanding the commemorative repetition of the rite. St. Paul alone repeats this clause after both the forms of consecration. Fourthly, they both give the words of institution for the cup in the peculiar form, "This chalice is the New Testament in my blood." It

is manifest that these varieties do not affect the substance of the narrative. Two of the writers give additional circumstances, and thus complete the history. But it is no less manifest that the expression recorded by the two classes, in relating the consecration of the cup, must be considered quite synonymous; so that "This cup is the New Covenant in my blood," is equivalent to "this is my blood." I will now cite you the words of St. Matthew: any of these trifling differences which our adversaries may consider opposed to our interpretation, will be examined as objections.

"And while they were at supper, Jesus took bread, and blessed, and broke, and gave to his disciples, and said: Take ye and eat; THIS IS MY BODY. And taking the chalice, he gave thanks, and gave to them saying: Drink ye all of this; for THIS IS MY BLOOD of the New Testament, which shall be shed for many for the remission of sins."—Matt. xxvi. 26–28.

Before entering on the examination of these important words, I think it right to make a few remarks upon the higher dogmatical ground on which we now stand. I have not the slightest shadow of doubt upon my mind, that the latter portion of the sixth chapter of St. John refers to the Eucharist, and demonstrates the Real

Presence; but for the proof drawn from the words of institution, we have a higher authority than any hermeneutical reasoning can supply,—the positive decree of the Council of Trent, which expressly defined that they prove the Real Presence of Christ's body and blood in the adorable Sacrament.* But regarding the promise in St. John, the holy Synod observed its usual caution, which proves how far it was from merely seeking to impose doctrines, without sufficient proof to satisfy the conditions of our principle of faith. For the functions of a general Council being to define what the Church has always taught, as such unanimity among the ancient Fathers and among later divines was not discovered as could meet the intensity of proof required, it manifestly drew a distinction between the two passages, and did not sanction the words of promise with a formal dogmatical precision. This was evidently shown in the twenty-first Session, where the decree relating to communion under one kind was framed. For, in the contests with the Hussites, who urged the necessity of all receiving the cup, upon the strength of texts in Jo. vi., many Catholic divines, following the footsteps of some among the

* Sess. xiii. cap. 1.

Fathers, had denied that the discourse related to the blessed Sacrament. When, therefore, that decree was drawn up, and that chapter was referred to, a clause was added to this effect: “*utcumque juxta varias Sanctorum Patrum et doctorum interpretationes intelligatur.*”* This clause was introduced by the congregation appointed to prepare the decree, in consequence of objections urged against it by Guerrero, Archbishop of Grenada, on the ground that the Council would thereby appear to *define* that the chapter relates to the Eucharist. Cardinal Seripandus, who presided, observed that the question on this chapter being twofold, one on the use of the cup with heretics, the other on the meaning of the chapter between Catholics, it never was the intention of the congregation to step in between the parties of the latter difference, but only to deny the consequences drawn by the former.† The clause “*utcumque*” was then introduced. Salmeron and Torres exerted themselves to prevail on Cardinal Hosius, and other members of the Council, whom Pallavicini enumerates, to have the clause expunged. They were formally heard upon the subject, and the following adju-

* Sess. xxi. cap. 1.

† Pallavicini, “*Vera Concilii Tridentini Historia,*” *Antwerp*, 1670, tom. iii. p. 64

dication was given:—"Cum ea geminæ interpretationis opulencia de S. Joannis testimonio ecclesia frueretur, quarum utraque probationem ab hæreticis inde deductam impugnabat, ad unius tantummodo paupertatem non esse redigendam." The reasons given are, that the interpretation in question was not new, nor even so modern as the controversies with the Bohemians, and that many divines of name had preferred it.* Hence Estius expressly writes, and other divines acknowledge, that there is not the same strength in the proof drawn from the discourse in St. John, as in the words of institution.†

This controversy is important in many respects. First, inasmuch as it proves how false are the assertions commonly made, that the Council blindly decreed whatever it listed, without any consideration of grounds or arguments; since so far from wishing, at any cost, to seize upon a strong confirmatory proof such as it might have drawn from Jo. vi., it prudently refrained from defining any thing regarding it, because the tradition of the Church, however favorable,

* Ibid. p. 69.

† "Comment. in IV. Libros Sentent." *Par.* 1696. p. 114. Jansenius of Ghent. "Commentar." ad loc Hawarden. "Church of Christ," vol. ii. p. 176.

was not decided for it, as for the other argument. Secondly, although when arguing with Protestants we waive the authority of the Council and argue upon mere hermenèutical grounds, and can support one proof on these as strongly as the other, yet to the mind of the Catholic, who receives his faith from the teaching of the Church, the evidence of the dogma is in the argument on which we are now entering, and which has been pronounced by her definitive on the subject.

This consideration must suffice to gain your attention in favor of the important matter which I am about to propose to your consideration.

The argument from the words of institution, strange as it may seem, is not so easy to propose in an hermeneutical form, as that from Jo. vi., and that on account of its extreme simplicity. We believe that the body and blood of Jesus Christ are truly and really present in the adorable Eucharist, because, taking bread and wine, he who was Omnipotent, said, "This is my body, this is my blood." Here is our argument; and what can we advance, to prove a strict accordance between our doctrine and that of our Saviour, stronger and clearer, than the bare enunciation of our dogma beside the words which he used in delivering it. "This is my

body," says our Lord; "I believe it to be thy body," replies the Catholic. "This is my blood," repeats our Redeemer; "I believe it to be the *figure* of thy blood," rejoins the Protestant. Whose speech is here *yea, yea?* who saith *amen* to the teaching of Christ? Is it the Catholic or the Protestant? You must plainly see that we have nothing more or better to say for ourselves than what Christ has already said; and that our best argument consists in the bare repetition of his sacred and infallible words.

This, however, is not our only course of argument; our opponents do not let us get through the question on such easy terms. So far are we from receiving any credit for our absolute belief in Christ's words, that we are generally greeted in no conciliatory terms for our simple-hearted faith.

Dr. A. Clarke, whose work I shall now have often to mention as the great armory of Protestants in this controversy, designates those who hold the Catholic belief on the Real Presence, as "the most stupid of mortals." On one occasion he says of us, "he who can believe such a congeries of absurdities cannot be said to be a volunteer in faith, for it is evident the man can have neither faith nor reason."* This is not

* "A Discourse on the nature, institution, and design of

very complimentary; but when I consider how very parallel to these and suchlike expressions are the taunts formerly cast by Julian the Apostate, and his fellows, on the Galileans—the equivalent for Papists in ancient controversy—because they believed a mere man to be God, against the evidence of their senses, on his bare word that he *was* God, I own I feel not only comforted, but proud at finding ourselves placed in a situation so similar as our ancestors in Christianity, with relation to our modern adversaries. I could occupy you long by extracts from Protestants, full of the most ribald scurrility when speaking of this blessed institution. But considering them, as we must do, at least ignorantly blasphemous, I will not shock your ears, nor pollute my lips, by repeating what can in no manner strengthen their case with virtuous or sensible men.

From what I have before remarked, it is clear that we intrench ourselves behind the strong power of our Saviour's words, and calmly remain there till driven from our position. The aggression must come from the other side; and the trouble taken by its divines to prove that our

interpretation is incorrect, sufficiently evinces that they are aware of our strength.

But before closing with them, or rather meeting their aggression on this subject, I deem it right first to give you one or two specimens of the easy way in which it would appear popular preachers and writers imagine that their hearers or readers can be reasoned into an opinion; and what a mean idea they must have of the logical powers of those who willingly drink in declamations against our faith. I will take a specimen of a sermon from one of a series, expressly delivered on our doctrines, by select preachers at Tavistock-place Chapel, not many years ago.

“We contend that we must understand the words (of institution) *figuratively*; because, first, *there is no necessity to understand them literally; and because it is morally impossible that the disciples should have so understood them* For, let me ask, what is more common in all languages than to give to the *sign* the name of the thing *signified*? If you saw a picture, would you not call it by the name of the person it represents? or if you looked on a map, at a particular country, would you not describe it by the name of that country?”*

* “On the Administration of the Lord’s Supper,” by the Rev. D. Ruell, p. 15.

This is truly the logic of determined prepossession. What beautifully original canons of hermeneutics is it not based upon? Canon the first: A passage of Scripture must be taken figuratively, unless we can demonstrate a *necessity* for taking it literally. Canon the second: It is morally impossible that the apostles should have understood certain words literally, *because* it is the custom in all languages (sometimes) to call signs by the name of things signified. Canon the third: There is no difference between one sign and another. Bread is as natural, obvious, and intelligible a representation of a person's body, as a portrait is of a person's countenance, or a map is of a country; so that I should be no more unintelligible if I took a morsel of bread and said, "This is my body," than if, pointing to a portrait, I said, "This is my father;" but both would be understood with equal facility. On this point I shall have occasion to speak more at length hereafter.

We have a similar departure from all the plainest principles of interpretation in another popular author, whom I have so often quoted to you, and shall have to quote still oftener in this and the following lectures,—Mr. Hartwell Horne. He writes that the Catholic doctrine of Transubstantiation is "erected upon a forced

and literal construction of our Lord's declaration."* I much doubt whether on any other occasion an interpretation was honored with such incompatible epithets as these two. The same meaning, at once forced and literal! It is as though you said in morals, that an action was spontaneous and compulsory: the one annihilates the other. Who ever heard, in law, such an application of contradictory terms to the same object? Who ever heard that the literal construction of a statute could be considered forced? Surely into no argument except a controversial one, would such logical errors and such flagrant inconsistencies be allowed to enter.

But, while popular preachers and writers may thus set at defiance the rules of logic and hermeneutics, calculating, perhaps, on the veil of blindness which prepossession may cast over their hearers' or readers' eyes, more learned and sensible Protestant writers are far from considering their figurative interpretation of these texts a matter of such easy and simple demonstration. Listen to the following observations of Dr. Paley: "I think also that the *difficulty* arising from the conciseness of Christ's expres-

* "Introduction," vol. ii. p. 373, 6th ed. In the 7th ed. p. 448.

sion, 'This is my body,' would have been avoided in a made-up story." Why so, if it be as natural as calling a picture by the name of him it represents? What difficulty is there in *this* proceeding? "I allow," he continues, "that the explanation of these words, given by Protestants, is satisfactory; but it is deduced from a diligent comparison of the words in question, with forms of expression used in Scripture, and especially by Christ on other occasions. *No writer would have arbitrarily and unnecessarily cast in his reader's way a difficulty, which, to say the least, it required research and erudition to clear up.*"*

This candid admission of a learned man throws the strength of the argument completely into our hands. It follows that ours is the simple and obvious mode of interpreting, and that Protestants have to prove theirs, by research and erudition, and by the allegation of other passages in its justification. Later, I shall have occasion to show you one or two specimens of the strange erudition by which some of them have thought necessary to establish their interpretation.

But, on the other hand, if we prove all this

* "Evidences of Christianity," part ii. chap. iii. vol. ii. p 90. *Edinb.* 1817.

erudition and research to have been fruitless, if we show that not one of the arguments brought by them to uphold their explanation is valid and sound, then, upon Dr. Paley's showing, I say it follows no less, that their explanation is *not* satisfactory, and that they can make out no case against us.

Hitherto we have been occupied in taking up our position. We have intrenched ourselves in the letter of the text, and our more sensible adversaries have acknowledged that the offensive warfare must be undertaken by them. I must now point out to you their strongest plan of attack, and our most certain means of repelling it. The most plausible, or rather the only satisfactory course which our adversaries can take, is the following:—First, to prove that the words of institution may be taken figuratively; secondly, to demonstrate that, to avoid absurdities or falsehoods, or at least great difficulties, we are compelled to adopt this figurative interpretation. This, I conceive, is the only line of argument by which a Protestant theologian could make good his explanation. It is followed by most, though not always in the exact order I have given. Thus, the controversial orator whom I quoted, goes on to give a well-known passage from Dr. A. Clarke, which will be pre-

sently examined, in order to prove that our Saviour's expressions *may* be taken figuratively, and then *demonstrates* the necessity of doing so, in the following terms:—"But we are compelled to understand these words figuratively, *secondly*, because the literal meaning leads to direct contradictions and gross absurdities."* You will be pleased to remember that the *first* of his compulsory arguments for taking the words figuratively, was, that there was *no necessity* for taking them literally. The same plan is followed by others.

Such, then, is likewise our twofold task. First, we must examine the arguments whereby our opponents endeavor to prove that the words of institution will bear a metaphorical interpretation, and this will occupy our attention this evening. In my next lecture, I will proceed to discuss the question whether we are compelled by philosophical or practical difficulties to recur to a figurative explanation.

To prove the first point, the following is the system ordinarily followed: to produce a number of passages from Scripture, and from other writers, where "*to be*" evidently signifies "*to represent*;" and from these it is concluded, that

* Sermon, &c. p. 17.

we can as well understand the verb here in the same sense. This is the method to which Dr. Paley alludes in the passage I have just quoted, and it is that used by almost every Protestant author on the subject. Mr. Faber, to whom I shall allude more distinctly just now, has reasoned precisely in the same manner. But Dr. A. Clarke has accumulated this sort of passages together, in one heap,* and I suppose may be considered as approved of by modern writers of his way of thinking, as he is quoted and copied by them word for word.† In fact, his list is sufficiently complete, if the argument be worth any thing at all. If the passages collected already, and here brought together, do not suffice to prove that the words of institution *may* be taken figuratively, no further discovery will prove it;—not to say that these texts are the only ground on which till now this figurative interpretation has been held by Protestants.

As the passages in question are confusedly heaped together by Clarke and his copyists, I find it necessary to sift them, and reduce them to some arrangement. For the same answers do not apply exactly to all, and we shall gain

* *Ubi sup.* p. 52.

† Ruell, *ubi sup.* Horne, *ubi sup.*

in clearness by the separation of such incongruous materials. I shall be careful, however, not to omit one text. I distribute them, therefore, as follows:—

1st Class.—1 Gen. xli. 26, 27, “The seven good kine ARE seven years.” Dan. vii. 24, “The ten horns ARE ten kingdoms.” Mat. xiii. 38, 39, “The field IS the world; the good seed IS the children of the kingdom; the tares ARE the children of the wicked one. The enemy IS the devil; the harvest IS the end of the world; the reapers ARE the angels.” 1 Cor. x. 4, “And the rock WAS Christ.” Gal. iv. 24, “For these ARE the two covenants.” Apoc. i. 20, “The seven stars *are* the angels of the seven churches.”

2. Jo. x. 7, “I AM the door;” xv. 1, “I AM the true vine.”

3. Gen. xvii. 10, “This IS my covenant between thee and me,” speaking of circumcision.

4. Exod. xii. 11, “This IS the Lord’s Pass-over.”

The texts composing the first class can alone cause us the slightest difficulty; I will show you that all the others are nothing at all to the purpose.

I. The only way in which these texts can be brought to illustrate the words of institution, is

by adducing them as *parallel* passages; and as such Mr. Horne has brought them. For he thus concludes his argument:—"It is evident, therefore, from the context, *from parallel passages*, and the scope of the passage, that the literal interpretation of Mat. xxvi. 26, 28, must be abandoned." My confutation will therefore consist in simply proving that they are *not* parallel.

1. The question in dispute is whether *is* in our case is to be taken figuratively, or may be taken figuratively, in the words of institution; and our adversaries bring a number of passages where it is so taken. But, on the other hand, I can bring them some thousands of passages where the verb "to be" is taken literally. If, therefore, they choose to take those passages as parallel, and reject mine, they must show some peculiarity in the words in question, which detaches them from the great mass of passages where "to be" occurs, and associates them with the few, where it bears a certain peculiar sense. Yet this they have never attempted to do.

2. To examine the matter a little more closely, let us see what it is that constitutes *parallelism* between two passages, and authorizes us to illustrate one from the other. I am willing to take Mr. Horne's own rule. "When



ever the mind is struck with any resemblance, in the first place consider whether it is a true resemblance, and whether the passages are sufficiently similar; that is, *not only whether the same word, but also the same thing, answers together*, in order to form a safe judgment concerning it. It often happens that one word has several distinct meanings, one of which obtains in one place, and one in another. When, therefore, words of such various meanings present themselves, all those passages where they occur are not to be immediately considered as parallel, *unless they have a similar power.** This rule is only a translation from Ernesti, whose words are even clearer: “Proximum erit considerare, an vera similitudo sit, satisque similia sint loca, hoc est, *an sit in utraque eadem res, non modo verbum idem.*” Upon which words Ammon adds this pithy commentary: “Tenendum itaque *similitudinem rei non verbi* parere parallelismum.”†

The same is the opinion of the best writers on Hermeneutics. Jahn thus defines *verbal* parallelisms: “Parallela dicuntur loca, quæ a se invicem quidem distant, similia tamen sunt, quia eædem voces aut phrases *in simili orationis*

* Horne, *ubi sup.* p. 308.

† Ernesti Instit. p. 61.

inmixtu atque eodem significatu occurrunt."* Not to multiply authorities, Arigler's definition is couched in equivalent terms: "Ejusmodi jam vero loca, *quæ de eadem re tractant*, dicuntur loca parallela."†

Such, then, is the rule given by Mr. Horne, in common with other writers, that to constitute a parallelism between two texts, so as to be warranted in illustrating one by the other, it is not sufficient that the words and phrases be alike, but that from the context, or other circumstances, a resemblance of *things* can be pointed out. Before, therefore, the Protestant can have a right to explain the words "this *is* my body," by "the field *is* the world," it is not sufficient for him to show me that the word *is* occurs in both, but that the same *thing* or object is intended.

I will illustrate the rule by a case in point. In my former lectures, I proved, by the examination of many passages of the New Testament, that, judging from our Saviour's conduct, the Jews must have been right when they understood his words, "the bread which I will give, is my flesh for the life of the world," in their plain, literal sense. The passages which I

* "Appendix Hermeneut." p. 81.

† "Hermeneut. Biblica," p. 181.

brought, I cited as *parallel* passages. Well, I did not content myself with merely showing that there was a similarity of words, as that Christ in all the cases began his reply by "amen, amen," or that Nicodemus answered like the Jews, "how *can* a man be born again;"* but I examined the facts of the different cases, and saw that Jesus spoke in a peculiar manner, and that the Jews understanding his words rightly, objected, and that he invariably, when they were right, replied by repeating the obnoxious phrase. Then seeing that his *conduct* was the reverse, when they erroneously took his figurative expressions literally, and thereupon objected, I concluded that the former class of passages, wherein *the same thing*, the *res eadem*, occurred, were to be considered parallel, and the latter not.

Let us take another example from the same source. I contended that "the spirit which quickeneth," could not signify the spiritual or figurative meaning of Christ's words; but simply the agency of grace and the Holy Ghost in man, or man spiritualized by their influence. I did not prove this by simply showing you that "the spirit" sometimes means this; but I demon-

* See above, p. 120.

strated by many examples, and by the concurrent acknowledgment of scholars, that *whenever* the flesh and the spirit are contrasted together, which they are in the text in question, they have an invariable meaning,—the one which I gave them. This union of the two in contrast forms the *fact*, the *thing*, which authorizes the admission of a parallelism; and in addition I pointed out to you, in the passage from the Epistle to the Romans, the very same *thing* said of the spirit and the flesh, as occurs in the text then under discussion; namely, the living or quickening power of the one, and the deadly unprofitableness of the other.

These, then, were instances of true parallelisms, founded on similarity or identity of things, and not of words. Now, then, let us apply Mr. Horne's rule, so illustrated, to the texts under our consideration. The rule is, that the same thing must be found in the texts, for us to be justified in considering them parallel. In fact, this is the case with regard to all the texts of the first class; they are strictly parallel one with another.

To place this point beyond controversy, let us take an instance. If I desire to illustrate the phrase, (Gen. xli 26,) "the seven good kine are seven years," by Mat. xiii. 38, "the field is the

world," or both these by Gal. iv. 24, "for these are the two covenants," I am fully justified in doing so, and in considering the passages as perfectly parallel; because the context in all three demonstrates to me that the same *thing* exists in all; namely, the *explanation of a symbolical instruction*, in one instance a vision, in another a parable, in the third an allegory. But then it follows, likewise, that in order to thrust the words "this is my body," into the same category, and treat them as parallel, we must show *them* also to contain the same *thing* (which every single instance in the first class of texts does show)—the explanation of a symbolical instruction. Till this be done, there is no parallelism established.

3. This argument receives still greater strength, from observing that, in no one of the instances heaped together by our opponents, are we left to conjecture that an explanation of symbols is meant to be conveyed, but the context in each expressly informs us of the circumstance. This is evident of the examples from Joseph, Daniel, and our Saviour, for they are clearly said to be giving or receiving interpretations. St. Paul to the Galatians is equally careful to let us see the same; for this is his entire sentence: "Which things are an *allegory* ;

FOR these *are* the two covenants." After the expression, "the rock *was* Christ," he is careful to add, (v. 6,) "now these things were done *in figure of us*;" and in the very sentence he tells us that it was a *spiritual* rock whereof he spoke. In fine, the instance from the Apocalypse is equally explicit: "Write down the things which thou hast seen . . . the mystery (*allegory or symbol**) of the seven stars . . . and seven golden candlesticks. The seven stars **ARE** the angels of the seven churches." And with passages so explained by the very writers, it is pretended to compare the simple narrative, "Jesus took bread, and blessed, and brake, and gave to his disciples, and said, Take ye and eat: *this is my body!*"

4. But I must urge this reply still more home to our adversaries, by retorting their own argument against themselves, in the person of a Socinian. In the very beginning of his gospel, St. John says, "The Word *was* God." This has always been considered, by Protestants as well as Catholics, a strong argument for the

* I have proved this meaning of *μυστηριον* drawn from the signification of the corresponding Syriac word ܡܝܫܬܪܝܘܢ *rozo*, on another occasion. See "Horæ Syriacæ," vol. i. Rome, 1828, p. 41. Consult "Eichhorn's Comment. in Apocalyp." Götting. 1791, tom. ii. p. 206.

divinity of Christ. Now the entire force of the argument rests upon the little word *was*. So important is this syllable, that, to evade its force, Photinus thought it necessary to separate it from the following word, and read *καὶ Θεὸς ἦν*. ‘Ο λόγος οὗτος, &c. ;* Crellius, on the contrary, wished to read Θεοῦ, the *Word was of God*.† But, how useless is all this torture inflicted upon the text, after the simple process of reasoning which Protestants have employed against us, with such satisfaction to themselves.

Mr. Faber, doubtless one of the most strenuous and most ingenious of our modern antagonists, has chosen one text out of the mass of passages commonly collected, as particularly to the purpose in proving that the Eucharistic formulas may have been used in a figurative sense. For he thus writes: “Christ does not more explicitly say of the bread and wine ‘this is my body,’ and ‘this my blood,’ than St. Paul says of the rock whereof the Israelites drank in

* “S. Ambrose, in proœm.” *Rom.* 1579, tom. iii. p. 5.
 “Auctor. Quæstion. in Vet. et Nov. Test.” in Append. iii.
 tom. Opp. S. Aug. ed. Maur. p. 82.

† See Bengel, “Apparatus criticus,” *Tübing.* 1763, p. 214; Christ. Ben. Michaelis, “Tractatio critica de variis lectt. N. T. caute colligendis,” *Halæ*, 1749, p. 18; Wetstein, ad Jo. i. 1.

the wilderness, 'and the rock was Christ.'* Well now, let us take this very text and compare it with the words of institution, on one side, and with the first verse of St. John, and see which it most resembles, to which it is more parallel. I write it thus between them :—

“The word *was* God,”

“The rock *was* Christ,”

“This *is* my body.”

Now tell me which have we most right to consider parallel. The construction of the two first is, word for word, identical; certainly much more so than that of the two last; and if parallelism have to depend only upon similarity of phrase, and if Protestants have a right to interpret the words “this is my body” by the help of “the rock was Christ,” then, I say, the Socinian has an equal right to interpret the phrase “the Word was God,” by the very same parallelism, and explain it by “the Word *represented* God.” Nay, I will say he has a far greater right, not only because the parallelism is more complete, but because he could bring other passages of Scripture to support it, where it is expressly said that the Word, or Christ, was the *image* or *representative* of God; “Christ who is

* “Difficulties of Romanism.” *Lond.* 1826, p 58

the *image* of God,"* "who is the *image* of the invisible God;"† whereas Protestants cannot pretend to bring a single passage where it is expressly said, that bread is the *image* or *representation* of the body of Christ.

Yet has no Socinian ever thought of such a course of reasoning, and such principles of interpretation, too absurd to be used except in contest with Catholics. And if any of them had brought it forward, what answer would Protestants have given? Why they would have replied, and replied triumphantly, that the two texts, "the Word was God," and, "the rock was Christ," could not for a moment be compared, because a mere similarity of collocation in the words does not constitute parallelism; but that to establish this, a similarity of circumstances is required; that, while St. Paul is manifestly interpreting an allegory, the words of St. John stand independent of any such circumstance, nor is there any thing in the context that denotes his wish to be figuratively understood. Now, all this we can say to our adversaries when they attempt to establish a parallelism between the words of institution and the phrases adduced; whatever they deny to the Socinian,

* 2 Cor iv. 4.

† Coloss. i. 15.

they grant to us; whatever they take from us, they give in argument to the Socinian.

5. These phrases differ materially from ours in point of construction. For in all of them, except the one from St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians, there is a definite subject which is said to be something else; as the rock is said to be Christ, horns are said to be kings. Now we know that two material objects cannot be identical; and therefore we are compelled to fly, by a positive repugnance and contradiction, to another sense. In fact, according to the philosophy of language, there are two ways of considering these sentences, both of which save the logical consistency of the idea, and yet preserve to the verb substantive its true determinate meaning. The first is, to consider one of the objects mentioned, or the predicate, in the form of an adjective or epithet; that is, as the concrete expression of the qualities which belong to the other. As though one should say, "the rock was Christlike," the name Christ being the complete enunciation of the qualities meant to be attributed to the rock. And, in this manner of conception, the verb "to be" keeps its own determinate signification expressive of identity. A second way of analyzing these passages, is to consider the subject as specifi-

cally modified by the circumstances of the occasion, so as to be deprived of that material quality which defies identity with another object. In other words, "the rock" means not the material rock, but as St. Paul himself describes it, "the spiritual rock which followed them;" that is, an ideal rock which was symbolized in the material one, and which was truly Christ. Here again "to be" has its genuine power, and expresses identity; the substitution of the idea or phrase "represents," is an act of our limited minds, unable to grasp the pure ideal expression.

But, to come down to more intelligible ideas: it is obviously necessary to fly from the literal meaning of texts which represent two material objects as identical; which every one of those alleged, excepting one, does in its ordinary acceptance. But we have no reason for this change, where one term is left vague and indefinite, and has no subjective existence till the other confers it. For Christ does not say "bread is my body," "wine is my blood," which, in point of construction, would have brought these words within a possibility of a comparison with "the seven kine are seven years," or, "the horns are kings." But he says, "*this* is my body," "*this* is my blood,"

The THIS is nothing but the body and the blood; it represents nothing, it means nothing, till identified, at the close of the sentence, with the substances named.

This is even more marked in the original Greek than in our language; because the distinction of genders shows clearly that the bread is not indicated, but only a vague something, to be determined by the remainder of the sentence. In this manner, the motive or reason which in those texts drives us from the literal sense, as involving a contradiction, does not exist here, and consequently we cannot consider this as parallel with them.

But even the one text which I seemed just now to except,—“these are the two covenants,” affords no real ground of resemblance in construction. For the translation is not accurate; but should be, “these persons,” or “they.” For the Greek has not the mere demonstrative pronoun as in our text, but the strictly personal demonstrative pronoun. *Αὐται γάρ εἰσι δύο διαθήκαι*,—“For *they* are two covenants:” that is, Agar and Sarah, of whom St. Paul is speaking. Hence it is manifest that the pronoun represents the two persons, and is not indefinite as in our text, where its determination is only

fixed by the substantives which succeed, $\sigma\tilde{\omega}\mu\alpha$, $\alpha\tilde{\iota}\mu\alpha$; body and blood.

6. Even supposing that the hypothesis or opinion of Protestants could be substantiated *aliunde*, that Christ meant only to institute a symbolical or representative rite, yet would not these texts be available as parallel passages, for they all refer to the *explanation* of a symbol, and not to the *institution* of one. This is a very different thing, and consequently the two passages brought into comparison contain not the same fact or thing.

After having thus seen that no argument can be drawn in favour of the Protestant interpretation from this first class of texts, let us proceed to the succeeding ones, in every one of which I deny that "to be" can be at all rendered by "to represent." If, therefore, nothing can be done against us by those texts, in which we allow that the substitution can be made, how much less, or rather how completely nothing, is to be effected by those where it is inadmissible.

II. In the second class, I have placed two texts commonly mixed up with the preceding: "I am the door, I am the vine." Christ, we are told, is not really the vine or door, but only figuratively; so, in like manner, is the Eucha-

rist not his body, except in figure. I assert that these passages can boast of no parallelism with the words of institution. And for the following reasons :—

1. Because all that I have already said concerning the other texts, as clearly informing us by their historical context that a parable is delivered, holds good here. Our Saviour goes on, by a series of comparisons, to show us how he is the door and the vine; to all which there is nothing corresponding in the history of the Eucharist.

2. The necessity of avoiding the literal construction, on the ground of identity being predicated of two distinct objects, is the same here as in the former class of passages.

3. "To be" here does not mean "to represent," for, if you make the substitution, you have these propositions, "I *represent* the door, I *am a figure* of a vine." This, most certainly, is not our Lord's meaning, who did not intend to demean himself into a symbol or figure of material objects. In fact, he evidently meant to say, "I *resemble* the door, I *am like* a vine."

4. But this is a very different idea from the other, and is in truth, admissible in every language, while the other is not. If I say,

“Achilles was a lion,” everybody understands me; because the two not being by possibility identical, usage tells me that I mean he was “*like* a lion.” But if, pointing to a lion, I should say, “this is Achilles,” you might conclude that Achilles was the animal’s name, but never that I meant to say it symbolizes the hero. To be understood in this sense, I must say, “that is a fit emblem or type of Achilles.”

5. In like manner, had our divine Saviour said, pointing to a vine, “that is I,” or, “that is my body,” the expressions would have borne some resemblance; but, when he says that *he* is the vine, the usages of language, founded on necessity, make us recur to the idea of resemblance between the two objects; especially when a long context elaborately enumerates the points of resemblance.

Nor can it be said that the conclusion is the same, if we interpret the Eucharistic words in the same manner, by “this resembles my body and blood;” because a declaration of similarity does not constitute a type or commemorative symbol. This is a matter of positive institution, nor would Protestants presume to ground their ordinance of the Lord’s Supper on nothing more than similarity. This would be as bad as Wetstein’s resolution of this point, when he says,

“We can easily understand how red wine could signify blood; but it is not easy to understand what resemblance exists between the human body and bread. It might be answered that a bloodless corpse, as that of one dead on a cross, is as dry as bread; and then that the body of Christ, mystically considered as the flesh of sacrifice, nourishes the mind as bread does the body!”*

Let us pass on to the third class.

III. The passage which I have placed in it, “this is my covenant between me and thee,” is no more applicable to the present case.

1. Circumcision, of which this text speaks, was indeed a sign of God’s covenant with his people; but then God was careful to let his people know this. He is not content with telling them that it is his covenant, and leaving them to conjecture or argue that this meant a sign of his covenant, for in the very verse following, he adds, “and ye shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin; and it shall be a *sign* or token of the covenant between me and you.” But are these two verses identical in meaning, and is the second only an explanation of the first; so that *is* really corresponds to “represent?” Certainly not.

* In loc. Nov. Test. p. 519.

2. Because, secondly, circumcision was, at all events, not merely the symbol or emblem, but actually the instrument whereby the covenant between God and his people was at once executed and recorded. It was, according to the established law of every language and country, the treaty itself. If I present any one with a writing or book, and say to him, "This is the treaty of Amiens, or Tolentino, or Westphalia," every one must understand me to mean the instrument or act of treaty. But if the book contained nothing more than a symbolical drawing of a treaty, for instance, two hands joined together, I should have been completely misunderstood; for no one could have conjectured this to be my meaning. In the former sense, was circumcision not a bare and empty symbol, but an effective representative, that which formed the covenant, and recorded upon each individual his personal comprehension under its provisions, and his accession to it as a holder of its promises. Therefore, "this is my covenant between me and thee," signifies much more than "this is the sign of my covenant," to wit, this is "the *act* of my covenant:" taking the word "act" in both its meanings, of its execution and its record. This interpretation is fully borne out by what follows, (v. 13 :) "He who is born in thy house,

and he that is bought with thy money, must needs be circumcised; and *my covenant shall be in your flesh* for an everlasting covenant."

3. Satisfactory, however, as these answers are, and perfectly in harmony with each other, I am led, by a more minute examination of Scripture phraseology, to adopt a third, which does not, however, in any way disturb the correctness of all I have asserted. I have no hesitation in saying, that the verb *is* must here be taken quite literally, and the pronoun *this* referred not to *circumcision* or its idea, but to the latter member of the sentence. "This is my covenant which ye shall keep between me and thee . . . every male child among you shall be circumcised." As, if one said, "this is our agreement, you shall pay me a hundred pounds," I presume no one would hesitate to refer the pronoun to the condition proposed. The idea of *is* meaning to represent, would never have entered into any one's head in either proposition, except in a controversial argument. I have said that I noways doubt this to be the true meaning.

First, because I see that, as in the following verse, so in every other place, a sign of a covenant is clearly styled such, and no encouragement is given elsewhere by Scripture to this Protestant interpretation. Thus, in Gen. ix. 12,

13, 17, the rainbow is not called a covenant, but thrice distinctly named the sign or token of the covenant.

Secondly, whenever the words "this is my covenant" occur in Scripture, they refer to the second member of the sentence, in which the covenant is described. Thus Is. lix. 21, "*This is my covenant with them*, saith the Lord; my spirit which is upon thee, and my words which I have put in thy mouth, shall not depart out of thy mouth," &c.; Jer. xxxi. 33, "And this is the covenant which I will make with the house of Israel; after those days, saith the Lord, I will put my law in their interior," &c.; 1 Sam. xi. 2, according to the original, "In this will I make a covenant with you, in boring out your right eyes." This is further confirmed by the analogous and parallel forms: "this is what the Lord hath commanded;"* "this is what the Lord hath said;"† "this shall be an everlasting statute to you;"‡ "this shall be a statute for ever unto them."§

In all these, and in similar phrases, reference is clearly made to what is proposed in the other member of the sentence. Now, in fact, no one has ever dreamt of interpreting these passages

* Exod. xvi. 16.

† Ib 23.

‡ Levit. xvi. 34.

§ Ib xvii. 7, where the proposition precedes.

by, "this is a figure of my covenant," or "a figure of my statute," and, consequently, in the objected passage, there is no reason whatever to render it similarly. On the contrary, it is evident by the real parallelism of these quotations, where not only the same words are used, but the same things expressed, that it ought and must be explained in these terms: "the following is my covenant between thee and me, that every male child among you shall be circumcised."

IV. We come finally to the passage occupying the fourth class, which possesses an interest quite independent of its real value. "This is the Lord's passover." This text, you are doubtless aware, was considered by Zwinglius the ægis of his figurative interpretation, and the discovery of it was esteemed by him a complete triumph. For he himself tells us, that he made little or no impression upon his hearers with other texts, because in them all, it was evident, as I have shown you at full, that parables or allegories are treated. The history of his discovery you shall have in his own words. "The attempt yet remained, and it was not the least, to produce examples which should not be joined to parables. We began, therefore, to think over every thing; but no examples came to mind

except what were in the Commentary, or resembled them. But when the thirteenth day approached,—I relate a true occurrence, and so true, that my conscience obliges me to manifest (when I desire to conceal it) what the Lord communicated to me, knowing to what contumely and laughter I shall expose myself:—when, then, the 13th of April was come, I appeared to myself again to be contending in my sleep with my adversary the Scribe,* with great annoyance; and unable to utter what I knew to be true, because my tongue refused to do its office. I was troubled as men are in deceitful dreams, (for I relate nothing more than a dream as far as I am concerned, though what I learnt in the dream was not, through God's favor, of light moment, for whose glory I relate it,) when, opportunely, a monitor appeared to be present, (whether he were black or white, I do not remember, for I relate a dream,) who said, 'You coward, why do you not answer him, that in Exod. xii. is written, it is the Pasch, that is, the Passover of the Lord?' As soon as this phantom appeared I awake and leap up from bed;

* The defendant of the Catholic doctrine before the Senate of Zurich against Henry Engelhardt, mentioned before, p. 247. Of him, too, Zwinglius says, "Qui albus an ater sit non est hujus instituti dicere."

I examine well the passage in the Septuagint, and preach to the assembly about it.”*

There is much to remark in this statement. One does not know, after reading it, whether to consider the writer a mad enthusiast, or little better than an idiot. It is scarcely possible to understand the motives which impelled him to publish this disgraceful narrative, in spite of his own better feelings. The best criterion for ascertaining whether the spirit, if any, who suggested this palmary argument against us was a true or lying one, is to see whether the argument he suggested was correct or false; and, if we find that the text is nothing on earth to the purpose, I think we may determine the character of its suggestor; if, indeed, the incoherences of a raver deserve such credit. At any rate, we must compassionate the poor burghers of Zurich, who allowed themselves to be cheated out of their belief in the Catholic dogma, with all its consolations and all its charms, by a misapplication of a Scripture text. For Zwinglius adds, that the discovery of this wonderful text on the 13th of April, achieved their conviction!

1. I say, then, in the first place, that if the words in question signify “this represents the

* *Operum Huldrici Zuinglii*, 2a pars, *Tigur.* 1581, p. 249. *Subsidium seu Coronis de Eucharistia.*

passover," the many ceremonies and peculiar rites prescribed in eating the paschal lamb, of which they were spoken, were of a character to prepare the Jews for a symbolical explanation of them.

2. Again, granting the point at issue, that the paschal sacrifice is called "the Lord's passover," meaning that it was only its symbol, this might be a figure easily allowed; because it was familiar to the Hebrews to call sacrifices by the name of the object for which they were offered. Thus a peace-offering and a sin-offering are known in Hebrew by the simple designation of *peace* and *sin*. This, in fact, was so usual, as to have given rise to several peculiar images, as, Osee iv. 8, where the priests are said "to eat the sins of the people;" and 2 Cor. v. 21, where St. Paul says of God, "Him who knew no sin, for us he hath made sin," that is, an oblation for sin. In like manner, therefore, the sacrifice of the Lord's passover might, by the same familiar image, be called his passover. But there is no trace of any such usage in regard to bread being the image or type of Christ's body.

3. But, in fact, these remarks are almost needless; for, as I before intimated, the text, from its very construction, is in nowise applicable to the matter under discussion, inasmuch as the

verb "to be" does not here signify "to represent," but purely what it sounds. A very simple and natural translation, proposed by Dr. Trevern, if admitted, makes this evident; that is, the referring of "this" to the day or festival. It would then no more mean "this is a figure of the Lord's passover," than "this is Easter-day" means that it is a figure of that holiday.* I am satisfied that this is nearly the sense, with this difference, that, instead of understanding "day," we may make the demonstrative pronoun refer to the repast or sacrifice just described.

But there is an important circumstance in the grammatical construction of this passage, noticed by modern commentators, which fairly removes all doubt as to the inapplicability of this text to the illustration of the Eucharistic formulas, by proving that the verb has its native signification. Rosenmüller has observed, that in the original it is not "the passover or pasch of the Lord," but with a dative, "to the Lord," לַיהוָה פֶּסַח הוּא. Now this construction invariably signifies "*sacred* or *dedicated* to." We have several examples; as Exod. xx. 10, שֶׁבֶת

* "Amicable Discussion." Lond. 1828, vol. i. p. 271.

לִיהוָה “a sabbath (sacred) to the Lord;” and xxxii. 5, הַגָּ לִי “a festival (sacred) to the Lord.” But this rendering is placed beyond all controversy by a passage perfectly parallel, in the very chapter from which the objection is drawn, which, if Zwinglius had possessed the sagacity to compare, he would not have become the instrument of ensnaring his unlearned auditors. I allude to the twenty-seventh verse, in which we read of this very sacrifice as follows, הוּא לִיהוָה זֶבַח-פֶּסַח; literally, “this is to the Lord the sacrifice of passover or pasch.” Here the paschal feast is spoken of, not as any emblem of the Lord’s passover, but as its sacrifice; and the thing so spoken of is said *to be* sacred to the Lord. The verb which expresses this idea must necessarily be taken in its own strict sense, for it affirms the fact of this consecration. In the other passage, therefore, in which the same thing is spoken of and the same construction employed, we must conclude that the word has the same meaning;* “this *is* the paschal feast of the Lord.”

* Rosenmüller, “Scholia in loc.” Of course, when we speak of the verb substantive in these texts, it is of the verb understood, and not expressed; as in Hebrew it is not used simply to connect two terms in a sentence. The argument, however, is precisely the same.

I have thus gone through every one of the texts brought forward by writers, whether popular or scientific, among Protestants, for the purpose of showing that the words of institution can be understood figuratively without doing violence to their construction, and in harmony with similar forms of expression found in Scripture. You have seen that, on solid hermeneutical grounds, they cannot be admitted as parallel with the words under examination; either because in them the verb in question is to be taken literally, or else because the circumstances in which other passages occur are such as group them into a class apart, into which our text cannot possibly be forced. The first part, then, of the Protestant reasoning against our interpretation falls to the ground;—it remains for us to see whether the second has any better foundation; that is, whether such difficulties surround the literal meaning, as drive us, however unwillingly, to take refuge in a metaphor. This disquisition will occupy your attention at our next meeting.


LECTURE VI.

Examination of the second point at issue between Catholics and Protestants, on the words of Institution ; are we compelled to prefer the Figurative Interpretation in order to escape from Greater Difficulties, such as Contradictions and violations of the Law of Nature?—Hermeneutical disquisition on the subject.—Philosophical principles applied to it.—Strong Confirmatory Arguments of the Catholic Interpretation, from the construction of the words, and from the circumstances of the Institution.

It might appear that, between us and Protestants, in the ordinary acceptation of the word, our contention was now closed. For they, as well as ourselves, believe in Christ's omnipotence, in the existence of mysteries unfathomable by reason, and in the infallible inspiration of the gospel. They must admit, likewise, the accuracy of the rules which I have adopted and observed most scrupulously throughout this investigation. With the principles which I have enumerated, common to us all, we may, I think, insist upon the completeness of the conclusi

which we have reached, independently of every other inquiry. For, if the words spoken by our Saviour be such as admit of no other meaning but what we attribute to them, it follows that this meaning alone, with all its difficulties, must be received, or else belief in Christ's omnipotence, or in his veracity, be renounced; an idea too blasphemous to be ever entertained.

For, a question very naturally presents itself: are we to modify the conclusions drawn from the examination of a text by other considerations? If hermeneutical principles be grounded on sound reason and correct logic, and if, when applied, they all converge to one interpretation of a text, and assure us that it alone can be accurate, have we a choice, except between the admission of that proof, and the rejection of the facts? For instance, when I read in a profane writer the account of a miraculous action performed by Vespasian or Apollonius, if, upon critically discussing the narrative, I find all my rules bring me to the conclusion that the writer meant to state such facts, am I not bound to admit that such was his intention, and obliged either to believe his words with all their difficulties, or else, acknowledging his intention, reject the statement as false? But am I not manifestly precluded from putting a meaning



or interpretation on the expressions, which would be at variance with all the rules of his language? Here, then, having proved that in the language used by our Saviour he can only have had one meaning, we have a right to propose a similar dilemma. We cannot depart from that meaning, but can only choose between believing or disbelieving him. If you say, that what he asserts involves an impossibility, the only choice is, will you believe what he states, in spite of its teaching what *to you* seems such, or will you reject his word and authority for it? It cannot be, that he does not state it, when all the evidence which can possibly be required or desired proves that he did. In a word, Christ says, "this is my body," and every rule of sound interpretation tells you that he must have meant to say it simply and literally: your selection is between belief or disbelief that it is his body; but you are shut out from all attempts to prove that he could not mean to make that literal assertion.

However, we must here, as often, condescend to the imperfect modes of reasoning pursued by those whom it is our duty to try to gain; and, therefore, foregoing the advantages of our previous argument, I proceed to reason upon the usual ground of necessity for departing from the

literal interpretation of our Saviour's words. But first, a few remarks on the manner in which the argument is presented.

You have heard how unceremoniously Dr. Clarke calls those little better than dolts and idiots, who believe in the possibility of the Catholic doctrine. The preacher, likewise, whom I quoted, appealed to the same argument; and Mr. Horne gives the same motive for departing from the letter, in the form of a rule. "Whatever is repugnant to natural reason cannot be the true meaning of the Scriptures. . . . No proposition, therefore, which is repugnant to the fundamental principles of reason, can be the sense of any part of God's word; hence, the words of Christ, 'This is my body, this is my blood,' are not to be understood in that sense, which makes for the doctrine of transubstantiation, because it is impossible that contradictions should be true; and we cannot be more certain that any thing is true, than we are that *that* doctrine is false."*

The very same line of argument is pursued by Dr. Tomline, whose "Elements of Theology" are, if I am rightly informed, a standard classical manual of the science in the Anglican Church.

* "Introduction," vol. ii. p. 448, 7th ed.

For, in expounding the Church article on the Lord's Supper, he summarily rejects our doctrine as follows:—

“In arguing against this doctrine, we may first observe, that it is contradicted by our senses, since we see and taste the bread and wine after consecration, and, when we actually receive them, they still continue to be bread and wine, without any change or alteration whatever. And again, was it possible for Christ, when he instituted the Lord's Supper, to take his own body and his own blood into his own hands, and to deliver them to every one of his apostles? Or, was it possible for the apostles to understand our Saviour's words, as a command to drink his blood, literally, &c. . . . The bread and wine must have been considered by them as symbolical; and, indeed, the whole transaction was evidently figurative in all its parts.”*

The learned bishop then goes on to say that it was performed when the Jews were commemorating their delivery from Egypt by eating the paschal lamb, which was symbolical of Christ's redemption. Now, before proceeding

* “Elements of Christian Theology,” by George Pretyman (Tomline), Lord Bishop of Lincoln, 2d ed. 1799, vol. ii. p. 484.

further, I may remark that this, to my idea, would make against the Doctor's argument rather than in its favor; for I should imagine that the impression of the apostles, and the impression which our Saviour's character and mission are calculated to make upon us, is, that if there was a conformity visible between any thing which he instituted and a ceremonial appointment of the old law, this was to be a *fulfilment* of the other, rather than a substitution of figure for figure. And, therefore, when he so celebrated his last Supper, as to fill up the circumstances of the Jewish paschal feast, in words and in actions, we must conclude that here was the accomplishment of that former rite; and if that was but a shadow or type of Christ, this should contain its corresponding reality; and if that was a typical sacrifice, pointing out the Lamb of God slain for the remission of sins, this must be one containing that very Lamb so slain for our propitiation.

This, however, is but a passing remark; at present we are occupied with the argument drawn from the possibility or impossibility of our Saviour's really performing what the palpable import of his words is that he did perform. But while so many Protestant divines have thus considered this to be the groundwork

of departure from our interpretation, others have acknowledged that such a line of argument is absolutely untenable. Among them, perhaps the most explicit, at least of modern times, is Mr. Faber, who certainly will not be suspected of any leaning to our way of thinking. This is the way in which he expresses himself:—

“While arguing upon this subject, or incidentally mentioning it, some persons, I regret to say, have been too copious in the use of those unseemly words, ‘absurdity and impossibility.’ To such language, the least objection is its reprehensible want of good manners. A much more serious objection is the tone of presumptuous loftiness which pervades it, and is wholly unbecoming a creature of very narrow faculties. Certainly God *will* do nothing absurd, and *can* do nothing impossible. But it does not therefore follow that our view of things should be always perfectly correct, and free from misapprehension. Contradictions we can easily *fancy*, where, in truth, there are none. Hence, therefore, before we consider any doctrine a contradiction, we must be sure we perfectly understand the nature of the matter propounded in that doctrine; for otherwise the contradiction may not be *in the matter itself*, but *in our mode of conceiving it*. In regard of myself,—as my

consciously finite intellect claims not to be an universal measure of congruities and possibilities,—I deem it to be both more wise and more decorous, to refrain from assailing the doctrine of Transubstantiation, on the grounds of its alleged absurdity, or contradictoriness, or impossibility. By such a mode of attack, we in reality quit the field of rational and satisfactory argumentation.

“The doctrine of Transubstantiation, like the doctrine of the Trinity, is a question, not of abstract reasoning, but of pure *evidence*. We believe the revelation of God to be essential and unerring truth. Our business most plainly is, not to discuss the abstract absurdity, and the imagined contradictoriness of Transubstantiation, but to inquire, according to the best means we possess, whether it be, indeed, a doctrine of Holy Scripture. If sufficient evidence shall determine such to be the case, we may be sure that the doctrine is neither absurd nor contradictory. I shall ever contend, that the doctrine of Transubstantiation, like the doctrine of the Trinity, is a question of *pure evidence*.”*

Here, then, is a clear and manly acknowledgment that the course pursued by divines of the

* “Difficulties of Romanism,” *Lond.* 1826, p. 54.

Protestant church is by no means satisfactory or tenable. Mr. Faber places the discussion of Transubstantiation on the same footing as that of the Trinity, as a question of pure evidence. This is precisely what I have considered it. But after this acknowledgment, I certainly expected to find in the succeeding pages of this acute controversialist's works, some additional arguments in aid of the Herculean task of building up the Protestant interpretation, as a positively demonstrated doctrine, and as standing on its own actual proofs. But, to my disappointment, I found nothing but the old trite and thrice-confuted remarks, on "the flesh profiteth nothing," which can have nothing to do with the words of institution, if the sixth chapter of St. John apply not to the blessed Sacrament, and Christ's declaration that he would not taste of the fruit of the vine! Nothing, indeed, that I have read in Catholics, has more confirmed my conviction—if it ever needed confirmation—than this evident barrenness of evidence in one who has disclaimed the incorrect reasoning of his predecessors, and the poverty of proof which he has displayed in maintaining his cause.

In spite, however, of this conflict between divines, whether the supposed contradictions or impossibility involved in our dogma, be or be

not a legitimate element of interpretation in examining the words of institution, I will go fully into the question; and that without turning aside one step from the great principles which I laid down at the commencement of my course.

Dr. Clarke and the Bishop of Lincoln place, as you have seen, this inquiry, if it have to be undertaken, upon a proper basis. For they refer the argument to the apostles, and consider its probable working on their minds.* They assert, or rather ask, in a tone of confidence, how it is possible that they can have taken our Saviour's words literally, and not at once fly to the figurative meaning? But they do not think it worth their while to prove any thing on the subject, or to convince us that the natural reasoning of the immediate hearers must have led them to this interpretation. Now, assuming the same correct point of departure with them, I hesitate not to assert that we shall come to exactly the opposite conclusion.

According to the admitted principles of biblical interpretation, which I explained in my first lecture, the immediate hearers who were personally addressed are the real judges of the meaning of words; we must place ourselves in their

* Clarke, *ubi sup.* p. 51. Tomline, *sup. cit.* p. 198.

situation, and we must make use only of those data and means which the speaker could suppose them to use for understanding his words. The institution of the Eucharist was addressed primarily to the twelve who were present. To satisfy ourselves, therefore, how far the contradictions, or apparent impossibilities, or violation of unalterable laws, involved in our interpretation, can have been the criterion used by them for reaching the sense of Christ's words, and how far he could have intended or expected them to use it, is now a question of great importance.

We must, in the first place, remember that the apostles were illiterate, uneducated, and by no means intellectual men at that time; consequently, we must not judge of their mind, or of its operations, as we should of a philosopher's; but we must look for its type among the ordinary class of virtuous and sensible, though ignorant men. Now, among such you will seek in vain for any profound notions on the subject of impossibility or contradictoriness. Their idea of possibility is measured exclusively by the degree of intensity of power applied to overcome an obstacle, never by the degree of the resistance. When that intensity has reached what they consider Omnipotence, they can understand

no further power of resistance. You may talk to them of the impossibility of a body being in two places at once, or existing without extension, in consequence of contradictions thence ensuing,—they will understand very little about the matter; but they *will* consider it a contradiction to speak about any thing being impossible to Omnipotence. I have made the experiment; and, on trying to prove to such persons that God cannot cause the same thing to be and not be at the same time, I have not succeeded in making them comprehend it: they invariably fly back to the same consequence; therefore, God cannot do all things; he is not then almighty. This may, perhaps, be considered a low state of intellectual power; but we need not go so low for our purpose. Supposing, then, the apostles to have possessed some notions of the repugnance of certain conceivable propositions to the unchangeable laws of nature, a twofold question arises: first, were they likely to form, in an instant, a decision to that effect on the literal import of their Divine Master's words; and, secondly, would they have been right in making it? The first is an inquiry of pure hermeneutics, and as such I proceed to treat it; the second is a more philosophical investigation, and will be touched upon in the sequel.

I. 1. First let us see what estimate of their Lord's power they must have formed by witnessing his actions. They had seen him cure every species of disease and deformity; such as restoring a withered limb to life and vigor. Three times, if not oftener, they had seen him raise the dead to life; in one instance, where decomposition must have taken place;* consequently where a change of matter from one state to another must have been effected.

But there were some miracles still more calculated to make them very timid in drawing the line between absolute impossibility to their Lord, and power over the received laws of nature. For instance, gravitation is one of the properties universally attributed to bodies, and is closely allied, in reality and in conception, with our notion of extension. Yet the apostles had seen the body of Jesus, for a time, deprived of this property, and able to walk, without sinking, on the surface of the waters.†

They had seen him, in another instance, actually change one substance into another. For at the marriage-feast at Cana, he completely transmuted, or, if you please, transubstantiated

* Jo. xi. 39.

† Matt. xiv. ; Mar. vi. ; Jo. vi.

water into wine.* It would require a very fine edge of intellect to distinguish in mind between the possibility of making water become wine, and the impossibility of making wine become blood. Such men as the apostles, at least, would not have made the distinction, if it existed, the basis of any interpretation of their Master's words.

Upon two other occasions they had witnessed him controlling still more remarkably the laws of nature, and that in a way likely to influence their ideas of his omnipotence to such an extent as would not allow them to use the notion of impossibility or contradictoriness for interpreting any thing he might ever teach. I allude to the miracles whereby he fed five thousand men with five loaves and two fishes, and four thousand with seven loaves.† For, according to the simple narrative of the Evangelists, it does not appear that the multiplication of the loaves took place by an addition to their number, whether through the creation of new matter, or by its being miraculously brought from some other place, but by actually causing the same substance, the very loaves, to be the nourishment of many individuals. The miracle is never

* Jo. ii.

† Jo. vi. 5-14; Mar. viii. 1-9.

described as consisting in an increase of number, but in a sufficiency of what existed; the fragments are not spoken of as additional pieces, but as part of that very bread, of those very loaves, which had been broken, distributed, and eaten by the multitude. Now you may explain the phenomenon as you please, so as to bring it into accordance with our supposed laws of nature regarding substance, extension, and matter's being in more places than one at a time; but the witnessing of such acts as these must have gone a long way towards weakening the confidence of simple-minded men in any distinctions between one interference and another with the laws of nature, such as they might have ever imagined, and must have left them very little qualified, and still less disposed, to make them the basis of their reasoning, when trying to reach the sense of his doctrines who had performed these works.

Such, then, were the apostles; and such were the notions of their Master's power, suggested by what they had seen him perform; will any one believe that they would have used, to interpret his simple words, "This is my body," any idea of the impossibility of their literal import;—an idea of impossibility to be grounded necessarily on the conception of their being at variance with

the laws of nature, in a totally different manner from the other miracles which I have described? Can we suppose that the apostles would think, "It is true that he once changed water into wine; it is true that he deprived his body of gravity; it is true that he multiplied a few loaves, so as to satisfy a crowd; but the change here proposed, the destruction of the essential qualities of a body, the *multi-presence* of one substance here designated, meets the laws of nature at a point so nicely different from the former cases, that *here* we must, for the first time, doubt whether his power can go so far, and must understand him figuratively?" And if the apostles, after his resurrection, reasoned on this matter, would this conclusion, supposing it to have been drawn, have received any confirmation from having seen and known that the body, on which all this learned reasoning had been made, was able to pass through closed doors,* and even penetrate the stone vault of the sepulchre, to the utter discomfiture of all reasoning on the boasted incompenetrability, as it is called, of matter?

2. But if what the apostles had seen must have thus worked upon their minds, what lessons had they heard in the school of Christ?

* Jo. xx. 19, 26.

Why, first, instead of any attempt to limit their ideas of possibility, his doctrine must have gone far to enlarge them. After the parable of the camel passing through the eye of a needle, he adds, "With men this is impossible." He does not complete the antithesis by saying, "with God IT IS possible." No; he gives a universal proposition in contradistinction to the first particular one; "but with God ALL THINGS are possible."*

Secondly, we find that he took every opportunity of encouraging a belief in his absolute omnipotence, without limitation. When the blind men asked to be cured, he first puts the question to them, "Do ye believe that I can do this thing unto you?" And upon their expressing their conviction, he replies, "According to your faith, be it done unto you."† When the centurion begs that he will not trouble himself to come to his house to cure his servant, but expresses a confidence that he can do it at a distance, even as he himself can, through his servants, perform what he wishes, Jesus approves of this high estimate, for the first time, expressed of his power; and answers, "Amen; I say unto you, I have not found so great faith in Israel."‡

* Matt. xix. 26.

† Ib. ix. 28.

‡ Ib. viii. 10.

So completely was this idea of his power possessed by his friends, and by the people in general, that in applying to him for favors, they only endeavored to gain his good-will, as if quite certain of its effects. "Lord," said the leper, "*if thou wilt, thou canst* make me clean."* So Martha addresses him: "Lord, if thou hadst been here, my brother had not died. But *I know* that even now, *whatever* thou shalt ask of God, he will give it thee."† Jesus, in his answers in both cases approved of this faith and of its principle. To the leper he replied, "*I will*: be thou made clean." To Martha he answered in his prayer, "Father, I thank thee that thou hast heard me. And I know that thou hearest me *always*."‡ Now, after thus encouraging unlimited belief in his power by his followers, are we to believe that he ever meant his words to be interpreted by them on the supposition that what he said, if taken simply, was impossible even to him?

Thirdly, they had scarcely ever been severely reproved by him except when their belief and confidence in him seemed to waver: "Why are ye fearful, O ye of little faith?" "O thou of little faith, why dost thou doubt?"§ Such conduct

* Matt. viii. 2.

† Jo. xi. 21, 22.

‡ Ib. 41, 42.

§ Matt. viii. 26; xix. 21.



towards them was not calculated to make the first impression of any proposition he might utter be a doubt of its possibility; nor would they be likely to make this the criterion for interpreting his words.

Finally, on a former occasion he had made this the very test whereby his disciples were to be assayed, and their fidelity or hollowness decided; that the unsteady and insecure would abandon him, upon hearing a doctrine which appeared to them to involve an impossibility, while the true ones adhered to him in spite of such a difficulty. This occurred after the discourse in the sixth chapter of St. John, on which I have already said so much; but the argument is quite independent of the controversial question; for it is evident that, whatever was the doctrine taught, the false disciples, who said "This is a hard saying, who can hear it?" were allowed to depart; and the tried fidelity of the twelve, who said, "To whom shall we go? thou hast the words of eternal life," was approved in those words, "Have I not chosen you twelve?"

The conclusion to which we must come upon these premises is strictly within the range of hermeneutical principles. For it is their province to decide whether, under given circumstances, a certain opinion or conviction could

have been an element employed for arriving at the interpretation of any passage. And here, therefore, we have a right to ask, concerning the apostles; they being illiterate, and not scientific men, accustomed to see their Divine Master, whom they considered omnipotent, perform actions apparently at variance with the established order of nature, taught by him never to limit their confidence in his power; can they be supposed to have used, as a key for understanding his words aright, the idea that, if taken literally, they implied a more complete violation of those laws of nature than the others, and the notion that here his power was unequal to the work, or that what he said was impossible to him?

Or let us transfer the ground of the conclusion to our Saviour's mind, and see whether he can have used words whereof the true meaning was to be reached only through the reasoning here supposed. In other words, having always accustomed his apostles to argue thus: "*Although* the thing may appear to us impossible, *as* our Divine Master says it, it *must* be so," can we believe that now, on a sudden, he should have chosen expressions, to understand which they must perforce reason in an exactly inverse manner: "*As* this thing appears to us impossible,

although our Divine Master says it, it cannot be so?"

Every unprejudiced mind will answer, that such a departure from an established course of reasoning cannot, for a moment, be allowed. The consequence is obvious; the apostles cannot have made the possibility or impossibility of the doctrine expressed a criterion for interpreting our Saviour's words. But then we have seen that, to interpret correctly, we must place ourselves in the immediate hearers' state, and identify ourselves as much as possible with their feelings and opinions; and therefore we are not warranted in using any criterions or instruments which could not have occurred to them for that purpose. Consequently we have no right to make the physical difficulties, supposed to be incurred by our interpretation, any ground for adopting or rejecting it.

II. Hitherto I have spoken only of the apostles, because they were the proper judges of our Lord's meaning; we may, however, boldly ask, who is the philosopher that will venture to define the properties of matter so nicely, as to say that they would have been right in weighing them against an Almighty's declaration? It is easy to talk of reason and common sense, and the laws which regulate bodies; but when we

come to introduce these matters into theology, and pretend to decide where they clash with a mystery, and where a mystery rides triumphant over them, we not only bring profane scales into the sanctuary, but we are mixing a dangerous ingredient with our faith. I need not repeat any well-known remarks upon the difficulty of defining the essential properties of matter, or of deciding what relation to space is so necessary to it, as not to be affected without destroying its nature. On such a subject, it would be rashness to pronounce a sentence, especially for those who believe in revelation, and read in its records the qualities attributed to Christ's body risen from the dead; and the profounder the philosopher, the more modest and timid will he be in coming to a decision. I will, therefore, confine myself to a few remarks more connected with the theological view of the case.

I would ask, then, what are the laws of nature which our interpretation is said to contradict? They are, they can be, nothing more than the aggregate of results from our observation of nature. We see that her workings and her appearances are constant and analogous, producing the same effects in all similar circumstances; and we call a result under given conditions, a *law*, and an unvarying appearance, a *property*

All objects cognizable by the senses, from the very fact, are proved to have a certain relation to space, which we call extension, and as we have no knowledge of matter except through that medium, we pronounce extension to be a necessary property of all bodies. We find that one material substance never occupies the very identical space of another, and we call this incompenetrability, another such property. It is so with regard to every other. The code of laws which we have framed for nature, consists of nothing more than the results of observation on the undeviating course which she pursues.

Now, then, suppose a mystery revealed; that is, a truth at the comprehension of which unaided reason cannot arrive. Is its truth to be tried by its accordance with the results deduced from the observation of nature's undeviating workings? If so, the decision must ever be against the mystery. For it is of its essence to depart from all natural analogies, through which it can never be reached. All the experience and observations of philosophers on the law of numbers, must have led them to conclude that the very term *Triune*, or three in one, was opposed to natural reasoning. Would they, then, have been right in rejecting the Trinity? Most undoubtedly not; because, revealed by that

authority which created nature, and framed the code of her government, man's reason must receive it, and yield the conclusions of its feeble powers to that supreme authority. In like manner, the observation of nature, and the undeviating principles observable in her, would have led Aristotle, or any other philosopher, to conclude that the infinite could not be united to or contained in the finite; consequently that the Godhead could not be incarnate in the human nature. Yet the mystery of the incarnation, once clearly revealed, overthrows this specious reasoning, deducible from experience.

Precisely of the same character is the argument relative to the blessed Sacrament. All the pretended laws of nature which it is said to transgress, are no more than results deducible from observation; no one will venture to assert that they have their being in the essence of matter. If, therefore, as clear a revelation has been made of this mystery as of the others, the results of our observations, which have been formalized into a code of laws, must yield to the revelation, as they have done before. Whether this revelation be as distinct in this instance as in any other, the arguments which you have heard may perhaps have sufficiently shown. An empty distinction has been often popularly made, though

never proved, that the Trinity is *above* reason, but Transubstantiation is *against* reason. This is truly a distinction without a difference. If it existed, it could only be in this sense; that reason could never have reached the doctrine of the Trinity, but that when this has been once manifested, reason sees nothing contrary to it; whereas the Eucharist, even after having been revealed or proposed, is strongly rejected by reason. This is manifestly a fallacy; for reason unaided has equal repugnance to one as to the other, but bows and is silent in regard to both, when revealed. It cannot pretend to sanction the one, or prove it, or understand it; it cannot presume to reject the other, if proposed by the same authority as the first. Both belong to a plane far elevated above her sphere of action, and thus both are beyond reason; they depend for their truth on an authority beside which reason is a valueless element, and so they cannot be contrary to it.

I will close this question, by referring to the opinion of one of the soundest philosophers of the last century, who lived and died a Protestant. The celebrated Leibnitz left behind him a work in manuscript, entitled "Systema Theologicum," in which he deliberately recorded his sentiments upon every point contested between

Catholics and Protestants, in a simple, moderate style. This work was not published till 1819, when the manuscript was procured from Hanover, by the Abbé L'Emery, who translated it into French. His version appeared at Paris, together with the original Latin. In this book, Leibnitz, of course, among other dogmas, treats of the Catholic doctrine of a corporal presence, or Transubstantiation; and examines its supposed opposition to philosophical principles in great detail. His answer necessarily runs into minute disquisition, which it would be at variance with my plan to give; I will therefore content myself with saying, that he perfectly repels the idea of any such contradiction, and observes, "that so far from its being demonstrable, as some flippantly boast, that a body cannot be in many places at once, it may, on the contrary, be solidly proved, that though the natural order of things requires that matter should be definitely circumscribed, yet no absolute necessity requires it."* In a letter to the Landgrave Ernest of Hesse Rheinfelds, given by the editor of his work, Leibnitz observes: "In regard to doctrine, the principal difficulty, it appears to me, turns on Transubstantiation. Upon

* "Systema Theologicum," p. 224. See Catholic Magazine, vol. i. pp. 577, *seqq.*

the subject of the Real Presence, I have worked out certain demonstrations, founded on mathematical reasoning, and on the nature of motion, which I own give no great satisfaction."

Thus much may suffice upon the motives given for a necessity of rejecting the literal sense of the words of Institution. You have seen that it is contrary to the first principles of hermeneutics to allow any such supposed difficulties to interfere in their interpretation, or to enter as an element in it; you have seen that they can no more be admitted in regard to this doctrine than they can respecting the Trinity, Incarnation, or any other divine mystery. This is more than sufficient to justify us in refusing to admit them into the disquisition of this doctrine.

Before closing this Lecture, however, I must not omit the positive arguments in favor of the literal sense. They are twofold,—drawn from the construction of the words themselves, and from the circumstances in which they were pronounced.

I. 1. The words in their own simplicity, as I before observed, speak powerfully. But this power is greater, if, with Dr. A. Clarke, and his transcribers, we admit a strong emphasis in the words of consecration of the cup. Hear their

commentary upon them:—"Almost every syllable of the original Greek, especially the articles, is singularly emphatic. It runs thus: Τουτο γαρ εστι ΤΟ αίμα μου, ΤΟ της καινης διαθηκης, ΤΟ περι πολλων εκχυνομενον εις αφεσιν άμαρτιων. The following literal translation and paraphrase do not exceed its meaning: '*For this is [represents] THAT blood of mine which was pointed out by all the sacrifices under the Jewish law, and particularly by the shedding and sprinkling the blood of the paschal lamb: THAT BLOOD of the sacrifice slain for the ratification of the new covenant: THE blood ready to be poured out for the multitudes, the whole Gentile world as well as the Jews, for the taking away of sins, sin, whether original or actual, in all its power and guilt, in all its energy and pollution.*'"* And yet, after all, it was not *that* blood! The writer, indeed, slips his "represents," within brackets, to the utter destruction of all sense, and of harmonious accord between his rule and his illustration. For, if the contents of the cup were not *the* blood, but only its emblem, and if the institution reached not the blood, surely the commendatory emphasis should, in common reason, have fallen on the thing instituted, not

* Clarke "On the Eucharist," p. 61. Horne, vol. ii. p. 369, 7th ed.

on what is represented. If I wished to recommend a model of St. Peter's Church, I would not say, "This is St. Pēter's, THAT St. Peter's in which the Pope officiates, THAT Church which is considered the most beautiful in the world; THE Church in which the Apostle's ashes repose." All this would be absurd; for my hearers would immediately think I wished to say that the model was the very church. But I should naturally say, "This is a model of St. Peter's, an exact model, the very image of it, its perfect representation." The emphasis would then fall right, on the object instituted or recommended. If, therefore, in the words of institution, it fall upon the blood, then I say, as in the instance just quoted, that blood is the subject of the sentence. For the words of my example could never be used, save only when speaking of the real church itself.

2. I have already had occasion to notice the syntax of the sentence in the Eucharistic formularies; namely, that the pronoun used could refer to no other subject but the body, ΤΟΥΤΟ ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα, and not, consequently, to the bread.* But the argument, naturally resulting

* See above, p. 205. See also "An etymological Essay on the Grammatical Sense, in the Greek, of the Sacred Texts regarding the Last Supper," by Sir John Dillon, 1836, p. 24.

from this construction, seems to me much strengthened by the identifying epithets added to the object mentioned. St. Luke adds to the words, the clause *το ὑπερ ὑμων ΔΙΔΟΜΕΝΟΝ*, “which is given for you;” St. Paul, *το ὑπερ ὑμων ΚΛΩΜΕΝΟΝ*, “which is BROKEN for you.”

I observe, in the first place, that not a single passage occurs in Scripture, where the two verbs to *give* and to *break* are synonymous, except where spoken of food; the epithets, therefore, apply not to the future state of Christ's body in his passion, but to the thing then before the Apostles. 2dly. The verb *κλαω*, as Schleusner observes, never is used in the New Testament, except of bread or food. He only quotes this very passage as an exception, applying it to the passion.* 3dly. I think it will be admitted as not improbable, that Jesus used both the words, and said, *Τουτο μου εστι ΤΟ ΣΩΜΑ, ΤΟ ὑπερ ὑμων ΚΛΩΜΕΝΟΝ και ΔΙΔΟΜΕΝΟΝ*,—“This is my body, *that* which is BROKEN and GIVEN for you.” The phrase exactly corresponds with the narrative of St. Luke: *Λαβων αρτον . . . ΕΚΛΑΣΕ και ΕΔΩΚΕΝ αυτοις*,—“Taking bread, he BROKE and GAVE to them.” It is worthy of remark, that St. Paul has preserved in his nar-

* “Lexicon N. T.” tom. i. p. 920, ed. cit.

rative only the verb "he broke," which corresponds to the participle which he selected of the two, in his formulary.

From these reflections, which as being, I believe, new, I put forward with becoming diffidence, I conclude two things; first, that the ΤΟΥΤΟ is positively defined to be identical with the σωμα or body: because the phrase, "This thing which is broken, and given, is my body," forms a more definite expression, much more difficult to be applied to express a figure, than the vague *this*. Secondly, the thing so broken and given could not be bread, because the expression "FOR YOU,"—ΤΙΠΕΡ ὑμῶν, could not be used of it, but only of Christ, who was alone our redemption.* While, therefore, epithets were chosen which exactly corresponded to the idea of food, an object was expressed which could only apply to the body of our Saviour itself.

II. I will pass briefly through the historical circumstances which must confirm the literal interpretation.

1. Our blessed Saviour alone, with his chosen twelve, on the point of suffering, is here pouring out the treasures of his love.

* See Rom. v. 8, viii. 26.

2. He is making his last will and testament, an occasion when all men speak as simply and as intelligibly as possible.

3. He tells his dear friends and brethren, that the time is come when he would speak plain and without parables to them.* These reflections ought surely greatly to strengthen our preference, on this occasion, of the plain, intelligible, natural signification of his words, when instituting the great sacrament of his religion.

* **Jo. xvi. 29.**

LECTURE VII.

jections to the Literal Interpretations of the words of Institution answered. First: Ordinary practice of calling a representation by the name of the thing signified. Secondly: Objections drawn from the celebration of the paschal feast; and Thirdly: From the language in which our Saviour spoke. Notice of Dr. Lee's allegations.

It now becomes my duty to notice the objections made by Protestants to the interpretation of the words of Institution, according to our belief. In this Lecture I shall only treat of such objections as affect this particular point; reserving the general ones brought by them, from Scripture, against the belief itself, till I have completed my proofs, in the next, by commenting on some passages of St. Paul's Epistle to the Corinthians.

The first and most popular argument urged by Protestants is, that nothing is more common than to call a figure by the name of the object. You will remember how the reverend preacher

whom I quoted at the beginning of my last lecture but one, exultingly demanded: "For, let me ask, what is more common than to give to the sign the name of the thing signified?" and then, by way of illustration, to cite the examples of a portrait or a map. Dr. Clarke uses the same argument; and asks whether any one would have a difficulty, if in a museum busts should be pointed out by the phrase—"This is Plato, that is Socrates?"* In short, this exemplification is quite trite, and to be found in almost every Protestant writer. Among others, Mr. Townsend brings it forward with great pomp, and seems quite satisfied of its sufficiency.†

The confutation of this reasoning is so obvious, and strikes the sense so immediately, that it is most wonderful to me, how such an illustration could ever have been brought. First, as to the principle itself: the obvious difference between the class of instances brought and the case to be elucidated is this; that the one speaks of images already instituted, the other of the actual institution. Had bread and wine been before constituted symbols, the words might

* Ubi sup. p. 62.

† "New Testament chronologically arranged," vol. 1. p. 457.

have been compared with a representation already made; then the phrase "this *is* my body," might possibly have led the hearers to a right understanding. But surely it is a very different thing to *institute* the symbol by such an expression. Let us take the very example. On entering the Vatican museum, you see a number of busts: you must know, if you have eyes, that they represent the human head and countenance; all your ignorance is as to *whose* features they exhibit. The words in question, "this is Plato," only inform you of this point; they are not intended to convey the marvellous intelligence, that the piece of marble is an image, at all: this your own eyes have told you. But in the words of institution, the inquiry is not *of what* this is the symbol, but whether it be one; for neither eyes nor reason have told you, or could have told the apostles, that the bread was such a symbol. Let us press it a little further. Suppose that on entering the Belvedere court of that museum, I called you solemnly to stand beside one of the porphyry pillars there, and, pointing to it, said, "This is Magna Charta;" would you understand me? You would be sadly confounded, and perhaps think me a little beside myself. Suppose, then, that I answered you thus: "Foolish creatures! you understood me

quite well, when I showed you a bust in the gallery and told you it was Plato; that is, that it represented Plato. Is it not precisely as easy to understand that I now mean this is a symbol of Magna Charta, the support of our constitution?" You would reasonably ask, "When was this pillar, or any other, constituted a symbol of it?" and, to preserve the parallelism, I should have to answer, "Why, I instituted it for the first time, by those words which I uttered." I ask, would such language be intelligible, or would you consider the person rational who used it? Yet this fancied scene accurately represents the two forms of expression which are brought together in that popular argument for the figurative interpretation of the Eucharistic formulas.

Then coming to the specific examples, those chosen are any thing but fortunate. For, not only are they of objects which already and conventionally represent others, but of such as actually have no possible existence except as representations. Symbol is their very essence, the very law of their being. A portrait, or bust, cannot exist save as the image of a man; this idea enters into every possible definition which you can give of it: you cannot describe or explain it, except by calling it a representa-



tion. So it is with a map, which is but the miniature portrait of a given country, and has no other cause of being but its destination for that purpose. Is such the case with bread, in relation to the body of Christ? If I hold up a coin, and, pointing to the king's image, say, "This is William IV.," every one understands me. If I show a blank piece of gold, and use the same words, no one would comprehend that I want to declare the metal to be a symbol of him.

A second objection, which, at first appearance, looks rather more plausible, is often drawn from the forms of expression supposed to have been in use among the Jews in the celebration of the paschal feast. "When they ate of the unleavened bread," says Dr. Whitby, "they said, 'This *is* the bread of affliction,' (that is, the representation or memorial of that bread,) 'which our fathers did eat in the land of Egypt.' What, therefore, could men, accustomed to such sacramental phrases, think of the like words of Christ, but that it was to be the representation or memorial of it?"* We are sometimes told, that the head of the family, solemnly holding a morsel of unleavened bread in his hand, pronounced

* "Commentary on the New Testament," vol. i. p. 256, *Lond.* 1744.

these words; by which the apostles would interpret the similar ones that followed.

Before giving what cannot fail to be a complete answer to this objection, I may premise, that under no circumstances could the words signify "this represents the bread of affliction." For, if I hold up in my hand a morsel of bread of a different sort from what we habitually use, and say, "This is the bread they eat in France," you do not understand me to mean, that it is a type or symbol of such bread, but simply that it is the same sort of bread. So, as the Jews ate unleavened bread on going out of Egypt, any person exhibiting a portion of such bread, and saying, "This is the bread, &c.," would be understood to designate identity of quality.

But the fact is, that these words could have done the apostles no service, towards reaching a figurative sense in our Saviour's words; because they were not used at all, as is stated, in the celebration of the passover. First, we have a very detailed account of the ceremonial of this solemnity in the Hebrew treatise, entitled, "*Pesachim*, or Pasch;" in which not a word is said of any such expression to be used. After that, we have a later treatise in the same Talmud, entitled, "*Beracoth*, or the Blessings," which likewise gives a minute description of the rites

to be observed; and again, not a syllable on the subject. At length comes Rabbi Maimonides, in the twelfth century, who describes exactly the forms to be followed on that occasion, without a hint at this phrase or ceremony, and concludes by saying: "In this manner they celebrated the paschal supper while the Temple stood." He then goes on to say: "Behold now the formula of the hymn, which, at present, the Jews in their dispersion use at the beginning of the meal. Taking up one of the cups, they say, 'We went out of Egypt in haste.' Then they begin this hymn: 'This is the bread,' &c."* So that, after all, this is but a canticle, and not a formula; and, even so, is acknowledged by the first writer who mentions it, to be quite modern.

Dr. Whitby quotes another expression, "the body of the pasch," applied to the lamb, as likely to have guided the apostles to a symbolical understanding of their master's words. This was first brought as an argument by the younger Buxtorf, and is answered fully by the author from whom I have taken the preceding reply, himself a Lutheran. He shows that the expres-

* "C. Schoettgenii Horæ Hebraicæ et Talmudicæ," vol. i. p. 227.

sion *גוף* *goph*, translated *body*, is a Syriacism, signifying no more than “the *very* pasch.”*

I come now to another popular objection, in which I naturally feel a peculiar interest, from its solution being the subject of my first youthful literary essay. Calvin, Piccard, Melancthon, and others, argued against the Catholic interpretation of the words of Institution, on the ground, that our Saviour spoke Hebrew, and not Greek; and that, in the Hebrew language, there is not a single word meaning *to represent*. Hence they concluded, that any one wishing to express in that language, that one object was figurative of another, he could not possibly do it otherwise than by saying that it *was* that thing. Of course this argument advances nothing positive; it could only show that the words are indefinite, and *may* imply only a figure; it might deprive Catholics, to some extent, of the stronghold which they have in the words themselves; but it could put no positive proof into the hands of Protestants, who would always be under the necessity of demonstrating, that in this peculiar case, the verb “to be” signifies “to represent.” Wolfius, after Hackspann, rightly answered to this argument, that if the

* “C. Schoettgenii Horæ Hebraicæ et Talmudicæ,” vol. i. p. 229

Hebrew had been ambiguous, the Evangelists, writing in Greek, a language in which the verb substantive was not ambiguous, would have used a verb more accurately explaining to their readers what they conceived the meaning of our Saviour's phrase to be.*

But this precise ground could be no longer tenable. For all philologers now agree, that the language spoken by our Saviour could not be Hebrew, but Syro-Chaldaic. Such a shifting, however, as might suffice to continue a catching argument like this, was easily made; it could cost only a word, the change of a name; for few readers would take the trouble, or have it in their power, to ascertain whether Syro-Chaldaic, any more than Hebrew, had any such terms. A good bold assertion, especially coming from a man who has a reputation for knowledge in the department of science to which it belongs, will go a great way with most readers; and a negative assertion no one can expect you to prove. If I assert, that in a language there is no word for a certain idea; if I say, for instance, that in Italian there is no equivalent for our word "spleen," or "cant," what proof can I possibly bring, except an acquaintance with the

* "Curæ philologicæ et criticæ." *Basil*, 1741, tom. i. p. 371.

language? I throw down a gauntlet when I make the assertion; I defy others to show the contrary; and one example overthrows all my argument. In this case, indeed, it might have seemed to require some courage to make the assertion, that no word existed for “a figure,” or “to represent,” in a language cultivated for ages, and spoken by a people who, beyond all others, delighted in figures, allegory, parable, and every other sort of symbolical teaching. However, no assertion could be, I suppose, too bold against *popeery*, and no art too slippery, to gain an argument against its doctrines. Dr. Adam Clarke, a man of some celebrity as an orientalist, fearlessly cast his credit upon the assertion, that Syro-Chaldaic affords no word which our Saviour could have used, in instituting a type of his body, except the verb “to be.”

These are his words:—“In the Hebrew, Chaldee, and Chaldeo-Syriac languages, there is no term which expresses to *mean*, *signify*, or *denote*; though both the Greek and Latin abound with them. Hence the Hebrews use a figure, and say *it is*, for it signifies.” Then follow the texts which I quoted in my Fifth Lecture, after which Dr. Clarke proceeds:—“That our Lord neither spoke in Greek or Latin, upon this occasion, needs no proof. It was probably in what

sents.”* Here follow the usual trite examples, discussed in my last Lecture ; and after it comes the concluding sentence of Dr. Clarke’s text, that no man, even at the present day, speaking the same language, would use, among the people to whom it was vernacular, other terms to express, “This represents my body.”

It is no wonder that other authors should have gone on copying these authorities, giving, doubtless, implicit credence to persons, who had acquired a reputation for their knowledge of biblical and oriental literature. Hardly a sermon or a treatise has been published on the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist, for some years past, in which the objection has not been repeated. The argument is one strictly philological, and seemed to me, when first engaged in the study of Syriac letters, to afford a fair field for purely literary discussion. As I had begun to make some collections towards the improvement and enlargement of our Syriac lexicons, I resolved to embody the result of my labors upon this question into a specimen of additions to the best which we possess, and thus to divest the discussion, if possible, of all controversial acrimony. As my essay, or, to use

* “Introduction,” part ii. chap. v. vol. ii. p. 590, 6th ed.



the German phrase, my *monography*, upon this subject, presents a form but little attractive to any but professed oriental scholars,* you will excuse me, if I endeavor to put you in possession of its substance, so that you may be able to rebut the objection, should you ever hear it repeated. I will afterwards proceed to notice the manner, courteous indeed, but sadly uncandid and unfair, in which my answer has been met by Mr. Horne and other writers.

After several preliminary observations, some of which have been more fully developed in these Lectures, and the remark that some word for *sign* or *figure* must be found both in Hebrew and Syriac, because the expression occurs both in the Old and New Testaments, as where circumcision is called *a sign* of God's covenant,† and where Adam is called *a type* of Christ,‡ the essay proceeds with the vocabulary arranged in alphabetical order. The words are all authen-

* "De objectionibus contra sensum literalem locorum Matt. xxvi. 26, &c., seu verborum SS. Eucharistiæ Sacramentum instituentium, ex indole linguæ Syriacæ nuperrime instauratis, commentatio philologica, continens specimen supplementi ad Lexica Syriaca." Horæ Syriacæ, Rome, 1328.

† As Gen. xvii. 11, where the noun אֹת *oth* is used; a word which every learner of Hebrew ought to know means *a sign*.

‡ Rom. v. 14.

ticated by reference to the most ancient and most esteemed writers in the Syriac language; principally St. Ephrem, James of Edessa, St. James of Sarug, Barhebræus, and others. When various significations are omitted in the lexicons, besides the meaning held chiefly in view, these are carefully given, with their authorities. But the principal pains are, of course, taken to verify the signification denied by Protestants to any word in the language. In some instances the references amount to forty or fifty—one word, to upwards of ninety, passages, in edited and manuscript works.

After the vocabulary, which occupies upwards of thirty pages, there comes a tabular arrangement of its results, which I will give you.

1. Words in Castell's Lexicon with this signification, and illustrated by sufficient examples	- -	4
2. With the signification, but no authority	- -	1
3. Words meaning a symbol, that have not this signification in him	- - - - -	21
4. Words of the same meaning totally omitted by him	- - - - -	2
5. Words used by Syriac writers in a less direct mode for the same purpose*	- - - - -	13
Total words signifying or expressing "a figure," or "to represent," in Syriac	- - - - -	41

* These words, which are in common use, are verbs signifying "to see, to show, to call," &c.; as when writers say, that in one thing we see or contemplate another.

Besides four other words, the examples of which were not quite so satisfactory to me, though I have no doubt of their power; thus making in all FORTY-FIVE words which our Saviour could have used!* And this is the Syriac language, of which Dr. Clarke had the hardihood to assert that it had not one single word with this meaning!

The next question is, how far it is usual with persons speaking that language to say that a thing *is* what it only represents? This point is tried and decided on the following grounds. First, Syriac commentators, after they have given us clear notice that they intend to indulge in allegorical or figurative interpretation, yet scarcely ever use the verb "to be" in the sense of "to represent," but use the different words given in the vocabulary. This may be proved by a simple enumeration. St. Ephrem, in his Commentary on Numbers, uses the verb substantive in the sense alluded to, *two* or *three* times, where no mistake could possibly arise; whereas he employs the words in question upwards of *sixty* times. In his Notes on Deuteronomy, the verb "to be" occurs as above *six* times; the other terms more than *seventy*!

Secondly, where they use the verb "to be" in that sense, it can be always used without danger in the Latin version; and what is still stronger, the translation occasionally prefers it, where the original has a verb meaning to represent. References are of course given to places where these things are found.

Thirdly, the words in question are often heaped together in these writers to such an extent, as to defy translation into any other language. As the text and version are in parallel columns on each page, it follows that a line of text is less than half the breadth; and from the greater space required for the translation, and from the straggling form of the Syriac type, there are often only two or three words in a line. Yet, notwithstanding this, St. Ephrem, in *eighteen* half-lines, uses these words *thirteen* times, and *eleven* times in *seventeen* lines; James of Sarug has them *ten* times in *thirteen* half-lines, and Barhebræus *eleven* times in as many lines.*

This is sufficient to decide whether it be so usual with the Syrians to use the verb "to be" for "to represent."

But it was fair to lay the question more directly before them for decision; and this is done

* Page 56.

in the following way. Three passages are brought from Syriac writers, one of which exists only in an Arabic translation. This and another merely say that the Eucharist is the true body of Christ, really, and not figuratively, and simply, by their very words, show that in Syriac this idea can be expressed. The third is a remarkable text of St. Maruthas, Bishop of Tangrit, at the close of the fourth century, who, writing in Syriac, expresses himself in these terms:—"If Christ had not instituted the blessed Sacrament, the faithful of after-times would have been deprived of the communion of his body and blood. But now, so often as we approach the body and blood, and receive them upon our hands, we believe that we embrace his body, and are made of his flesh and of his bones, as it is written. For, Christ did not call it a type or a symbol: but said, 'Truly this *is* my body, and this *is* my blood.'"*

Here, then, we have an early Syriac saint and ornament of the oriental Church, writing as though Dr. A. Clarke had been open before him; and so far from countenancing his assertion, reasoning exactly in the contrary direction. The English Doctor says "that we must

* Page 60.

not admit the Catholic interpretation, because Christ, speaking Syriac, *could* not say, ‘this represents my body;’” the Syriac Father asserts “that we must maintain it, because, in that very language (his own too) he *did* not say so.”

This controversy might have been said to end here, as no attempt has been made to controvert the substantial statements made in the Essay. But as the writings in which assent to them has been given, have indulged in an indirect attempt, at least, to show that I was not accurate or fair in some of my statements, I will proceed to relate the manner in which these have been received by the persons I allude to.

In the first place, Mr. Horne has expunged the extract from Dr. Clarke in his seventh edition; at least so much of it as contains the absurd assertion regarding the Syriac language; though the kine and the ears of corn, &c., are preserved, with a few additions of the same class. A long note is substituted, containing references to grammars, &c., by way of proof that in the Semitic dialects “to be” is put for “to represent.”* That is very true; as it is true of English or Latin: but the question is not whether such a substitution is ever made, but whether it is to

* Vol. ii. p. 449.

be made in our case—a point which I have abundantly discussed. But in his bibliographical catalogue, which forms the second part of the volume, he enters into an analysis of a critique upon my assertions by the Rev. Dr. Lee, Professor of Hebrew in the University of Cambridge, in which he seems greatly to exult; with what reason you shall judge just now, when I shall have examined, as I proceed to do, the strictures of both.

Dr. Lee's attack is contained in a note to his *Prolegomena to Bagster's Polyglott Bible*,* a composition doubtless intended for posterity, before which it was naturally intended, by the learned professor, that my fair fame should stand impaled upon the sharpness of his critical wand. The real theme which he is discussing is the Syriac versions, and he does me the honor to quote my little volume of "*Horæ*" with flattering commendation, not unmingled with strangles, and, to me, inexplicable misapprehensions.†

* "*Biblica sacra Polyglotta.*" *Lond.* 1831, p. 29.

† I cannot refrain from giving one specimen of the learned linguist's fairness in even mere literary criticism. In a note p. 24, he thus writes of me:—"N. Wiseman vero properantius, ut solet, xii. versiones Syriacas dinumerat:—'his (xii sc.) et alias addere possem;' Regere rem tamen; hæc vix satis persiculate." He then goes on gravely to teach me that the Karkaphensian version, which I was in that very

It is, as I observed, in a note that he undertakes, to all appearance, the confutation of my

volume the first to detect, is no version; and that the Nestorian version, which (p. 139) I completely reject, is fabulous; and to make confusion doubly dense, he discovers that in another place I reject these versions myself! "Ad p. 95, tamen ipse hæc omnia immisericors contundit." Now all this contradiction and confusion is entirely the result of Dr. Lee's not having understood a very ordinary Latin word. I was commencing a series of Essays on the Syriac versions, some of which I intended to elucidate, as I hope I did the Peshito; and some to explode, as the Karkaphensian, which I reduced to the condition of an emendation or recension. Others I should have proved identical, and some imaginary. Should the second volume of my *Horæ*, for which the materials were ready when the first appeared, ever come to the press, Dr. Lee would see that I had by me, when I enumerated the twelve unlucky versions, proofs, from inedited sources, that some of them never existed. But, as is usual with authors, before entering on my task, I enumerated, chiefly from Ezechorn, all the versions *usually spoken* of by the writers of biblical introductions. So far, however, was I from admitting them, (when it was my intention to disprove some of them,) that I selected the phrase most likely in my judgment to secure me from any suspicion of believing in them. My words are "Sequentes tamen præcipue *circumferuntur, tamquam versiones*, quarum aliqua saltem cognitio ad nos usque pervenerit." The expression *circumferuntur, tamquam versiones*, I fancied any child would have understood as equivalent to "are *commonly spoken of as versions*." For such is the meaning of *circumfero* in similar cases; it always leaves the truth or falsehood of the fact undecided, but leans oftener to the intimation of the latter. Thus Ovid:—

"Novi aliquam quæ se *circumfert* esse Corinnam."

But Dr. Lee decreed that I should believe in the twelve versions, I suppose because such a belief was absurd, and gave

Essay. He begins by admitting that as far as Dr. Clarke's assertion goes, which his friend Mr. Horne had quoted, it must be given up. These are his words : "Horneus noster, uti videtur, ad locum Matt. xxvi. 26, verba ipsa Adami Clarkii Doctiss. referens, dixerat, nullum esse morem loquendi apud Syros usitatum, quo dici potuit 'hoc est *typus* seu *symbolum* corporis mei, &c.' verba verò 'hoc est corpus meum,' ad mentem Syrorum id semper significare. Primum negat Wiseman, et rectè si quid video." Now this acknowledgment at the same time contains an unfair statement. It was no part of my theme to prove that the Syrians understood the words of Institution literally. Had this been my object, I surely would not have overlooked the testimonies of SS. Ephrem, Isaac, and a host of other witnesses. The only appeal to the Syrians was in answer to Dr. Clarke's challenge, repeated by Mr. Horne, that they had no word for "to represent." But it suited the learned Doctor to create his adversary before he attacked

good matter for dull jokes. One of these occurs in note **, p. 26, where the *versio figurata* is said tenaciously to adhere to my memory, because it will not fall out of the *cerebellum* of the learned. Now I no more believe in the twelve versions, or in the figured one, than I do in the twelve knights of the round table; and a very small inclination to be just would have made Dr. Lee perceive it.

him; and so the real point in dispute is misstated, and two of my three texts are examined, not as referring to the philological question under discussion, but as if brought by me to prove that the Syriac Church believed in the Real Presence; thus making show as if I had only been able to collect three texts for my purpose!


Now then let us see what Dr. Lee's "minute and critical examination" of my quotations, as Mr. Horne calls it, comes to. The first quotation was from Dionysius Barsalibæus, simply saying that the mysteries "are the body and blood of Christ, *in truth, and not in figure.*" The object of this quotation was obviously to show that the Syrians had a means of expressing, if they chose, "this is a figure of my body," and that Dr. Clarke's assertion was inaccurate, that the Syrians to this day could only express the idea by saying "this *is* my body." But Dr. Lee chooses to overlook the simple philological question, and to attack the testimony as an argument for the Real Presence. This he does in words to the following effect:—

"Among the Syriac authors whom he quotes, the first is Dionysius Bar Salibi, (p. 57.) But he wrote his book against the Franks or Catholics (Pontificios) themselves, towards the end

of the twelfth century, and sent it to Jerusalem. Here (pp. 57; 59) the bread and wine are called (by him) the body and blood of Christ; *but the bread is never said by him to be changed into the flesh of Christ*, which I consider a thing of great importance. And Bar Salibi himself elsewhere teaches that these expressions are to be taken mystically, (Assem. B. O. tom. ii. p. 191,) which N. Wiseman forgot to show. ‘We contemplate,’ he says, ‘the bread with the eye of the soul;’ and p. 193, ‘it makes it the body in a divine and mystical manner.’”

Here are two assertions, the one as remarkable for accuracy, as the other is for candor. First, speaking of Barsalibæus, Dr. Lee asserts, “but the bread is never said by him *to be changed* into the flesh of Christ; which I consider a thing of great importance.” Would you believe that in the very page which contains my quotation from Barsalibæus, there is another passage from him in the following terms? “As Jesus himself *appeared* to be a man, and *was* God, so do these things *appear* to be bread and wine, but *are* the body and blood . . . So also, when the Holy Ghost descends upon the altar, (which is a *type* of the womb and of the tomb,) he **CHANGES** the bread and wine, and *makes* them the body and blood of the Word.”*

* Page 57, note.

The term here used is  *nshachleph*, to *change, transmute*. The comparison with Christ's divinity in the flesh, shows that he understood the body and blood to be as really in the Eucharist, as his Godhead was in his person on earth.

So much for the accuracy of the learned professor's statements; but before going to the next error, I must not overlook a dexterous improvement introduced into his text, by his friend and applauder, Mr. Horne. It consists of the artful sliding in of the name of Maruthas, with that of Barsalibæus, in his analysis of the doctor's strictures; so to insinuate that Dr. Lee's attempted confutation extended no less to the formidable quotation from the saint, which he did not even venture to touch. But these are little arts unworthy of serious notice.

Another part of the extract, I said, was not less remarkable for its candor. I am charged with overlooking some expressions of Barsalibæus quoted by Assemani, which seem to imply that he disbelieved in the Real Presence; "which N. Wiseman forgot to show." Mr. Horne, in echoing these words, gives a typographical emphasis to the word *forgot*, by printing it in capitals, doubtless to insinuate that I did *not* forget. Now, here, again, would you

believe, that in the same note, I actually refer to the very page, 190, of Assemani's second volume;* and say that the learned orientalist had accused Barsalibæus of denying not the Real Presence, but Transubstantiation, and of admitting a species of companation? Nay, more than this, I brought the very passage, just quoted by me, in confutation of Assemani's very assertion, which I am charged with forgetting! These are my words: "Primam partem (loci sequentis) jam dedit Assemani, (ib. p. 190,) sed postrema verba omittens, quæ tamen præclarum continent testimonium." Then follows the passage just given, in the original, and in Latin, after which I conclude thus; "Postremam textus partem ut innui, non dedit Cl. Assemani, *ideoque pono, quod videatur* (ibid.) *negatæ Transubstantiationis Dionysium* (Barsalibæum) *insimulare, subobscuris nonnullis sententiis ductus, quum tamen quæ dedi tam clara sint.*"† So that the history of the transaction is briefly this: Assemani quotes a passage from Barsalibæus, wherein he seems to doubt of our doctrine. I go to the MS. of his work in the Vatican, and find that immediately after that passage, which

* I refer to p. 190, and Dr. Lee to p. 191; but the subject referred to is the same.

† "Horæ Syra." p. 57.

is very obscure, comes the clearest possible assertion of the reality of Christ's presence, and of an absolute change of the elements. I bring it expressly in explanation of the other extracts, and in confutation of Assemani; and Dr. Lee finds that I *forgot* what Assemani asserts, and holds me dishonest because I do not submit my conviction to the authority which I am actually confuting! And the sentences by which I was to correct my strong quotation were, "that we contemplate the bread with the soul's eye;" and that "it is made the body in a manner divine and mystical," (mysterious in Syriac.)* As if I should not use the same phrases, who yet believe in the Real Presence! For it is the Protestant who looks upon the Eucharist with the bodily eye, and sees nothing but bread, while we look on it by the eye of the soul, and discover it to be a nobler gift; the Protestant sees nothing *divine* or *mysterious* in his ordinance, while we require a *divine* power, and believe in a *mysterious* effect in ours.

Dr. Lee, whom I own I am wearied with thus following in his doubling logic, then attacks the Arabic passage from David; and his transcriber

* In Latin and English there is a difference between *mystical* and *mysterious*; in Syriac there is no such distinction. The word used means *secret*, and so mysterious.

again supports him by his emphatic capitals: for I am now charged with MISTRANSLATING the text. Had the translation been mine, I might have felt hurt, and certainly I should have bowed to the professor's superior reputation in Arabic literature. But it happens not to be mine, but that of a scholar, a native Syrian or Arab, who leaves Dr. Lee as far behind him, as he may be justly thought to surpass me. And yet I do not mean to defend even his work, simply because the supposed mistranslation in no manner affects the consequences to be drawn from the text. This was simply quoted to prove that the Syrians could distinguish in their language between saying, "this is my body," and "this represents it." The latter part proves this fact. "Christ said, 'this is my body,' but did not say, 'this is the figure of my body;'" or, as Dr. Lee prefers, "this is like my body." It is evident that a contrast, which must have been expressed no less in the Syriac original, is here made between the Real Presence and some other presence by emblems, and this is all I wish to establish. But, on the other hand, what an ingeniously absurd meaning the doctor's learned commentator has put upon his version. You shall hear both. This is Dr. Lee's translation of the passage: "Illud dedit nobis in remis-

tionem peccatorum *postquam id sibi met assimilerat*; imo dixit, 'Hoc est corpus meum,' at NON dixit, 'Simile est corpori meo.'" I suppose that by Christ's assimilating the bread to himself at the Last Supper, is meant, according to Dr. Lee, making it a symbol of himself; otherwise the Syriac canon does not agree in doctrine with the Anglican Church.

But now hear Mr. Horne's paraphrase: "That is, the sacrament ought to be received with faith, as my body itself; but not as any likeness of it, which indeed would be idolatry." In the first place, the two small words, "with faith," are a little interpolation of the learned critic's, who assumes, of course, for granted, the very point in dispute, whether this passage express a Real Presence, or one by faith. 2dly, Expunge this trifle, and read the passage: "That is, the sacrament ought to be received as my body, but not as any likeness of it, which would indeed be idolatry." From which words I draw the interesting conclusion, that there is no idolatry in the Catholic doctrine, which holds that it is the body of Christ, and not merely a resemblance or *image* of it; and moreover, that they who believe it such, *are* idolaters. 3. The framer of this canon must have been guilty of precious absurdity, to tell us that Christ made the bread

like himself, “sibimet assimilaverat,” and yet took care to say that it was “*not like* his body;” and, moreover, that it would be idolatry, according to Mr. H.’s gloss, to receive it as that which he had made it! Lastly, I am quite satisfied to take the sentiments of the Syrian Church upon the Eucharist, from this text as expounded by Horne, with the omission of the adjunct “with faith,” for which there is not the slightest warrant in the text.

Anxious as I feel to bring this contest to a close, I am sure I shall be one day charged with cowardice, if I do not notice the new additions brought by Dr. Lee, to the passages illustrative of the Protestant interpretation of the words of institution. Mr. Horne introduces the matter with his usual accuracy, as follows:—“Dr. Wiseman has professed a wish for some philological illustrations in behalf of the Protestant, or *true* mode of interpreting Matt. xxvi. 26.” *I* have expressed such a wish? Where? on what occasion? I took up my pen, simply to confute Dr. Clarke’s statement, copied by Mr. Horne; and this gentleman’s erasure of the passage from his work, and Dr. Lee’s acknowledgment, prove that my confutation was complete. He goes on:—“Dr. Lee proceeds to gratify the wish, and accordingly cites one passage from the old

Syriac version of 1 Kings xxii. 11, &c., all which ABUNDANTLY CONFIRM the Protestant mode of interpretation." A few words will decide this.

The reference to the Syriac version of the text alluded to, can only be made to blind persons unacquainted with the language, and so make them imagine that it contains some peculiarity of phrase applicable to the contest on Syriac philology; whereas the reference might have been as easily made to the Hebrew, the Latin, or the English. For the argument is simply this; that a false prophet "made him horns of iron, and said, 'Thus saith the Lord, with *these* thou shalt push the Syrians.'" This is the passage, according to the Anglican version, and upon it the learned professor is pleased facetiously to argue thus:—"Therefore, he proceeded horned to battle! therefore he was to push the Syrians with those very horns!" "Qui potest capere capiat." How these words "abundantly confirm" the Protestant exposition, I own I do not see. That *horn* is a familiar established metaphor for strength; and that a horn was consequently its emblem, every reader of Scripture knows; nor did any one, on reading "he hath raised the *horn* of salvation," or even on hearing the poet say of wine,

"Addis *cornua* pauperi,"

ever understand that actual horns were alluded to. Was bread then a standing type of Christ's body, as horns were of strength? Secondly, a prophet, true or false, *acting* his prophecy, is surely to be interpreted by different rules from a legislator instituting a sacrament. Dr. Lee's "confirmation" might have been made still more abundant, by his taking equal pains to prove that God did not really mean to put wooden yokes on the necks of the kings of Moab and Edom,* and that the wall of Jerusalem was not—a frying-pan.† An instance from another source will still further illustrate this quotation. When Constantine saw a cross in the heavens, with the legend *εν ΤΟΥΤΩ νικα*, "in THIS conquer," could he have understood that he was to mount the skies, and bring down that very cross; or would he not understand, "by what this represents, that is, *by the cross*, the emblem of Christianity, thou shalt conquer?" But, in short, what resemblance or parallelism, either in construction or circumstance, is there between the text of Kings and the words of Institution? Till this is shown, the argument is nothing worth.

The two other texts, you might suppose,

* Jer. xxvii. 2.

† Ezech. iv. 3

would be from Syriac writers, as the controversy was about their language. Not at all; but the one is from the *Hamasa*, an *Arabic* poem, the other from the *Persian* of Saadi. The first says, —“If you had considered his head, you would have said, ‘it is a stone of the stones used in a balista.’” On which the scholiast says, “This means similitude; you would have said, that *for size*, it was a stone of an engine.” An Englishman would have applied the similitude to its hardness, which shows how we required an explanation to reach the true meaning. It proves what I have before said of conventional metaphors refusing capricious interpretations. A *poet*, therefore, says that one thing is another, as every poet has ever done, and means, not that it is its *symbol* or its *figure*, but that it is *like* it. But our Saviour is not supposed to have said, that the bread was *like* his body: nay, Mr. Horne has told us, that it would be idolatry to receive it as such. The words of Saadi, to which, if needful, I could have added as many similar examples as you choose, are these: “Our affairs are the lightning of the world.” Here is a poetical *simile*, in which one *thing* is said to be another, that is, to possess its properties. As well might every instance be brought, where a hero is called a lion, or a virtuous man an angel.

But the sentence means, not that the affairs spoken of are a figure or symbol of lightning; and that is the meaning wanted in our case. I never could deny that a thing is said to *be* that which it resembles, or whose qualities it possesses. Again, in this instance, the addition of the qualifying expression "of the world," further destroys all parallelism. It resembles the expression, "you are the salt *of the earth*;" where the addition explains all the meaning; "you have the qualities of salt in regard to the earth."

I have hurried over these instances, because they are nothing at all to the purpose; especially after the full examination I have already made of the Scripture texts brought as parallel to the words of Institution. Perhaps in this Lecture I have betrayed more warmth than is my wont. But, while God alone can be our last appeal in questions of religion, and we can only leave the cause in His hands, after we have sincerely argued in its defence, unfairness and misrepresentation are amenable to a human tribunal. They are not weapons from the armory of truth; and where such poisoned arrows are used, it is difficult not to have recourse to less bland methods of repulse, than where candor and good faith expose themselves, with a

confiding bosom, to the contest. I believe that few instances of more glaring misrepresentations of an antagonist's statements, or of an unfaire attempt to shift the ground measured for the lists, are to be found in modern controversy, than what I have laid open in the conduct of these two clergymen. Can a cause so supported prosper?



LECTURES
ON
THE REAL PRESENCE.

SECTION III.

ON THE DOCTRINE OF ST. PAUL REGARDING
THE EUCHARIST.

DOCTRINE OF ST. PAUL.

1 COR. x. 16.

GREEK TEXT.

Τὸ ποτήριον τῆς εὐλογίας, ὃ εὐ-
λογοῦμεν, οὐχὶ κοινωνία τοῦ αἵμα-
τος τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐστὶ; τὸν ἄρτον
ὃν κλῶμεν, οὐχὶ κοινωνία τοῦ σώ-
ματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐστὶ;

VULGATE.

Calix benedictionis, cui bene-
dicimus, nonne communicatio
sanguinis Christi est? et panis
quem frangimus, nonne parti-
cipatio corporis Domini est?

CHAP. XI. 27-29.

Ὡστε ὃς ἂν ἐσθίῃ τὸν ἄρτον τοῦ-
τον ἢ πίνη τὸ ποτήριον τοῦ Κυρίου
ἀναξίως, ἐνοχος ἔσται τοῦ σώματος
καὶ τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ Κυρίου. Δο-
κιμαζέτω δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἑαυτὸν, καὶ
οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἄρτου ἐσθιέτω, καὶ ἐκ
τοῦ ποτηρίου πινέτω· ὃ γὰρ ἐσθίων
καὶ πίνων ἀναξίως, κρίμα ἑαυτῷ
ἐσθίει καὶ πίνει, μὴ διακρίνων τὸ
σῶμα τοῦ Κυρίου.

Quicumque igitur manduca-
verit panem hunc, vel biberit
calicem Domini indigne, reus
erit corporis et sanguinis Domi-
ni. Probet autem seipsum ho-
mo, et sic de pane illo edat, et de
calice bibat. Qui enim man-
ducat bibit indigne, iudicium
sibi manducat et bibit, non
dijudicans corpus Domini.

VERSION AUTHORIZED BY THE ENGLISH PROTESTANT
CHURCH.

1 COR. x. 16.

The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion
of the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not the
communion of the body of Christ?

CHAP. XI. 27-29.

Wherefore, whosoever shall eat this bread, and (OR) drink
this cup of the Lord unworthily, shall be guilty of the body and
blood of the Lord. But let a man examine himself, and so let
him eat of *that* bread, and drink of *that* cup. For he that eateth
and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh damnation to
himself, not discerning the body of the Lord.

LECTURE VIII.

Arguments for the Real Presence from the Doctrine of St. Paul regarding the use of the Blessed Sacrament.—General objections against the Catholic doctrine from Scripture.—Remark on the connection between the Real Presence and Transubstantiation.

To complete the Catholic proof of the Real Presence from the Scriptures, nothing is wanting but to examine the doctrine delivered by St. Paul regarding the effects of this sacred institution. I have for this purpose placed before you two passages in which he speaks of it: and I proceed, at once, to the brief but convincing argument which they afford to our doctrine.

In the first of these, 1 Cor. x. 16, the Apostle touches quite incidentally upon it; for he is speaking of the guilt of participating in the idolatrous sacrifices of the heathens. He enforces this by the question,—“The cup of benediction which we bless, is it not the partaking of the blood of Christ? And the bread which we break,

is it not partaking of the body of the Lord?" The word here rendered *partaking*, or communion, is used several other times in the following verses:—"Behold Israel according to the flesh; are not they that eat of the sacrifices, *partakers* of the altar?" The adjective here used corresponds exactly to the substantive in the first passage, *κοινωνοὶ, κοινωνία*. The word is here applied to the real participation of the sacrifices on the altar, and should, therefore, have a similar power in the other. But the force of this text is not so great as that of the second passage, in the eleventh chapter; and I have brought it chiefly for the sake of some remarks which I shall have occasion to make.


In the passage to which I have but now alluded, St. Paul draws important practical consequences from the narrative of the institution which he had just detailed. If the words of our Saviour, "this is my body," had been figurative, we might expect that his apostle, in commenting on them, would drop some word calculated to betray their real meaning. Now, therefore, we have to see whether, in his instructions, grounded upon them, he argues as though they were figurative or literal. That he is going to draw consequences from the account of the institution, is obvious from the introductory word:

—“*Therefore,*” he says, “whosoever shall eat of this bread, or drink of the chalice of the Lord unworthily, shall be guilty of the body and blood of the Lord.” The consequence, then, to be drawn from the manner in which our Saviour instituted the blessed Eucharist, is, that whosoever receives it unprepared, is “*guilty of his body and blood.*”

What is the meaning of this phrase? Only one expression is to be found parallel to it in the New Testament. The word *ἔνοχος*, translated in Latin *reus*, in English *guilty*, is said sometimes of the punishment incurred; as, “guilty of death;”* or is referred to the tribunal; as, “guilty of the judgment;”† in which latter passages it would be more accurately rendered by “subject to;” as, “subject to the council.” But on one occasion besides the present, it is applied to the object against which the transgression is committed. This is in the Epistle of St. James, (ii. 10,) where he says, that, “whoever offendeth against one commandment, *is guilty of all;*” that is, offends against all God’s commandments. In like manner, then, the unworthy communicant offends against the body and blood of Christ. The expression may re

* Matt. xxvi.

† Ibid. v. 21, 22.



ceive still farther illustration from a term of Roman jurisprudence, by which a person guilty of high treason is said to be *reus majestatis*, guilty of majesty, that is *læsæ*, or *violatæ majestatis*, of an outrage against majesty. Similarly, then, to be guilty of Christ's body and blood, signifies committing an injury against those component parts of his sacred person.

The next question is, whether such an expression could have been applied to the crime committed by an unworthy participation of symbols of Christ. In the first place, I remark, that a personal offence to the body of Christ is the highest outrage or sin that can even be imagined; it forms a crime of such enormous magnitude, that we cannot well conceive its being used to designate any offence of a lower class. Could a disrespectful or unworthy approach to a morsel of bread, symbolical of him, be characterized as equal to it, and be designated by a name positively describing it?

Secondly, we may easily verify this point by example. Although the defacing of the king's coin be considered an offence against the king, and I believe treasonable, yet who would venture to call it an offence against his person, or his body, or to rank it with an actual assault committed to injure him? We have, perhaps,

an illustration of this in a well-known historical anecdote. When the Arians disfigured and defaced the statues of Constantine, his courtiers endeavored to rouse his indignation by saying, "See how *your face* is covered with dirt, and quite deformed." But this attempt to transfer to his own person the outrage done to his emblems, or representations, appeared to the sensible and virtuous emperor too gross a piece of flattery; so that, passing his hand quickly over his head, he replied:—"I do not feel any thing." In like manner, therefore, any offence against symbolical representations of Christ's body and blood could not be considered as outrages against the realities themselves.

Thirdly, such an expression, under these circumstances, would be rather a diminution than an aggravation of the transgression. For, assuming that St. Paul's intention was to place in its proper light the heinous guilt of a sinful communion; if we suppose the body and blood of Christ to be absent, and only in heaven, and consequently, the insult offered him to consist only in the abuse of his institution, it surely would have been placing it in a stronger light, to describe it as an offence against his mercy and kindness, or his dignity and authority, rather than as one against his body and blood. For,

though such an offence is enormous beyond any other, when the body is there, it is but a poor characterization of an offence against the Son of God, so to designate it, when the body is not there.

In fine, plain and simple reason seems to tell us, that the presence of Christ's body is necessary for an offence committed against it. A man cannot be "guilty of majesty," unless the majesty exist in the object against which his crime is committed. In like manner, an offender against the blessed Eucharist cannot be described as "guilty of Christ's body and blood," if these be not in the sacrament.

St. Paul then goes on to inculcate the necessity of proving or trying one's self before partaking of this sacred banquet, "*because he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment or damnation to himself, not discerning the body of the Lord.*" The crime, before described, is now represented, as not discerning or distinguishing the body of Christ from other, or profane food. A natural question presents itself: What ground is there for this distinction, if the body of the Lord be not present to be distinguished? It may be a holier food, or a spiritual food, but not so immeasurably dis-

unct from all others as the body of Christ must necessarily be.

But these two passages from St. Paul receive a full development, and an immense accession of force, when considered in connection with those which have been so fully investigated in my preceding lectures. For, considering them conjointly, we have four different occasions on which certain expressions are used, referred by us to one subject, but by Protestants to totally distinct topics. In the first instance, we find our Saviour instructing the crowds, according to their theory, upon the simple doctrine of belief in him. He involves this doctrine in a strange, unusual metaphor, implying, to all appearance, the eating of his body and the drinking of his blood. The hearers certainly understand him so, and he conducts himself so as to strengthen their erroneous impression, without even condescending to explain himself to his faithful apostles.

Well, inexplicable as this behavior may be, let us allow it for a moment. We come to another scene, where he is to institute a sacrament, as the legacy of his love, in the presence of the chosen few who had stood by him in his temptations. He only wishes to give them some bread to be eaten in commemoration of his passion; but

though speaking on quite a different subject, he again unaccountably selects metaphorical expressions, which would recall those of the former discourse, and would lead them to understand, that now he *was* giving them that body to eat, and that blood to drink, which he had before promised. And to increase the risk of their being misled still more, the key to interpret these words properly was to be found in philosophical principles, to which all their observation, and the lessons he had given them, would forbid their recurrence. Here then we are to suppose a different topic, treated precisely in the same manner as the former.

St. Paul has occasion to speak of the comparison between the Christian altar and that of the heathens. We have now readers very different in point of ideas from the hearers of our Saviour's doctrine. If the phraseology, used on the two former occasions, must have been unintelligible to the Jews, it must have been doubly so to the Greeks. But there was no necessity for using it at all. An expression indicative of the symbolical character of the Eucharist, would have sufficiently placed it in contrast with the profane sacrifices of Paganism. But no such expression escapes the apostle's pen; he speaks of the blessed Sacrament as truly containing

a participation in the body and blood of Jesus Christ.

Again, he comes to draw practical moral conclusions from the words of Institution. This is a serious point; it consists in defining the consequences of an unworthy participation; there is no room for poetry or exaggeration. How does he write? Why, he characterizes the transgression in a twofold form, just as he would transgressions against the real body and blood of Christ, *if present*, but in words totally inapplicable to the Eucharist, if these be absent from it.

I ask, is it credible that different topics, or the same topic under the most dissimilar circumstances, should have been treated by different teachers, and recorded by different writers, in terms all tending necessarily to produce the appearance of one doctrine's being simply taught; without any of these teachers or historians, our Saviour, St. Paul, and the four Evangelists, once using the obvious literal exposition or statement of their doctrines, or letting slip the idea that only symbols, and not realities, were signified? Is it possible that they should have all preferred a strange, uncommon metaphor to simple literal phrases? and that, too, to convey quite different doctrines?

But take the Catholic interpretation, which applies these various passages to one and the same subject, and understands every phrase and word, not as a new and unheard-of trope, but as the simplest expression possible of one doctrine, and you establish an analogy throughout; you interpret on principle and in accordance with rule, you keep clear of numerous inconsistencies and anomalies, and you bring into perfect harmony a series of passages, through which a similarity of phraseology manifestly prevails.

This has always appeared to me one of the strongest views of the case between Catholics and Protestants; and must, I think, make a convincing impression upon every reflecting mind. The unity which the Catholic belief bestows on this variety of passages, and the fragmentary form which the other opinion gives to their interpretation, are strongly contrasted; and this contrast will be greatly heightened by the consideration of the objections brought against us. In my last lecture I examined those difficulties which are raised against the literal interpretation of the Eucharistic formulas, as I had before dealt with the objections raised against the Catholic explanation of the sixth chapter of St. John. But there still remains a certain number of objections drawn from Scripture against

the doctrine of the Real Presence, which it is right to examine before leaving our present field, and with which I at once proceed.

In the examination of the objections against those principal proofs of our doctrine, you could not fail to observe one leading difference between our arguments and the objections of our opponents; in other words, their arguments in favor of their interpretation. It consists in this, that we construct our argument in each case from all the parts of the discourse, considered in relation with the historical circumstances, the philology of the language used, the character of our Saviour, his customary method of teaching, and every other subsidiary means of arriving at a true meaning. They, on the contrary, fasten upon some little phrase, in some corner of the narrative, which seems to favor their idea, or hunt out some other passage of Scripture somewhat resembling the words under examination; and, overlooking all the mass of accumulative evidence which we possess, maintain that it must all give way before the hint which that favorite little text affords, or be interpreted by that imaginary parallelism. Thus, it is in vain that we urge the repeated injunctions of Christ to eat his flesh and drink his blood, and to receive him, and the manner in which he be-

haved to his disciples at Capernaum. All this is nothing, because he said at the end, and too late evidently to prevent the defection of his disciples, "the flesh profiteth nothing!" And yet these words, as has been fully shown, are nothing at all to the purpose of explanation. Again, nothing can be clearer than the words of institution considered with all their circumstances; every thing tells with us; but St. Paul, interpreting an allegory, said "the rock was Christ;" *therefore* Christ, when *not* interpreting an allegory, *must* be understood to mean "this represents my body."

The general objections to the Eucharist offend in the same manner; they are taken from scattered reflections; they consist in weighing a chance expression against the overpowering collection of evidence derived from so many different contexts. One or two instances, which appear the most generally in favor, will suffice to show this defect.

It is argued that in the Eucharist no change can be admitted, because our Saviour called the contents of the cup "the fruit of the vine,"* and St. Paul speaks of the other element as bread: "whosoever shall eat *this bread* unworthily."

* Luke xxii. 18; Matt. xxvi. 29

if they were not bread and wine, but the body and blood of Christ, how could they be called thus? Such is one of the arguments for the Protestant interpretation alleged by Mr. Faber,* and more at length by the Bishop of Lincoln.† I will not stay to deny the first portion of the assertion on which the argument is based; that the expression "fruit of the vine" was applied to the sacramental cup. It is, indeed, evident from St. Luke, that these words were spoken before the consecration, or the institution of the Eucharist. This appears from the very narrative. "With desire," says our blessed Lord, "I have desired to eat this pasch with you before I suffer. For I say to you, that from this time I will not eat it, till it be fulfilled in the kingdom of God. And having taken the cup, he gave thanks and said, 'Take and divide it among you; for I say to you, that I will not drink of *the fruit of the vine*, till the kingdom of God come.'" Then comes the institution of the Eucharist first as regards the bread, followed by the words, "In like manner the cup also, after he had supped," &c. Here it is clearly stated that the words, placed vaguely by St. Matthew at the conclusion of the rite, were in

* "Difficulties of Romanism," p. 60.

† "Elements of Theology," vol. ii. pp. 484-486.

reality spoken of the paschal banquet, before the institution. But I do not wish to insist further on this circumstance, otherwise than to note it as an inaccuracy in the statement of the argument; for the difficulty stands good, if only the expressions in St. Paul be admitted.

1. The first observation which I will make in reply to this form of argument, may be drawn from a mystery to which I have already more than once referred. The doctrine of the Trinity, like every other great dogma, is necessarily evolved from the consideration of a number of texts, which prove it, if I may so say, by parts. In one place, the Son is declared to be God; in another, he and the Father are pronounced equal; in a third, the Holy Ghost is associated with the two in attributes or in operations; and thus chiefly is this fundamental doctrine worked out. How is it opposed? By the Protestant process of discovering texts apparently in contradiction with the great conclusions thus drawn, and giving them individually a power of proof equivalent to their united force. Thus a Socinian will select the words, "The Father is greater than I,"* or the acknowledgment that "the day of judgment is unknown to the Son of Man;"† and

* Jo. xiv. 28.

† Matt. xiii 32.

maintaining that these texts are incompatible with equality between him and God the Father, and refusing to allow that they may be spoken with reference to the humanity alone, withstand the clear evidence of positive texts to the contrary. The orthodox divine replies, that, as contradictions cannot be allowed, and as one text must yield to the other, the one which will bear a consistent explanation must give way: and that, as equality with the Father is an idea that will bear no modification, but implies divinity, while inferiority is admissible by referring it to Christ's human nature, so both classes of texts are correct in his system, while one is inapplicable in the other. Similar are our respective positions in this controversy. We stand upon the complicated proofs which I just now summed up, drawn from passages spoken, on a variety of occasions, under different circumstances, but all manifestly converging into one simple doctrine. But St. Paul calls the Eucharist, not indeed simple bread, but emphatically "this bread;" therefore all this complication of proof is worth nothing! We then reply, as the Protestant does to the Socinian; is it fair to balance one word, so written, against the entire weight of our proofs? For, as in the case alleged, if we take your views, we must, for the

sake of one phrase easily brought into harmony, refuse to admit the clear and obvious meaning of many passages, which cannot be brought into agreement with your idea, without sacrificing all right principles of interpretation. But in our view, we preserve the simple signification of all these, and bring this into accord by the very process used in the other controversy; as Christ is said to be an inferior, or a man, from the outward form in which he subsisted, so is this called bread, from the appearances under which the body of the Lord is veiled.

2. We may further remark, that we Catholics call the sacred elements by the names of their appearances, after the consecration. In the canon of the mass, we call them "*panem sanctum vitæ æternæ, et calicem salutis perpetuæ:*" again, we say, "*panem cœlestem accipiam.*" Now, would any one seriously argue that we do not believe in the Real Presence, and in Transubstantiation, because we continue to speak of bread being still upon the altar after consecration? Certainly not: for it is natural to call by this name the sacred gift, both from its appearance, and from its properties. It can, therefore, be no more inferred, from similar phraseology in St. Paul, that he excluded our belief.

3. These reflections will be greatly strengthened by comparison with other passages of Holy Writ. In the ninth chapter of St. John, we have a detailed account of a miracle wrought by our Saviour, in the cure of a man born blind. Nothing can be more minute; we are told how our Lord healed him, how the Pharisees, annoyed, undertake a captious investigation of the case; they interrogate the man himself, his friends, and even his parents. No one doubts, after this, the truth of the miracle, the reality of the change wrought on the poor man's eyes. But suppose that a rationalist stepped in, and said, "Hold! all your reasoning from these clear expressions, and from this simple narrative, may be very plausible; but there is one little expression which destroys it all, and lets us into the true secret. For, in verse the seventeenth, after all these clear assertions, it is written, 'they say again to the *blind man*.' The man, then, was still blind; no change could have been wrought; for if it had, he could not be still called blind." I ask, would not such reasoning, if it deserve the name, be rejected with indignation? And yet it is precisely what is pursued against us. Again, in Genesis, after Aaron's rod on the one side, and those of the Egyptian magicians on the other, are said to

have been changed into serpents, it is added: "but Aaron's *rod* devoured their *rods*."* Therefore the infidel may again conclude that no change had taken place in the rods. Another example we have in Jo. ii., where the account of the marriage-feast at Cana is recited. We read, (v. 9,) "And when the chief steward had tasted the *water made wine*, and knew not whence it was; but the waiters knew, who had drawn *the water*."† Here it is called water, though transubstantiated into wine. From which examples we may fairly conclude, that it is usual in Scripture to continue to call substances, after they have been changed into others, by the name which they bore before the change occurred. No argument, then, against a change of substance in the Eucharist, can be brought from a corresponding change not being always found in phraseology concerning it.

I will only indulge you with one more objection, which exemplifies all that I have said of the imperfect and inaccurate reasoning pursued

* Gen. viii. 12.

† The verb here used, "to draw," evidently applies to the broaching of the vessels which contained the new-made wine. For the same word is used by our Saviour in the preceding verse, after the vessels had been filled. "*Draw out now, and carry to the chief steward.*" In both cases the same verb ἀντλῆω occurs.

by our opponents. Mr. Horne gives this rule: "An obscure, doubtful, ambiguous, or figurative text, must never be interpreted in such a sense as to make it contradict a plain one." The defect of this rule is, that in application, you have first to ascertain which is the figurative text, and which the plain one; in other words, wishing to apply it to our controversy, to make up your mind first, to an opinion on the point in dispute, whether it be a figurative or a literal text. No matter, however; only let us see the sagacity of this writer's application. "We may further conclude, that the sense put upon the words, 'this is my body,' by the Church of Rome, cannot be the true one, being contrary to the express declaration of the New Testament history; from which it is evident that our Lord is ascended into heaven, where he is to continue 'till the time of the restitution of all things,' (Acts iii. 21,) that is, till his second coming to judgment."*

Now, for this argument to have any force, it would be necessary that the Catholic doctrine should deny Christ's being in heaven till the restitution of all things, which we believe as much as Protestants. The question resolves

* Vol. ii. p. 414, 7th ed

itself into this : whether Christ's being in heaven is incompatible with his being on earth too ; in other words, into the philosophical question, whether a body constituted like his, so as to pass through closed doors, can be in more places than one at a time. St. Paul assures us that he had seen Christ after his ascension,* which again is incompatible with the interpretation put upon these words. But this is an instance of an objection raised upon a passage that has no connection with the subject, but is made to counterbalance strong and explicit declarations with which it is not in the least at variance.

If I wished to convince any one of the extreme difficulties under which Protestants labor, who endeavor to *construct* a figurative reasoning for the Eucharistic formulas, I would refer him to Eichhorn's attempt at an explanation of them, grounded upon hermeneutical principles. He begins, by supposing that all the sacred historians drew their narrative from the Hebrew *prot-evangelium*, or primitive gospel, as it is called. He then surmises, that into St. Luke's and St. Paul's accounts glosses have crept, and that the former did not understand the original well ! Having thus stated his problem, he proceeds to

* 1 Cor. xv. 8.

make substitutions of what he considers equivalent quantities, as ingeniously as an Algebraist could do: till we have the following equation.

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{Τουτο εστι το σωμα} \\ \text{μου,} \\ \text{“This is my body,”} \end{array} \right\} \text{equal to} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Τουτο εστιν ο αρτος του σω-} \\ \text{ματος μου.} \\ \text{“This is the bread of my} \\ \text{body.”} \end{array} \right.$$

And this again is equal to—

Τουτο εστιν ο αρτος της διαθηκης δια του εμου θανατος εγκαινισθεσομενης.

“This is the bread of the covenant, to be renewed through my death.”* So that by the word “body” the apostles were to understand the idea of “bread of a covenant to be renewed by death!” No wonder that the author himself exclaims in conclusion, “How enigmatical! truly enigmatical and obscure.”†

But this one example may suffice. In concluding these lectures on the Scriptural proofs of the Real Presence, I will simply say, that throughout them, I have spoken of this doctrine as synonymous with Transubstantiation. For, as by the Real Presence, I have understood a corporal presence, to the exclusion of all other substances, it is evident that the one is, in truth, equivalent to the other. On this account, I have

* “Ueber die Einsetzung-Worte des heiligen Abendmahls,” in his “Allgemeine Bibliothek,” vol. vi. pp. 759–772.

† Page 776.

contended for the literal meaning of our Saviour's words: leaving it as a matter of inference, that the Eucharist, after consecration, *is* the body and blood of Christ. The arguments which you have heard will receive their full development from the overwhelming force of tradition, which yet remains to be unfolded before you.

THE END.





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The real presence	.A3
TITLE	vol.11

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